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August 2012

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in this issue . . .

 

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By Lt. Josh Kyle

My chief was livid and put the training section on notice. Over the last couple of years training injuries at the Riley County Police Department had been on the rise and recently a sergeant had reported an injury to his knee after a defensive tactics (DT) class. The message was clear – if the sergeant’s knee was seriously injured then draconian actions were going to be taken; including the possibility of terminating the entire defensive tactics program. Later that morning the chief stopped me again and gave me the bad news. The sergeant’s knee was indeed seriously injured and it was the direct result of DT training. The training section had until mid-afternoon to prepare for a meeting where all options would be on the table.
For some time now I suspected that takedown moves were getting officers (and possibly) suspects injured both in training and in the field. In fact several months earlier I myself had received a serious concussion during scenario training after a takedown move was applied while I was pretending to be a suspect. At the time of my injury the culprit was thought to be a lack of proper safety equipment. I ordered the equipment, made certain it was used during training and moved on – lesson learned. However, those of us in training could no longer ignore that training injuries were persisting and they were costing us money, lost time and serious injuries to our employees.

Going into a high-stakes meeting without information was a recipe for disaster. I could not walk into this meeting with excuses and guesswork. I had to take an honest look at our DT program. I had to get the hard facts.

Step 1: Internal Injury reports.
My first stop was the Human Resources (HR) section where I received a report of all employee injuries over the last eighteen months. I combed through the data and recorded those injuries associated with physical force for both training and in the field (Figure 1). The information did not look good; it told me that almost as many officers were injured in DT training as were injured in the field. Also to my surprise a significant number of officers reported injuries while chasing suspects on foot. This data confirmed similar information found in a case study by the FBI, which among other things stated that foot pursuits were a high-risk endeavor for police officers (Violent Encounters, 2006).

Injuries come in different shape and sizes. We also needed to determine the seriousness of the injuries incurred. In Figure 2 red is bad. Red means the employee had to receive medical treatment for their injuries. I couldn’t ignore the fact that training injuries were significantly more severe than injuries in the field. Conclusion: Not only were our employees being injured in training; the training injuries were more serious. On a side note, I also found that though a relatively high number of injuries were associated with foot pursuits; almost all of these injuries did not require treatment.
The training section had previously conducted internal (more on that later) and external research to determine the types of resistance commonly faced by officers (In the Line of Fire: Violence Against Law Enforcement, 1997). The research showed that suspect resistance is highly stable. Suspects seem to consistently choose five forms of resistance against officers (Killed in the Line of Duty, 1992). They are:


• The suspect is standing and refuses to put his arms behind his back or otherwise resists the officer by pulling away or running.
• The suspect is face down on the ground with arms tucked under his torso and refusing to surrender them for handcuffing.
• The suspect is outright assaulting the officer.
• The suspect is in handcuffs and refusing to move or otherwise resisting the officer.
• The suspect is attempting to take the officer’s weapon.

The astute reader will recognize that there are many other forms of suspect resistance, but my research showed that these five forms of resistance were the most common and stable across time. The training staff therefore deliberately chose to focus DT training around these five areas. In fact we call them “The Big Five”. So for the purposes of injury analysis I wanted an answer to the million dollar question, “What form of resistance were the officers working on when they got injured?” Figure 3 revealed that of the 10 officers injured in DT training, 6 of them were injured while dealing with “suspect standing” resistance. This form of resistance is countered by RCPD officers through takedown moves. My suspicions were confirmed; takedown moves accounted for the majority of injures during the period under review. I now wanted to look at injuries in the field for both suspects and officers. Fortunately I had been compiling internal use of force data for some time and was able to quickly determine that suspects were most commonly injured during the act of being taken to the ground. I attempted to compile officer injury data but the number of officer injuries reported in the use of force reports did not correlate with injuries reported to HR. I was further frustrated because unlike the DT injury reports, the injury reports from force in the field lacked detail. Often the officer simply reported “injured while making arrest”. I did glean one fact from the injuries listed in the use of force reports; the majority of officers were injured while using non-department trained techniques. This was a hint that officers in the field were not using the DT training. A fact that became more apparent as I turned my focus of research to our internal use of force reports.

