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May 2012

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in this issue . . .

 

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 By  John Reid & Associates

1998 David Lykken wrote a book titled, "A Tremor in the Blood: The Uses and Abuses of the Polygraph Technique". In it, he advocated the use of his own "Guilty Knowledge Test" and attacked the existing Control Question Technique by initially offering a naive description of control question theory. He then picked apart his own implausible theory. The uninformed reader was left with the forgone conclusion: 'Of course the control question polygraph technique is invalid, look at how faulty the underlying theory is.'

History is repeating itself. Defense "experts" are condemning contemporary interrogation techniques by presenting their own distorted portrayal of what occurs during an interrogation and then attacking their own inaccurate description. Fortunately, most courts have seen through their blatant attempt to discredit any confession obtained through a police interrogation. Nonetheless, it is instructive to know what these defense experts are saying.

The Defense Experts' Characterization of Interrogation

The following is taken from a report prepared by Dr. Richard Leo on a contested confession case in Wisconsin (Brendan Dassey). It is representative of how many defense experts describe the interrogation process:

A. "The sole purpose for custodial interrogation is to elicit a confession. Contemporary American interrogation methods are structured to persuade a rational person who knows he is guilty to rethink his initial decision to deny culpability and instead choose to confess."

B. "The first step of successful interrogation consists of causing a suspect to view his situation as hopeless. The interrogator communicates to the suspect that he has been caught , that there is no way he will escape the interrogation without incriminating himself, and that his future is determined - that regardless of the suspect's denials or protestations of innocence, he is going to be arrested, prosecuted convicted and eventually incarcerated."

C. "The second step of successful interrogation consists of offering the suspect inducements to confess - reasons or scenarios that suggest the suspect will receive some personal, moral, communal, procedural material or other benefit if he confesses to some version of the offense." There are three forms of such inducements:

. "Low-end inducements refer to interpersonal or moral appeals the interrogator uses to convince a suspect that he will feel better if he confesses."

. "Systemic inducements refer to appeals that the interrogator uses to focus the suspect's attention on the processes and outcomes of the criminal justice system in order to get the suspect to come to the conclusion that his case is likely to be processed more favorably by all actors in the criminal justice system if he confesses."

. "High-end inducements refer to appeals that directly communicate that the suspect will receive less punishment, a lower prison sentence, and/or some form of police, prosecutorial, judicial, or juror leniency if he complies with the interrogator's demand that he confess."

This portrayal of the interrogation process clearly describes techniques that are illegal and, if used, may cause a confession to be suppressed. It certainly does not describe The Reid Nine Steps of Interrogation. In fact, it contains a number of procedures that we specifically teach as being improper.

Reid's Response


We certainly take issue with the stated purpose of an interrogation being to elicit a confession. On page 4 of our training manual we state that the objective of an interrogation is to elicit the truth from a suspect, not a confession.

There are a number of possible outcomes of a successful interrogation other than obtaining a confession. Some of these are: (1) The suspect is innocent; (2) The suspect did not commit the offense under investigation but lied about some aspect of the investigation (motive, alibi, access, etc.) ; (3) The suspect did not commit the offense under investigation but knows who did. Throughout an interrogation the investigator's goal is always to learn the truth.Leo states that the first step of an interrogation is to convince the suspect that his situation is helpless. This is an outright false statement. This statement or goal never appears in our text books or seminar manuals. On page 49 of our training manual we teach the opposite, that it is improper to tell the suspect that he is facing inevitable consequences. We reference cases where innocence people falsely confessed because the investigator convinced the suspect that he would suffer consequences regardless of his denials. On page 64 we offer information on how to identify truthful from deceptive denials and, on that same page, acknowledge that sometimes innocent suspects are mistakenly interrogated.

