By Valerie Van Brocklin
www.valvanbrocklin.com
Up until now …
This is the fourth in a
series of articles examining the legal and ethical parameters
and
societal implications of police deception in criminal
investigations. Web links are listed below for the first 3 articles.
This series provoked lively reader comments when
it first appeared on www.officer.com. The comments ranged from
forceful attacks on any use of police deception – including
undercover operations – to vigorous defenses of court-sanctioned
uses of strategic deception, along with public policy arguments for
these positions.
This article in the series
looks at some more court decisions on what deceptions are
legally
permissible. My primary intent is to provide this case law as
guidance for police officers. However, I encourage readers to
continue to all readers to think about what the courts are deciding.
Art, morality, obscenity and the courts.
G.K. Chesterton, a 19th-century
English essayist and poet said,
“Art, like morality, consists of drawing the
line somewhere.”
Similarly, Supreme Court Justice Stewart wrote in the obscenity and
free speech case of
Jacobellis v. Ohio
[web link below] that "hard-core
pornography"
was hard to define, but that "I
know it when I see it."
His Honor may be able to draw the line
between what’s obscene and what isn’t but apparently different
people see things differently – including judges
The state court deemed the
film at issue in
Jacobellis
obscene.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed
that ruling, holding that the film was not obscene and so was
constitutionally protected. However, the Court could not agree as to
a rationale, yielding four different opinions from the majority,
with none garnering the support of more than two justices, as well
as two dissenting opinions.
Police officers need and want to know where the
line is on the legally sanctioned use of deception in criminal
investigations. Unfortunately, it’s not only blurry, it’s moving,
which cops know makes for a difficult target
Bold lines.
Courts do not sanction police lying about their
authority to search or seize, for example, telling a suspect that if
they don’t consent to a search the officer will just go get a
warrant when the officer does not have probable cause.
Nor may police lie about investigating a
non-existent burglary in order to gain consent to enter and search a
home.
The first deception undermines the Fourth
Amendment’s probable cause requirement. The second could undermine
the voluntary, knowing and intelligent requirements for valid
consent.
A general limitation in undercover work and
interrogations is that the police deception may not be of such a
nature that it would coerce an innocent person to commit a crime
(undercover work) or falsely confess (interrogations).
In
Training Cops to Lie – Pt 1, we saw
that most courts agree they'll decide whether the deception is
unconstitutionally coercive based on a "totality of the
circumstances."
The U.S. Supreme Court set
out the totality of the circumstances criteria in
Frazier v.
Cupp, 394 U.S.
731 (1969). During interrogation, the officer told Frazier, falsely,
that his cousin had confessed and implicated Frazier in the crime.
The Supreme Court held the deception did not coerce the defendant so
as to render his confession involuntary
Totality of the circumstances can include:
·
Police conduct -
what
officers say and do and how
they say and do it, e.g., the length of the interrogation and
whether police offer refreshment or breaks.
·
The environment
- e.g., are police questioning the suspect in a 6' X 8' windowless
room where they stand between him and the only exit?
·
The suspect's
age and mental status.
·
Etc. -
anything else that bears on the
coercive nature, or not, of the interrogation.
How courts apply these lines, however, is not
only contradictory but blurry.
Falling between the lines.
In
Training Cops to Lie – PT 1, we saw
how 14 trial, state and federal appellate judges disagreed 7 to 7 in
the case of Miller v. Fenton,
796 F.2d 598 (3rd Cir. 1986), on whether factually undisputed
deception was legal.
Let’s look at some other court decisions.
In In
re D.A.S., 391 A.2d 255, (D.C. App. 1978), the police
pretended to compare the defendant’s fingerprints to a fingerprint
on the victim’s checkbook and pronounced them a match. In truth, no
fingerprints were recovered. The defendant confessed to the robbery
and the Court held that the deception did not render the confession
involuntary.
In re D.A.S.
came on the heels of Oregon
v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) in which the Supreme Court
upheld police falsely telling the defendant they had found his
fingerprints at the scene.
See also,
Michigan
v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (confessing suspect had been told
that another person had named him as the gunman.)
In Illinois
v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990), the Court held 8 to 1 that
Perkins was not coerced when he confessed to committing a murder to
an undercover police officer who was falsely posing as another
inmate.