Step 2: Use of Force Report Analysis


With the chief wanting a meeting in a few hours I did not have the time to go through hundreds of force applications to determine effectiveness. Fortunately this work had already been completed on an annual basis and I was familiar with the data. The first thing I noticed is that although the number of use of force reports we filed each year was relatively stable, our applications of force were dropping steadily since 2009. This coincided with our adoption of Tasers. Our Taser program was slowly evolving with about a fourth of our officers equipped with them. However, assuming that Tasers were reducing force applications was guesswork so I needed to dive deeper into the data.


My first objective was to look at the frequency of techniques used in the field. Figure 5 is a redacted version of the data. However it clearly shows that the top two techniques used by RCPD officers to counter resistance were Strength and Tackling-Grounding. It should be noted that these two techniques accounted for the overwhelming majority of techniques used, they were used to counter “standing resistance” and both of these techniques are not trained by the RCPD. In other words, under stress our officers were not relying on training, but falling back to instincts or prior experiences such as sports (e.g. football or wrestling). The techniques designed to counter standing resistance such as the Straight Armbar Takedown are found much further down on the list indicating that they were not used by the officers frequently. I also noticed that the Taser and Pepperspray (OC) were the most frequently used Department trained techniques. It appeared that officers were relying heavily on intermediate weapons rather than going hands on. However an equally important issue is whether or not these techniques were effective. Figure 6 revealed to me that officers were not very effective when they used physical strength. However, they were quite successful at getting suspects on the ground without using trained techniques. I also noted that Department trained techniques designed to get a suspect on the ground had a dubious track record. Additionally when officers fired Taser probes, they were effective only 2/3rds of the time, but there was a significant deterrence factor with Tasers because suspects often surrendered when confronted with a Taser. The poster child for use of force options appeared to be OC spray. OC was used frequently by officers and maintained a reasonable effectiveness rate. When I compared this information to that of past years I discovered that OC’s effectiveness was remarkably stable across the years. My takeaway from all this information was that officers and suspects (including role-players) were being hurt in training and in the field while forcibly going to the ground.

 Furthermore, officers were not using Department trained hands on techniques and when they did the techniques were not successful. Instead officers were relying heavily on improvised techniques or brute force and Intermediate weapons. The brute force had to change, but the success rate of tackling-grounding could not be ignored. In short, officers were good at getting suspects on the ground without any help from the training staff. The only problem then with improvised grounding techniques was the risk of injury they posed. I was able to glean quite a bit of information from our internal sources. However this information only represented one police department and much of the data involved only a few events which prevented it from standing up to intense analysis. I now needed to point my research outside the Department.

Step 3: External force analysis.

Fortunately for the training staff two reports had just been published by the National Institute of Justice. The first report focused on the safety of Electronic Control Devices (NIJ Special Report: Study of Deaths Following Electro Muscular Disruption, 2011). The NIJ put together a panel of experts who reviewed the medical research into Electronic Control Devices (ECDs) and conclusively determined that there was no significant medical evidence to indicate that the use of ECDs result in cardiac death and that this conclusion held true when looking at actual application data in the field. NIJ’s second report was even more of a goldmine (NIJ Research in Brief: Police Use of Force, Tasers and Other Less-Lethal Weapons, 2011). In the largest use of force study to date, the use of force reports from twelve metropolitan agencies were examined. This netted between 24-25,000 use of force reports. The conclusion? ECDs and OC are safe and effective; far safer than physical control. When compared side by side OC was slightly safer for suspects, but not by much. However, OC was not nearly as safe for officers when compared to ECDs. Put together the NIJ reports gave us the confidence we needed to report to the chief that our Taser program should be expanded.

Meeting with the chief:


Our research resulted in a three pronged argument.
1. Our officers are getting injured in training and in the field when taking suspects to the ground after facing standing resistance. Suspects are also getting injured.
2. Officers are not using Department trained techniques to ground suspects. When trained techniques are used they have a dubious effectiveness rate. Officers are very effective at getting suspects on the ground without official training.
3. We now have authoritative evidence that Tasers are safe and effective for all parties, safer than any other means of control with OC being a close second.

We finished our presentation by recommending that our Taser program expand to include all officers and that all officers be trained to use their Tasers or OC to ground suspects. The chief concurred.