What we do teach is that, at the outset of the interrogation, the investigator should express high confidence that the suspect was involved in committing the crime. Guilty suspects are unlikely to tell the truth unless they believe the investigator already knows that they committed the crime. Consequently, expressing confidence in the suspect's guilt is necessary to learn the truth from guilty suspects. However, this procedure certainly does not result in false confessions from innocent suspects. Leo, and others, have taken the concept of expressing high confidence in the suspect's guilt and converting it to a self-serving portrayal that interrogations are designed to convince the suspect that he is in a helpless situation. This is simply not the case.

As to the second step of the process, any successful interrogation technique must offer the guilty suspect a real or perceived benefit of telling the truth. This is fundamental to persuasive communication and, on a daily basis, the average person is bombarded with incentives designed to influence their behavior. Whether the message is to buy a particular product, get a medical checkup, or watch a particular television program, all persuasive arguments involves a promise of benefit with one choice and adverse consequences with another choice.

Common law recognized that some promises of benefit or threats of adverse consequences may cause an innocent person to confess. Examples include promises to avoid a lengthy sentence or threats of physical pain if the suspect does not confess. These would fit the description of what Leo calls, "high-end inducements." Countries whose criminal justice system is based on common law forbid interrogation procedures that involve inflicting, or threatening to inflict pain or discomfort onto a suspect in an effort to obtain a confession. However, they differ somewhat on the use of promises to obtain a confession.In the United Kingdom, promises of leniency in exchange for a confession are codified within their law, e.g., if a suspect confesses early during an investigation, by statue, he increases the probability of receiving a lesser sentence. In 2000 the Canadian Supreme Court provided a bright line distinction with respect to promises of leniency. In Oickle, the court ruled that only a quid pro quo offer by the interrogator for leniency in exchange for a confession is impermissible. The United States has the most stringent legal requirement concerning rewards for a confession. Very simply, an investigator cannot offer or imply a promise of lenience in exchange for a confession.

Applying legal standards, Leo's description of low-end inducements are certainly legal and are advocated in the Reid Technique. The high-end inducements are clearly illegal in the United States as well as Canada and we teach investigators not to use these tactics. There are multiple references to these illegal interrogation tactics in both our training manual as well as our text, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions.

This leaves "systemic inducements" which are designed to get the suspect to come to the conclusion that if he confesses, his case may be processed more favorably by the criminal justice system. From the interrogator's perspective, of course, this is desirable and yet the interrogator cannot mention or imply a benefit of more favorable treatment in exchange for telling the truth. It is perfectly legal, however, to allow the suspect to form his own conclusion that he may benefit in some way by telling the truth.

To allow a suspect to believe that it may be beneficial if he tells the truth, the Reid Technique takes advantage of two fundamental principles of human nature. The first is that criminal suspects justify their crime in some manner (blaming the victim, an accomplice, intoxication, financial pressure re-describing the intentions behind their crime, contrasting their crime to worse behavior, etc.). Second, it is human nature to not want to be blamed for something we didn't do. Given the choice, the average person will choose to suffer consequences for something he did wrong rather than have people think something about him or his behavior that was not true.

With this in mind, the first tactic within the Reid Technique that is used to allow a suspect to perceive some benefit of telling the truth is an interrogation theme. During the theme we express understanding toward the suspect's crime and offer moral justifications and excuses for committing it. The theme is intended to reinforce the existing justifications already present in the guilty suspect's mind. The guilty suspect who hears the interrogation theme may well conclude,

"The investigator is right. I did have a good reason for robbing that store. I'm not a bad person and I really did need that money to help out my family. If the investigator can understand why I robbed that place, maybe others will too." An innocent suspect who has not gone through the process of justifying the crime will not relate to the interrogator's theme and will reject the interrogator's suggested justifications. When presented with a theme, most innocent suspects offer persistent denials of involvement in the offense.

The second tactic takes advantage of the drive within each of us to not want others to think things about us or our behavior that are not true. We call it the use of an alternative question. An alternative question offers the suspect two choices concerning some aspect of his crime. Accepting either choice represents an admission of guilt. For example: "Did you plan this out for months in advance or did it just happen on the spur of the moment?"; "Did you steal that money and blow it on drugs and booze or did you take it for something important?" The perceived benefit offered through the use of an alternative question is that by choosing to confess, the guilty suspect may keep others from believing something about him or his crime that is not true, e.g., that he planned the crime out for months or that he blew the money on drugs and booze. The suspect, of course, always has a third choice which is to state that neither alternative is true - that he did not commit the crime.