In State
v. Cayward, 552 So. 2d 971 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. 1989), police
interviewed a 19-year-old suspect in the rape and murder of his
5-year-old niece. Prior to the interview, the local prosecutor
told police it was lawful to falsely tell the suspect they'd had the
victim's underwear scientifically tested and the results showed
semen stains on it from him -- and to show him a false lab
report of the results.
The suspect came to the station voluntarily,
waived his Miranda rights, and, after denying his involvement,
confessed when told about and shown a false lab report.
The trial court concluded
the deception was would not coerce an innocent person to confess.
The appellate court disagreed. It held the verbal lie was lawful
but the false documents were not. Notably, the court seemed much
more concerned that such documents could inadvertently make their
way into court records and be mistakenly viewed as true than with
the coercive effect of the reports on the defendant. Other courts
have disagreed with Florida.
In Arthur
v. Commonwealth, 480 S.E. 2d 749 (Va. 1997), the appellate court
held that police showing a suspect “dummy” reports indicating his
fingerprints and hair were found at the crime scene was not unduly
coercive. The court addressed the
Cayward court's concern
by noting the police kept the false documents in a separate file
from the actual investigative and lab reports.
In
Sheriff, Washoe Co. v. Bessey,
914 P. 2d 618 (Nev.
1996), the Nevada Supreme Court criticized the
Cayward court’s
distinction between a verbal lie and the same lie “embodied in a
piece of paper,” concluding there was no real difference. The court
upheld police creating a “falsified lab report” showing a defendant
had committed a sexual assault against a minor, stating,
“[T]here was nothing about the fabricated document presented in this
case which would have produced a false confession.”
In People
v. Henry, 518 N.Y.S.2d 44 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987), the court
upheld a confession obtained after police confronted the defendant
with fake polygraph test results indicating he had lied to police.
In State
v. Whittington, 809 A. 2d 721 (Md. App. 2002), police placed an
invisible powder on a pen they gave to the suspect so when they
later conducted a fake gunpowder residue test, it appeared to her
she still had gunpowder on her hand. The court found this deception
was not unconstitutionally coercive.
Still other courts have sided with the
Cayward decision and
reversed convictions based upon confessions obtained after the
police presented fabricated evidence to the defendant.
In State
v. Patton, 362 N.J. Super. 16 (App. Div.) (2003), an officer
posing as an eyewitness was “interviewed” on an audiotape that was
later played to the defendant who, despite his early denials of
involvement, confessed upon hearing the tape. The trial judge
permitted the admission of the confession and the false tape.
The subsequent conviction was reversed on appeal.
How should police draw the lines on
investigative deception?
If there’s wide disagreement amongst judges
looking at the same facts and law, how is a cop trying to do the
right thing but also being expected to use all legally available
tools to investigate and solve serious crimes supposed to figure
this stuff out?
Stay tuned as we try to answer this question. In
future articles in this series we’re going to look at:
- Does legal equal ethical in the use of
police deception?
- Does ethical depend on whose ox is being
gored, that is – on whom the deception is being used?
- Do the legal and ethical parameters of
deception depend on how serious the crime that is being
investigated is? What if it could prevent a death?
- If legal doesn’t equal ethical, what should
be the guiding standard for police?
- Applying the legal and ethical parameters to
a real case.
- What about the issue of false confessions?
- What kinds of effects can deception have on
the officers using it?
- What should police leadership be doing in
this critical, complicated, provocative, high stakes area of
policing?
Training Cops to Lie – PT 1: The tangled web
of police deception,
http://www.officer.com/web/online/Investigation/Training-Cops-to-Lie---Pt-1/18$49343
Training Cops to Lie –
PT 2:
OR Parameters of Police Deception,
http://www.officer.com/web/online/Investigation/Training-Cops-to-Lie--Pt-2/18$49853
A Trial is NOT About the Truth – Just ask
defense attorneys,
http://www.officer.com/web/online/Investigation/A-Trial-is-NOT-About-the-Truth/18$50182
Jacobellis v. Ohio,
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=378&invol=184
Described by Calibre Press as "the indisputable master of enter-train-ment,"
Val Van Brocklin is a trainer and author. She
combines a dynamic presentation style with over 10 years experience
as a state and federal prosecutor where her trial work received
national media attention on ABC's Primetime Live, the Discovery
Channel's Justice Files, in USA Today, The National Enquirer and
REDBOOK. In addition to her personal appearances, she appears on
television, radio, and webcasts, in newspapers, journal articles and
books. Val is a regular contributor to
officer.com and
lawofficer.com and her
writing has also been featured in the Calibre Press
Online Street Survival
Newsletter, Police Chief magazine, The Law
Enforcement Trainer
magazine,
Integrity Talk magazine,
Outdoor magazines and books.