The Devil is in the Details


Our DT program had survived and our Taser program greatly expanded through the use of evidence based arguments. But I was still unclear precisely what to teach our officers. After speaking with force experts from other agencies who warned against Taser over use and dependence (Taser: An officer's weapon of choice, 2011), I concluded that our force sequence should look something like this:

A. The officer advises the suspect that he is under arrest and attempts to verbally de-escalate the situation.
B. If unsuccessful the officer will move in and attempt a department trained control technique which does not involve grounding the suspect. Note: this step is skipped if the officer reasonably perceives that physical control will likely fail (e.g. aggressive suspect, size disparity or suspect has a past history of violence).
C. If the control technique is unsuccessful the officer will disengage while getting out their Taser or OC and order the suspect to the ground.
D. If the suspect refuses to get on the ground the officer will then deploy their Taser (or OC if a Taser is unavailable).

The point is that we were no longer teaching our officers to physically fight with suspects, but instead to disengage and use intermediate weapons. We recognize that the above model is simplistic and will not cover all situations, but it serves as a lower risk option for both officers and suspects when engaged in standing resistance and this model can be supported with extensive evidence. As an agency we fully recognized that our Taser usage would likely increase dramatically and we owed it to our governing board and the public to inform them of this change. A presentation was made at a public meeting of our governing board, this presentation then resulted in follow up press coverage (Police urged to increase pepper spray, Taser use, 2011) and intense interest from other law enforcement agencies.

Ok so far


Officers have been trained under this new philosophy since August of 2011 with no serious repercussions. $73,000 worth of Tasers and related equipment were ordered to equip all sworn and correctional personnel. 16 hour Taser operator certification courses are being rescheduled regularly. We anticipate that it will take about one year to train all officers. I believe all of this was made possible because of an emergency meeting with a chief that went well as a result of an ongoing commitment to evidence based training practices. I encourage other agencies dealing with similar force related issues to begin closely analyzing their force applications in the field along with internal injury data. Without regular evaluation it is all too easy for force-related training programs to drift into ineffective, high-risk, field irrelevant techniques.

Bibliography
60 Minutes. (2011, November 13). Taser: An officer's weapon of choice. Retrieved February 11, 2012, from CBSNews.com: http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7388128n
Alpert, G. P., Smith, M. R., Kaminski, R. J., Fridell, L. A., MacDonald, J., & Kubu, B. (2011, May). NIJ Research in Brief: Police Use of Force, Tasers and Other Less-Lethal Weapons. Retrieved February 11, 2012, from National Criminal Justice Refence Service: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/232215.pdf
National Institute of Justice United States. (2011, May). NIJ Special Report: Study of Deaths Following Electro Muscular Disruption. Retrieved February 11, 2012, from National Criminal Justice Reference Service: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/233432.pdf
Pinizzotto, A. J., Davis, E. F., & Miller III, C. E. (1997). In the Line of Fire: Violence Against Law Enforcement. United States Department of Justice.
Pinizzotto, A. J., Davis, E. F., & Miller III, C. E. (2006). Violent Encounters. U.S. Department of Justice.
The Associated Press. (2011, September 23). Police urged to increase pepper spray, Taser use. Retrieved February 11, 2012, from The Topeka Captitol-Journal cjonline.com: http://cjonline.com/news/state/2011-09-23/police-urged-increase-pepper-spray-taser-use
Uniform Crime Reports Section - FBI. (1992). Killed in the Line of Duty. U.S. Department of Justice.

About the author
Lt. Josh Kyle was the Riley County Police Department’s full time training officer from 2007 thru 2011. He is currently the department’s Public Information Officer and continues to teach police related courses across Kansas and North America. He can be reached at jkyle@rileycountypolice.org.

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The Cooper Institute

DALLAS – Cancer is the second leading cause of death among U.S. men. While tobacco use and poor diet remain the largest contributors to cancer mortality, there is growing evidence that obesity and low levels of cardiorespiratory fitness may contribute to cancer mortality as well. A new study from The Cooper Institute published January 15, 2008, in Obesity, reports on the relation between cardiorespiratory fitness levels, different measures of body fatness and cancer mortality in men.

Lead researcher and Director of Professional Education Stephen Farrell, Ph.D., studied 38,410 men who completed a comprehensive baseline physical examination at Cooper Clinic in Dallas. “This study shows that sedentary individuals of all body fatness levels should strive to become at least moderately fit in order to decrease their risk of cancer mortality,” said Farrell.

Results showed a strong and direct relationship between all measures of body fatness and cancer mortality. Leaner men had significantly lower rates of cancer mortality than fatter men, regardless of the method used to assess body fatness. A strong inverse relationship between cardiorespiratory fitness level and cancer mortality was also observed, showing lower fit men had significantly greater rates of cancer mortality than higher fit men.