Whether Reid's use of an interrogation theme or alternative question falls within the category of Leo's low-end or systemic inducements is insignificant since neither procedure offer a direct or implied promise of leniency. Rather, the techniques represent legally persuasive tactics that increases the likelihood that a guilty suspect will choose to tell the truth during an interrogation.

In summary, defense experts have attempted to suppress confessions by first providing a distorted and inaccurate description of the "standard police interrogation" and then presenting studies demonstrating that these improper interrogation techniques result in false confessions. As explained in this web tip, these experts are not describing procedures or tactics taught in the Reid Technique, nor tactics that are considered legal by most courts
.

Credit and Permission Statement: This Investigator Tip was developed by John E. Reid and Associates Inc. Permission is hereby granted to those who wish to share or copy the article. For additional 'tips' visit www.reid.com; select 'Educational Information' and 'Investigator Tip'. Inquiries regarding Investigator Tips should be directed to Janet Finnerty johnreid@htc.net. For more information regarding Reid seminars and training products, contact John E. Reid and Associates, Inc. at 800-255-5747 or www.reid.com

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We Need Defensive Driving

By Val Van Brocklin

Let’s look at some stories of real cops who posted stuff on the internet that got them disciplined or cost them their jobs, and hurt the reputation of their departments. Too bad they didn’t have a clue about their rights, responsibilities and liabilities as a police officer online. WARNING – VIEWER DISCRETION ADVISED. If you like happy endings, you may not wish to proceed.

Bikini wearing cop vs. bikini wearing cop car.

Can a bikini get you fired? That may depend on how and where you wear it.

Let’s say one of you is a female Deputy Sheriff. In your off-duty time you philanthropically participate in a charity bikini car wash fundraiser wearing, well, a skimpy bikini. The fundraiser is marketed as “Tits n Tats.” The event also features employees from a topless strip club.

The other of you is a male police officer who takes his private car to the fundraiser, then decides to take his patrol car. A photo of your patrol car with the “scantily-clad” car washers draped on the hood surfaces on Facebook.

This happened in Moncks Corner, South Carolina – population 7,044. The ending is a mixed bag. No job action was taken against the Deputy Sheriff. A statement issued by the Sheriff’s Office said, “She was involved in the event as a private citizen and did not violate the law, BC [Berkley County] SO or county’s policies.”

The police officer is out of a job. It’s unknown whether he was fired or asked to resign. His Chief said there were policies governing take-home cruisers and allowing bikini-clad women to be photographed next to one violated those policies. [For the sake of research, you can link here to a photo of the bikini-clad patrol car – http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20017318-504083.html]

I ask you, dear readers, if you think the punishment would’ve been the same if the photo hadn’t been circulated on Facebook, thus garnering public attention. That is, would the officer have been fired for violating the policies governing the use of take-home cruisers if the violation had been known only within the department and hadn’t made it onto the wide world web?

"They weren’t thinking.”

An Indiana State Trooper resigned and an Indianapolis Metro PD Officer was suspended for what all would agree were some stupid postings on the trooper’s personal Facebook page.

The trooper bragged about heavy drinking and posted photos of his banged up patrol car with the comment, “Oops! Where did my front end go?” Perhaps the most infamous photo showed the police officer friend holding a gun to the trooper’s head as he described drinking lots of beer with his buddies.

The trooper also weighed in on his work and people who resist arrest. He referred to himself as a “garbage man” and “I pick up trash for a living.” Commenting on an incident in which Fresno police officers punched a homeless man during his arrest, the trooper posted, “Let someone, homeless or not, try and stab me … he’ll probably end up shot. These people should have died when they were young anyway, I’m just doing them a favor.”