When she’s not working, Val can be found flying her airplane with
her retriever, a shotgun, a fly rod, and high aspirations. Visit her
at her website:
www.valvanbrocklin.com.
By
John Reid & Associates
Imagine what it would be like to make everyday decisions without
caring how your choices affected others and
to live each day with the only goal being to elevate your
insatiable self-worth.*
When telling lies or engaging in criminal activity you experience no
guilt or remorse and you have such confidence in your ability to
escape punishment that you lie at will; in fact, engaging in illegal
behavior, and the thrill of getting away with it, becomes a driving
force in your life allowing you to express superiority over others:
Welcome to the mind of the primary psychopath.
Fortunately, less than one percent of the population is diagnosed as
a primary psychopath.*
The predominant traits that characterize this psychological disorder
include lack of remorse or guilt, poor behavioral control, need for
emotional stimulation,* irresponsibility, shallow affect, failure to
learn from experience, and involvement in anti-social behavior,
including frequent lying. Primary psychopaths are usually diagnosed
in their twenties, tend to be male and have a higher than average
IQ.** They experience a psychological burn-out by mid-life after
which they are likely to be nonproductive members of society
(incarcerated, drug addicts, recluses).
Statistically, an investigator is much more likely to encounter a
secondary psychopath.*
These are individuals who possess some psychopathic traits in
combination with symptoms from other personality disorders or mental
illness.* About fifty percent of the prison population is diagnosed
as having some psychopathic traits.
Identifying the psychopath
An investigator is generally not concerned with exactly what mental
illness a suspect suffers from, but rather how to recognize
fundamental symptoms of a disorder and how to effectively deal with
the suspect.* A suspect with psychopathic tendencies will exhibit
several of the following behaviors:
1.* Glibness / superficial charm e.g., unconcerned attitude, overly
polite, inappropriate levity
2.* Irresponsibility e.g., failure to meet financial obligations,
failure to keep appointments, not following through on promises
3.* Reckless disregard of otheris safety or feelings / lack of
empathy e.g., irrationally shooting a customer during a robbery,
purposefully aiming a car toward an animal trying to cross the road
4.* Pervasive engagement in anti-social behavior, e.g., lying,
cheating, theft, fraud
5.* Impulsive behaviors, e.g., promiscuous sexual behavior,
spontaneous crimes
6.* Feelings of entitlement, e.g., strive for positions of authority
and power, expectation of special treatment (or claims of unfair
treatment)
There are a number of key behaviors that may indicate a suspect has
psychopathic tendencies.* The first is the suspect who, upon meeting
the investigator, exhibits no fear or anxiety.* Rather, the suspect
appears to almost enjoy the challenge of answering questions and
does not present any outward symptoms of anxiety or guilt even when
caught making an inconsistent or false statement.*
The suspect may engage in
testing behavior shortly after meeting the investigator.*
This concept comes from con men who would stage certain scenarios to
test the gullibility of a potential victim.* Examples of testing
behavior may include asking the investigator for a business card, to
draw a map showing the best route to the freeway, or simply for the
current time.* By engaging in this preemptive behavior, the suspect
gains a sense of control during the interview.
Finally, it is not uncommon for psychopaths to falsify their
credentials and even impersonate others.* When psychopathy is
suspected, the investigator should question the suspect about his
background, education, professional licenses and certification.* It
may be productive to ask the suspect, "Have you ever pretended to be
someone else, where you posed as another person?"
Interviewing The Psychopath
***********
Because of the psychopathis high level of self confidence, he often
believes that he does not need an attorney.* A psychopath is likely
to waive his Miranda rights and agree to be interviewed.* During the
interview he is easily engaged and appears to be helpful and
cooperative.* In reality this "cooperative facade" allows the
psychopath to manipulate the investigator with the intent to
convince the investigator of his innocence.