The examination included a maximal treadmill exercise test, which provides an objective measure of cardiorespiratory fitness level. A unique feature of the study was that different measures of body fatness including body mass index (BMI), percent body fat, and waist circumference were also performed. The men were followed for an average period of 17.2 years, during which 1,037 cancer deaths occurred.

Another unique feature of the study was an examination of the cancer mortality rates between fit and unfit men within various categories of the different measures of adiposity or fat levels. Using the three official categories for BMI (normal weight, overweight, obese), fit men in each category had significantly lower death rates from cancer than unfit men. Using the two official categories for waist circumference (obese and non-obese), fit men in each category had significantly lower death rates from cancer than unfit men. Similarly, using two categories for percent body fat (obese and non-obese), fit men in each category also had significantly lower death rates from cancer than unfit men.

Farrell added, “These data suggest that attaining a moderate to high level of cardiorespiratory fitness may decrease some of the cancer mortality risks associated with increased adiposity.”

About The Cooper Institute
Founded in 1970 but Kenneth Cooper, M.D., M.P.H., The Cooper Institute is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit research and education facility dedicated to preventive medicine research and education. The Institute’s research is often sited and has affected public health policy. The Cooper Institute is also committed to educating and certifying health and fitness professionals by offering over 20 courses in Dallas or At Your Site and numerous fitness tools including books and DVDs. The Cooper Institute Personal Trainer Certification Exam (CI-CPT) is accredited by the National Commission for Certifying Agencies (NCCA).

 

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By  John Reid & Associates

If the agents involved in the recent Colombia incident are interrogated, should the investigators tell them they have evidence that they don't really have? It depends on a number of considerations.

Earlier this year a case was reported in which a detective doctored a crime lab report to use as a prop during an interrogation. While the suspect did not confess, the detective's tactics spurred legal questions regarding the use of deception during an interrogation. The legal twist was that even though the report used as an interrogation prop was manufactured by the investigator, it was based on factual verbal information provided by the crime lab. In other words, the manufactured evidence contained truthful information that incriminated the suspect but the report was not a bona fide report from the crime lab.

Legal Considerations

The legal test for deceptive practices during an interrogation has remain unchanged for more than 40 years. The use of deception during an interrogation must be considered within the totality of circumstances when deciding the admissibility of a confession.2 Deception that shocks the conscience of the court or community will generally result in a suppressed confession. An example of deception that "shocks the conscience" is lying to the suspect about the possible consequences he faces, e.g., telling a homicide suspect that the legislature just dropped first degree murder to a misdemeanor. Similarly, an investigator who elicits a confession after falsely telling the suspect that he is his court appointed public defender has "shocked the conscience".

A second legal guideline regulating deceptive practices, stemming from a 1989 case, makes a distinction between manufacturing evidence against the suspect (which is not permissible) and false verbal assertions (which generally are permissible). 3 In that case the investigator manufactured a fictitious crime lab report indicating that the suspect's DNA was found during an autopsy of the victim. After reading the "crime lab report" the suspect confessed. The suspect's confession was later suppressed at trial. If the investigator had falsely told the suspect that his DNA was found during the victim's autopsy this would have been permissible - but the investigator went too far by manufacturing the lab report. Other than these exceptions, there are many decisions upholding the use of verbal deception during an interrogation.

There is no per se legal restriction against the use of "props" during an interrogation. However, the prop must truly be a mere visual aid such as a blank DVD where the suspect is falsely told that it is the surveillance video showing the suspect removing property from a building. To determine whether a prop crosses the line of being improper, ask the following question: "Could an analysis of the purported evidence incriminate the suspect?" If the answer is "yes" the prop should not be used. In the DVD example, even if the DVD was labeled "Surveillance Video, May 12, 2012" anyone who played the DVD would realize that there was absolutely nothing on it that would incriminate the suspect.

Procedural Considerations

Most investigators have experienced some success with deceptive practices during an interrogation. For example, the investigator may produce a file containing a number of blank pages. As the investigator thumbs through the pages in the file he states, "This is a report from an eye-witness who saw you outside the building that night; this is a report indicating your fingerprints were found inside the building; this report shows that you made a large cash purchase two days after you went into that apartment building." A guilty person who believes that the investigator, in fact, has all of this incriminating evidence is more likely to tell the truth.