According to a Major with the ISP, the state’s biggest concern was that the trooper may have been Facebook-ing on duty. I’m biting my keyboard here. How does personal use of a computer (not unlike a personal phone call) on department time rise above concern about the content here? Maybe it’s because, in the absence of any specific social media policy, using a computer for personal communication on tax payer time was the only violation.

Asked what the trooper and IMPD officer could have been thinking, an IMPD Sergeant spokesperson said, “They weren’t thinking. It was an error in judgment…so now there has to be accountability and that’s what we’re doing.” [Trooper resigns after Facebook controversy -- http://www.wthr.com/Global/story.asp?S=10552361]

With MySpace friends like these, who needs enemies?

A well-known roadkill on the information highway was Lexington Officer Joshua Cromer who stopped and arrested country singing star John Michael Montgomery. Montgomery ended up charged with DUI, possessing a controlled drug and two counts of carrying a concealed weapon.

Friends, mostly fellow cops, congratulated Cromer on his MySpace page and made fun of Montgomery by posting a doctored photo portraying Cromer as an adoring fan.

Complaints about Cromer’s site sparked the brass into checking out other officers’ MySpace pages. The pages contained disparaging comments about the citizenry, gays, and the mentally disabled. Cromer was dismissed and five of his MySpace friends were suspended. [Watch What You Post -- http://www.policemag.com/Channel/Technology/Articles/2009/12/Watch-What-You-Post.aspx]

Montgomery copped a plea to just the DUI charge with a $660 fine and court costs. If you don’t think his attorneys’ possible subpoena for the officers’ MySpace pages had anything to do with that deal, I’ve got some costume jewelry I’d like to show you. [Country Singer John Michael Montgomery Makes Plea Deal in DUI Arrest -- http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,210160,00.html.]

Detective’s Facebook comments targeted by gun advocates.

An East Palo Alto detective came under fire for posting disparaging Facebook comments about gun advocates carrying unloaded weapons. The California gun law at issue apparently prohibits carrying a concealed weapon without a license but permits open display of a firearm in a holster, but it’s illegal for the gun to be loaded in most cases.

Gun advocates say they’re open-carrying unloaded firearms because they can’t get concealed carry permits. Police say the practice is dangerous because officers can’t tell whether a gun is loaded and what an armed person’s intentions are.

The detective got caught in the cross fire when he posted back and forth with a Facebook friend about the issue and apparently joked that an unloaded carrier should be “proned out,” reminded that “turds will jack him for his gun in a heartbeat” and if he makes a move …”2 weeks off!!!”

A gun rights advocate and lawyer posted a screen grab of the Facebook thread and a link to the detective’s Facebook page on his own web site and urged his readers to complain to East Palo Alto council members. They did. They also railed in a thread that continued for 45 pages.

The Chief said the detective wouldn’t be fired but he would be disciplined. The Open Carry advocacy group said they were “ecstatic about the decision.” [East Palo Alto cop takes heat for Facebook remarks -- http://www.mercurynews.com/breaking-news/ci_14361484.]

Officer gets his goat…and some discipline.

Southfield is a suburb of Detroit. Imagine you’re a Southfield cop and you get a call about two baby goats playing on a rooftop. It’s illegal to keep goats inside city limits so you respond to the densely populated neighborhood. The baby goats are really cute so you post a picture of them on your personal Facebook page.

Any problem? Well, Southfield PD didn’t have specific policies about social media sites, but their policies do require officers to keep evidence and investigations confidential. In disciplining the responding officer, the Southfield Police Chief said, “[T]hat’s a photograph of the crime scene.” [Too Much Info – Police Officers & Their Social Media Profiles -- http://www.poam.net/on-the-job/2010/police-officers-social-media-profiles/.]

No good MySpace deed goes unpunished.

Now imagine you’re a great school resource officer, well-liked by the kids and school staff. Like many school resource officers, you set up a MySpace page to further communicate with students. School leaders, parents and your department are supportive as you widely share safety tips with the kids and also receive tips that help investigations. Then it’s discovered that students who go to your MySpace page can link to pornographic material.