The challenge in interviewing a psychopath is that, depending on the
degree of psychopathy, the suspect may exhibit minimal behavior
symptoms of deception when lying.* This includes the lack of
specific nonverbal or paralinguistic behaviors reflecting anxiety,
guilt, fear or low confidence.* Similarly, on the verbal level, the
psychopath may not reduce anxiety by using memory qualifiers e.g.,
"to the best of my knowledge."*
In fact, psychopaths often tell bold lies that invite a challenge,
e.g.,** "I had nothing to do with this whatsoever.* Iill give you my
fingerprints because I know you wonit find them at the crime
scene."* Later, the investigator finds the suspectis fingerprints
all over the crime scene.* Needless to say, when a suspect exhibits
psychopathic traits the investigator should not take anything the
suspect says at face value.* Rather, the investigator should
carefully document the suspectis alleged credentials or alibi,
obtain exemplars, get blood sample, take fingerprints etc. and
check everything out.
The psychopathis weakness is within his attitudes.* During an
interview he will come across as unconcerned (inappropriate levity,
express leniency toward the guilty party), offer unrealistic
assessments of the crime, and express insincere emotions.* The
predominant feature is the absence of anxiety or concern that is
typically observed from innocent suspects.* Moreover, because
psychopaths engage in spontaneous behavior, often there is clear
evidence that places them at the crime scene or with the victim.* Of
course, when confronted with the evidence, the suspect will have an
explanation for the evidence and protest his innocence with a great
deal of conviction.
Interrogating the Psychopath
Hard-wired within the psychopathis affected personality is a very
high index of suspicion; psychopaths are incapable of fully trusting
another human being and believe that everyone only acts in their own
best interests.* Consequently, if the investigator attempts to come
across as someone who understands the suspectis situation and can
sympathize with the suspectis reasons for committing the crime, the
investigator will lose credibility.*
Rather, the investigator should use a factual approach to the
interrogation.* The investigatoris statements should focus on
evidence and attacking the suspectis credibility.* The
investigatoris demeanor should be professional, emotionally detached
and confident.* It is rare for a primary psychopath to fully confess
his crime.* More often, he will make incriminating statements and
ultimately accept a plea bargain from the prosecutor n the
psychopath will not fully admit wrong-doing, but may acknowledge
that it is in his best interest to plead guilty.
In conclusion, investigators must guard against labeling every
suspect who commits a despicable crime or who frequently lies as a
psychopath.* While it is true that many people who commit crimes
have psychopathic tendencies, certainly not all criminals are
primary psychopaths.* Psychopathy occurs on a wide continuum.*
Consequently, rather than asking, "Is this suspect a psychopath?"
the investigator may be better off asking, " To what extent does
this suspect exhibit psychopathic tendencies?"*
The more psychopathic tendencies a suspect exhibits, the less weight
should be placed on specific behavior symptoms of truth or deception
during the interview.* In fact, the focus of the interview should be
to obtain detailed information, about the suspectis alibi,
relationship with the victim, financial situation etc., and that
information should be verified (or refuted).* The psychopathis guilt
is usually revealed by detecting not one big lie, but several little
ones.* Also, the interrogation approach should appeal less to the
suspectis emotions and more to logic and intellectual arguments.
Credit and Permission Statement: This Investigator Tip was developed
by John E. Reid and Associates Inc. Permission is hereby granted to
those who wish to share or copy the article. For additional 'tips'
visit
www.reid.com;
select 'Educational Information' and 'Investigator Tip'. Inquiries
regarding Investigator Tips should be directed to Janet Finnerty
johnreid@htc.net. For more
information regarding Reid seminars and training products, contact
John E. Reid and Associates, Inc. at 800-255-5747 or
www.reid.com.
All Dressed Up and No Where to Go
By Kate O’Donnell
Public Grants & Training Initiatives
kodonnell@pg-ti.com
Through trial and error, police trainers have developed programs
that have become standards in the industry. Many have been by
accident, taking a concept, working through it and presenting it in
a manner that hit home. First it was the department that provided
great feedback, then the scope of training was expanded, and then
expanded further; all of a sudden you have a program that has some
legs in the police community. Some make it, but unfortunately, many
of these programs die on the vine because the trainer doesn’t have
the time or the knowledge of how to take this training to the next
step. Many are hesitant to ‘promote’ themselves, feeling
uncomfortable in the role of ‘promoter’ and actually profiting by
their service to the community. It is a common and understandable
mindset for a public servant.