On the other hand, consider the investigator who falsely tells a suspect, "We found your fingerprint inside that house." Unbeknownst to the investigator, the suspect wore gloves during the burglary that he committed. Obviously, under this circumstance the deceptive tactic completely backfires. The investigator will lose credibility, the suspect will become more confident in his ability to lie and the interrogation will deteriorate very quickly.

Suffice it to say, lying to a suspect about having incriminating evidence is a risky interrogation tactic. To reduce this risk the investigator who anticipates the possibility of mentioning fictitious evidence during the interrogation may first test the fictitious evidence during the interview by asking a bait question.

Consider the investigator who is contemplating making a false statement during the interrogation concerning an eye-witness who saw the suspect at the scene of the crime. During the interview the investigator may ask the following bait question, "Is there any reason a witness, who was walking their dog down Washington street that night, would tell us that they saw you leave the apartment complex around 7:00?"

If the suspect offers an emphatic denial to this bait question it would be an indication to the investigator that he should not mention a fictitious eye-witness during the interrogation. On the other hand, if the suspect offered a hesitant or qualified response to this bait question, the investigator should have confidence in mentioning an eye-witness during the interrogation. The following are other procedural considerations relating to deceptive statements during an interrogation:

  1. Consider deception as a last resort effort to overcome stubborn, weak denials typically offered by a guilty suspect.
  2. Do not lie to a suspect who claims not to remember his actions at the time of the crime. There are reported cases of internalized false confessions where innocent suspects claim that they were convinced by the investigator that they must have committed the crime, even though the suspect had no initial recollection of committing the crime. Obviously, the use of deception by the investigator could increase the likelihood of this occurrence.
  3. Do not use false evidence to threaten inevitable consequences. A number of previous web tips have addressed the dangers of convincing an innocent suspect that he or she will suffer negative consequences regardless of whether the suspect acknowledges guilt. When this tactic is reinforced with false claims that the investigator has evidence implicating the suspect in the crime, a false confession is a real possibility.
Miscellaneous Considerations

Some private companies have established internal policies that prohibit corporate investigators from making false statements during an interview or interrogation of an employee. The basis for this policy is generally based on corporate ethical considerations as opposed to legal requirements. Especially when a corporate investigation centers around administrative acts of wrong-doing, the use of deceptive practices may fall outside of the realm of acceptable standards of practice and open the employer to possible civil liability.

Police officers who work in small communities often arrest and re-arrest the same suspects, or relatives of that suspect on a regular basis. In a tight-knit community the officer's reputation will often dictate his success in developing informants and eliciting confessions from suspects. If the officer establishes a reputation of being a straight shooter and honest he is likely to be successful. On the other hand, if the officer has a reputation of lying to suspects and not being trustworthy, his ability to solve cases through gathering street information or by interrogating suspects is greatly hindered. Under this circumstance, the investigator will be more successful by establishing a reputation of being truthful.

The same advise applies to the corporate investigator who will quickly establish a reputation of either being credible or someone not to trust. It must be remembered that both innocent and guilty suspects will not cooperate with an investigator they do not trust; the one case that might be solved by making deceptive statements during an interrogation could result in the failure to resolve many future cases.

Finally, investigators who electronically record interrogations should consider their ability to explain their use of deception practices to a jury. The defense, of course, will argue that the recorded deception somehow renders the defendant's confession as untrustworthy. A competent prosecutor should be able to address this issue by educating the jury with respect to the law and emphasizing that the confession is corroborated with information only the guilty person could have provided.

Conclusion

Deceptive practices are prevalent within society and largely considered an acceptable part of doing business or preserving social relationships. When a store asks a customer to register for a free birthday gift they don't want to send the customer a gift - they want to find out how old the customer is so they can market products appropriate to someone that age. We have all been served a meal that was less than appetizing and yet, deceptively, we would finish our portion, compliment the chef and leave a generous tip. These examples involve everyday practices of law abiding citizens. What about when dealing with criminal suspects? Certainly courts and society recognize that investigators often need to resort to deceptive practices in an effort to learn the truth from a criminal suspect. Indeed, the law extends great latitude within the area of making false statements to a criminal suspect.

However, as addressed in this article, just because lying to a suspect is accepted by the courts and will generally not cause an innocent person to confess, there are other considerations that may cause an investigator to avoid making false statements to a suspect. These involve circumstances where the investigator's deceptive conduct may negatively affect the investigator's (or employer's) ability to solve the crimes, as well as affect their reputation.