However, what a terrible waste for a training program that has value
to the police community, not to find its audience. It’s a common
dilemma. Without a doubt, self-promotion is a challenge and that is
why there are only a handful of police trainers that have achieved
the truly elite status. Somehow these speakers worked through the
process and the community as a whole has benefited by their efforts.
Trainers should listen to the feedback they receive, research their
topics to assess the uniqueness of the program, and be confident
that their training has merit. Write about your topic, get it
published, spread the word, get some notoriety. If the trainer is
uncomfortable with the business end of the process, don’t let that
be an obstacle. A police trainer can work with a training company to
handle that aspect of it, thereby allowing him to concentrate on
being a cop and a trainer. So don’t be all dressed up with no place
to go with your training! Take the initiative and find out your
worth to the training community.
Kate O’Donnell has been involved in police training for over 25
years. She is the Executive Director of Public Grants & Training
Initiatives, a company that provides marketing and sales support to
a variety of police trainers. Grant writing services are also
available for municipalities and non-profits.
Reprinted from
WWW.PATC.COM
Legal requirements for protective sweeps of residences by law
enforcement
June 2011
by Brian S. Batterton, Attorney
On May 19, 2011, the Supreme Court of Arizona
decided
Arizona v. Fisher [i], which serves as an excellent
review of the law as it pertains to protective sweeps of residences
by law enforcement officers. The facts of
Fisher, taken directly from the case are as follows:
In May 2006, Mesa police responded to a call
alleging an aggravated assault. The victim, who was bleeding from a
cut on his head, told police he had been pistol-whipped by a man
known as "Taz." The victim described Taz and directed police to an
apartment complex where he believed Taz lived.
Other officers went to that apartment complex,
where Laquinn Anthony Fisher lived. After officers knocked and
announced their presence, Fisher and two others came out. None had a
weapon and all three were cooperative. Fisher, whose appearance
matched the description given by the victim, identified himself to
officers as "TA."
Despite having this information, officers thought
further investigation was necessary because the gun allegedly used
in the assault was still "unaccounted for." Apparently without
asking whether anyone was still inside, police entered the apartment
to see if anyone else was present. Inside, officers smelled
marijuana and observed open duffle bags containing marijuana. They
did not find anyone in the apartment. After the sweep, officers
obtained written consent from Fisher's roommate to search the
apartment and seized the marijuana. Officers later brought the
assault victim to the apartment, and he identified Fisher as his
attacker. [ii]
Fisher was charged with various crimes including
possession of marijuana for sale. He filed a motion to suppress the
marijuana and the trial court denied the motion. Fisher was
convicted by a jury and he subsequently appealed the denial of his
motion to suppress to the court of appeals. The court of appeals
affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress. Fisher appealed to
the Supreme Court of Arizona.
The issue before the Arizona Supreme Court was
whether the warrantless entry, articulated as a protective sweep,
was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.
The court first reviewed the relevant precedent
regarding this issue. The court stated that, while typically
officers must obtain warrants to enter a home, there are various
exceptions to the warrant requirement that have been held as
reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. [iii] The court then stated that one
of the exceptions to the warrant requirement is the “protective
sweep” which was first recognized by the United States Supreme Court
in
Maryland v. Buie. [iv] Quoting
Buie, the court stated
[I]ncident to [an] arrest the officers [can], as
a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable
suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining
the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately
launched." But to justify a broader sweep, there must be articulable
facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those
facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that
the area to be swept harbors an individual posing danger to those on
the arrest scene. [v] [internal quotations omitted]
Thus, under
Buie, the court observed that there were two types of
warrantless home searches incident to a lawful arrest. The first
type allows the officers to look into areas immediately adjacent to
the location of arrest. [vi] The second type allows a protective
sweep of the residence when the officer can articulate specific
facts that a person posing a danger to the officers is within the
residence. [vii] On the other hand, the court observed that if
officers act “purely on speculation” that a person who poses a
threat is in the residence, the protective sweep would be
unreasonable. [viii] The court also observed that the “common
thread” among cases involving constitutionally reasonable protective
sweeps is that the officers “have specific, articulable facts that
someone who could pose a safety threat is inside the residence.”