1 Reported in "Austin Police Use of Doctored DNA Report in Interrogation Raises Legal Questions," Statesman.com, Jan. 30, 2012
2Frazier v. Cupp 394 U.S. 731 (1969)
3 Cayward v. Fl 552 So 2nd 971 (1989)
Credit and Permission Statement: This Investigator Tip was developed by John E. Reid and Associates Inc. Permission is hereby granted to those who wish to share or copy the article. For additional 'tips' visit
www.reid.com; select 'Educational Information' and 'Investigator Tip'. Inquiries regarding Investigator Tips should be directed to Janet Finnerty johnreid@htc.net. For more information regarding Reid seminars and training products, contact John E. Reid and Associates, Inc. at 800-255-5747 or www.reid.com.

 

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Val Van Brocklin

The bad news.

Not too long ago I was asked to do a training titled Leading During Difficult Times.  I asked my contact person what she thought the top 3 challenges or concerns of those attending were.  I heard what I’d been hearing across the nation:

·         Budget cuts

·         Hiring freezes

·         Forced furloughs

·         All resulting in chronic staffing problems which result in a whole other list of problems

I murmured commiseration and summarized, “You mean – doing more with less.”

She replied, “Haven’t you heard? It’s now ‘Doing everything with nothing?’”

 Clearly I was behind the challenge curve of the times, which might best be summed up with a 2010 news article describing Arizona police officers laying one of their own to rest.

"Lincoln two, Lincoln two. Last call for Lieutenant Shuhandler, last call for Lieutenant Shuhandler. Rest in peace, sir. We've got it from here."
Read more:
http://www.azcentral.com/community/gilbert/articles/2010/02/03/20100203gr-slain-officer-funeral-gilbert-ON-02.html#ixzz1eonqRl4M

As they remembered Eric Shuhandler in Gilbert, Arizona, officers from nearby Phoenix faced furloughs and layoffs. http://www.azcentral.com/members/Blog/EJMontini/72939/sort_A/Offset20 Outsiders might wonder what kind of person puts his life on the line when he knows he might get laid off the next week. You, dear readers, know what kind. You need only look in the mirror.

Still, law enforcement leaders may be wondering how to lead and inspire officers and staff during these particularly tough times. Times that – beyond the accepted dangers of the work -- are demanding people do everything with nothing. In some cash-strapped cities employees are assuming dual jobs – like the Buckeye, Arizona fire fighters who are also managing a municipal cemetery.  http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/local/articles/2011/11/26/20111126phoenix-area-city-employees-take-dual-roles.html

The good news.

Where’s the good news in people being asked to do everything with nothing? Clearly, it calls for heroic efforts. The good news is that money isn’t what inspires people to accomplish the heroic.

We’ve known this for over 50 years. Frederick Herzberg is regarded as one of the great original thinkers in management and motivational theory. His 1968 publication "One More Time, How Do You Motivate Employees?" was the most requested article from the Harvard Business Review.

In his seminal book The Motivation to Work, Herzberg’s research determined that once people feel they are fairly compensated, the promise of more money doesn’t inspire them to extraordinary effort 

The Harvard Business Review is telling America’s business leaders,

 

“People do work for money … but they work even more for meaning in their lives.”

http://maaw.info/ArticleSummaries/ArtSumPfeffer98.htm

In Beyond Manipulating and Motivating to Leading and Inspiring, http://www.imclemmer.com/beyond-manipulating-and-motivating-to-leading-and-inspiring.php, Jim Clemmer continues with Herzberg’s work and concludes that what people want from their jobs are to:

·         Take pride in their work

·         Be part of a winning team

·         Work for an organization they believe in

These are all motivational factors that leadership can and should provide. It takes no budget line item.

It’s people who perform the mission.

At a minimum, leaders must accomplish the mission. It’s people – officers and staff – who perform the mission. During these particularly trying times, leaders must take extra special care of their people.

There is no more meaningful work than protecting and serving the people in our communities. Law enforcement leaders can remind officers and staff of this and thank them for having chosen such a noble profession.

While leaders may not be able to get more money, they can solicit thanks from the community -- personal, heartfelt, genuine thanks -- from civic groups, public schools, community organizations and businesses. From rubber wristbands that say “Thank You Blue. 24-7-365” http://www.thankyoublue.org/ to simple thank you cards, an email, a Facebook posting or phone call – police leaders need to rally the community to express their appreciation for officers and department staff.