[ix] The court then cited to numerous case from other jurisdictions
to support this rule. [x]
The Arizona Supreme Court also cited the
United States v. Gandia [xi] from the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals and stated that it was very persuasive. Regarding
Gandia, the court stated
[In
Gandia], officers responded to a reported dispute
between a building superintendent and a tenant. Officers were given
a description of a suspect who might be carrying a gun. Upon
arrival, they saw Gandia, who matched the description of the
suspect, but determined that he was unarmed. Officers escorted him
to his apartment and asked if anyone else was there. He said "no"
and allowed the officers to enter his apartment, but not to search
it. Once inside, they nonetheless conducted a protective sweep and
discovered a bullet. The Second Circuit held that the sweep was
invalid because the officers had no reason to believe that a person
might be hiding in Gandia's apartment. Although there was an
unaccounted-for weapon, nothing indicated that "there was a person
hiding in the apartment who might use it." The court emphasized that
"'lack of information cannot provide an articulable basis upon which
to justify a protective sweep.'" [xii] [internal citations omitted]
The Arizona Supreme Court then applied the facts
of Fisher’s case to the precedent previously discussed. The court
observed that the officers in
Fisher could not articulate specific facts that
indicated that another person was inside Fisher’s apartment.
Further, there is no evidence that the officers attempted to find
out how many people lived at that residence. The court stated that
even though there was a weapon that was unaccounted for, no facts
were present to indicate that there was another person in the
residence that posed a threat to the officers.
After a review of the facts applied to the
precedent, the court held
[O]fficers cannot conduct protective sweeps based
on mere speculation or the general risk inherent in all police work.
Because the officers here did not articulate specific facts to
establish a reasonable belief that someone might be in the
apartment, the protective sweep was invalid. [xiii]
As such, the decision of the court of appeals was
vacated and the case was remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this holding.
_______________________
NOTE: Court holdings can vary
significantly between jurisdictions. As such, it is advisable to
seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal advisor regarding
questions on specific cases. This article is not intended to
constitute legal advice on a specific case.
CITATIONS:
[i] 2011 Ariz. LEXIS 27 (Decided May 19, 2011)
[ii]
Id. at 2-3
[iii]
Id. at 4 (citing
Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546, 548 (2009)
[iv] 494 U.S. 325 (1990)
[v]
Id. at 5 (quoting
Buie, 494 U.S. 334)
[vi]
Id. at 5
[vii]
Id. at 6
[viii]
Id.
[ix]
Id. at 7
[x] Id. (citing
United States v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117, 1120-21 (9th
Cir. 2008) (determining fact that owner of storage unit who had
outstanding arrest warrant was not accounted for justified officer's
reasonable belief that another person could be present);
United States v. Lawlor, 406 F.3d 37, 42 (1st Cir. 2005)
(finding quick protective sweep justified when officers arrived at
residence where gunshot had been reported, shooter had not been
identified, and defendant "shrugged" when asked about the gun);
United States v. Gould,
364 F.3d 578, 592 (5th Cir. 2004) [*8] (en banc) (upholding
protective sweep of mobile home when officers have consent to enter
bedroom and a known dangerous suspect was not in bed, as previously
reported) ;
United States v. Taylor, 248 F.3d 506, 514 (6th Cir.
2001) (approving protective sweep when officers heard scuffling
noises from inside before being admitted into apartment and
suspect's demeanor indicated he was hiding something). The more
specific facts supporting a reasonable belief that an area contains
a potentially dangerous individual, the more likely the protective
sweep is valid. See, e.g.,
United States v. Tapia, 610 F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir.
2010) (protective sweep proper when officers had six separate valid
articulable facts);
United States v. Davis, 471 F.3d 938, 945 (8th Cir.
2006) (listing several articulable facts).
[xi] 424 F.3d 255 (2nd Cir. 2005)
[xui]
Id. at 8-9 (citing
Gandia, 424 F.3d 258-264)
[xiii]
Id. at 10
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