This may be difficult for leaders who are used to doing thankless work and not accustomed to drawing attention to themselves. Do it for your people – it’s about them, not you. In his article Mastering the ABCs of Organizations, John Throop cites a study of Gen X workers that determined their top work motivator was full appreciation for work done. http://www.jimclemmer.com/beyond-manipulating-and-motivating-to-leading-and-inspiring.ph 

Make the bosses prioritize.

Doing everything doesn’t mean there aren’t priorities. Where ever you are in the chain of command, make your boss prioritize.

If you’re the Chief, make the Mayor or City Council prioritize. If you’re a patrol sergeant, make the Lieutenant prioritize. If you’re the patrol officer, make your Sergeant prioritize.

First, do your homework. Know what work is extraneous, how many goals are too many and what you think needs to be focused on. http://www.futurevisions.org/crr_red_workload.htm

Explain the projects or work you have, along with time estimates for each – be realistic. Then ask your boss to prioritize what she wants done. The boss may not have a good grasp of the demands on your time but feel she can’t admit that. http://www.michaelpage.com/content/40-how-to-handle-your-manager.html  Describing your job requirements, asking your boss about her priorities and enlisting her to help you prioritize her demands will at least have you sharing expectations.

Agree that all your boss’ priorities are important but make her rank order them. Agree that you can’t do them all at once and that you will focus on the first 3 to 5 (be realistic). Set a time to re-visit her priorities, discuss progress, and re-evaluate focus.  

Acknowledge what it will take.

Don’t try and candy coat the circumstances. This is not the time to tell your officers and staff to look on the bright side or try and find a silver lining. Tell them you know they are being asked to do everything with nothing, acknowledge that it will take heroic efforts on their part, and then tell them how grateful you are to work with heroes.

Your job as a law enforcement leader is to give them the vision of a winning team that is facing especially difficult times together. Don’t try and minimize the challenge – make it heroic. People fight with you when they care about the battle. Asking people for small things makes them feel small. George Orwell said it well,

“The high sentiments always win in the end, the leaders who offer blood, toil, tears, and sweat always get more out of their followers than those who offer safety and a good time. When it comes to the pinch, human beings are heroic.”

Make it personal.

In his book Muddy Boots Leadership, Maj. John Chapman, USA (Ret.) writes,

"Five minutes checking on the guards in a freezing rain at midnight is worth a year of payday speeches. 

As a leader, your personal care and appreciation can have a tremendous impact. According to Chapman,

“The worse the weather, the later the hour, the darker the night, the more important it is to get out to see and be seen.”

Be forewarned, if you are going to expect heroic efforts on the part of your officers and staff, you better be prepared to lead by personal example. This, too, from Muddy Boots Leadership 

"It was late Friday night. The platoon had been breaking down tank track and replacing track shoes for hours. The soldiers were beyond exhaustion. They were beyond intimidation. They quit working and sat down, waiting for the inevitable ass-chewing.

The platoon sergeant had worked just as hard and long as they had. He was every bit as tired, and many years older. He approached the sullen group and said... nothing.

He walked past them as if they were invisible. He slowly bent down, picked up the tools and began to break down track alone.
For several minutes the soldiers watched him sweat and grunt. Slowly, one by one, they each stood up and resumed work. Not a word was said, not then, not ever."

Difficult times calls for leaders who can inspire people to achieve what they themselves didn’t believe they were capable of. As Chapman notes,

“Effective leadership is motivating people to give 10% more effort than they believe they have, to achieve goals they think they can’t.”

Of course when your people give that extra effort, and achieve what they didn’t know themselves capable of, be sure you personally recognize and appreciate their accomplishments. Celebrate them as a winning team. Watch their confidence to face new challenges grow.

Described by Calibre Press as "the indisputable master of enter-train-ment, Val Van Brocklin is an international law enforcement speaker, trainer and author. She combines her dynamic presentation style with years of experience as a state and federal prosecutor, where her trial work received national media attention on ABC's Primetime Live, the Discovery Channel's Justice Files, in USA Today, The National Enquirer and Redbook. In addition to her personal appearances, Val appears on television, radio, and the internet. She’s a regular contributor to www.officer.com and www.lawofficer.com and has been published in Police Chief, The RCMP’s Gazette, Integrity Talk, and other magazines and books. When she's not working, Val can be found flying her airplane with a shotgun, a fly rod, her retriever and high aspirations.  Feel free to visit her web site at www.valvanbrocklin.com.

 
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