That’s what happened to Officer John Nohejl. He was eventually cleared of any wrongdoing but the experience left a lasting imprint,
“I tried to do a good thing for kids. But I got blind-sided. I’d checked out this person’s profile and it seemed OK, so I allowed him on as a friend. … [H]e went back onto MySpace and maliciously changed his profile so that in a matter of three clicks from my page, kids could be exposed to this pornography. … It’s a good lesson for cops. You can be held responsible for things that are beyond your control. Who can possibly go through the profiles of hundreds of MySpace friends every day to make sure that someone’s not doing the same thing?”

Big stakes.

There’s more at stake here than individual officers as roadkill. There’s the tarnishing of entire agencies and the distrust of the community that other officers must bear.

There’s also officer safety. As Santa Monica Police Chief Tim Jackman recently commented at a SMILE (Social Media the Internet and Law Enforcement) Conference, all safety precautions can go to the wind with one click of the mouse. The Chief was speaking of a recent incident in which a traffic stop of a suspected drunk driver ended in a gunfight that sent the officer to the hospital with a bullet wound to his hip. The suspect fled and was later shot before he could be detained by a SWAT team.

Turned out the driver was a previous felon, had been in jail for murder and was a notorious gang member. He was also sent to the same hospital as the officer who stopped him. A quick and sound decision was made to not identify the officer or where he was.

But when the Chief logged onto Facebook at home that night he found a comment from a retired fellow officer who had recently moved away. Unaware, the well-meaning retired officer IDed the wounded officer to the world. [Calif. Chief on the dangers of Facebook -- http://www.policeone.com/police-technology/articles/3198725-Video-Calif-Chief-on-the-dangers-of-Facebook.]

The safety of officers’ families is also at stake. The profession prepares officers to have a plan for their families if a public safety threat occurs when an officer is off-duty on a family outing. Officers similarly need to be trained about potential risks when they post photos of their spouses and children on a social media site, talk about where they work and go to school, and when they’re all going to be gone on vacation.

Accountability needs to be shared.

The Indianapolis Metro PD Sergeant was right, there has to be accountability. I daresay most recruits eating at a restaurant the day before they start the Academy, don’t intuitively sit with their backs to the wall, evaluate lines of fire and plan their cover and escape routes. They are taught these things until it becomes second nature to them. But it’s not common sense. Commoners don’t routinely exercise such sense.

Relying on common sense to take the place of training and policies specifically dealing with the risks of social media seems equally ill-advised. Especially since the common sense of social media that many recruits and young officers grew up in is a much lower standard than they will be expected to meet as law enforcement officers.

I don’t equate the examples above. But they all have something in common – officers weren’t thinking. They weren’t thinking about the special circumstances of their work as it interfaces with an ever-evolving technology that is playing an ever-growing role in officers’ personal and professional lives. Yes, Officer Nohejl was innocent and unsuspecting, just like a recruit at a restaurant before he attends the Academy. But can we afford unsuspecting police officers?

The profession and departments bear responsibility for training officers and recruits to think in this area just as they train them in other legal and tactical aspects of the job. The occasional SMILE conference isn’t enough.

 

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BY KEVIN CALDER, PRESIDENT, K CALDER & ASSOCIATES

Reprinted from the Virginia Center for Policing Innovation

IN TODAY’S COMPLICATED WORLD, it is critical that public-safety professionals recognize that a wide range of factors impact how they handle both mundane and critical situations in the field. Recognition of the risk of violence and situational awareness allow officers to choose appropriate strategies that enhance their safety, as well as that of co-workers, protectees, and the public. Usually in law enforcement when we hear the term “situational awareness” we often think of the concept within a tactical application or context. However, having sound situational awareness is vital in every law-enforcement role. Situational awareness is the ongoing recognition of internal and external factors and influences that form the foundation of an officer’s decision making. It is a comprehensive thought process that ultimately leads to effective decisions resulting in minimized risk and liability.

As a Deputy Sheriff, I was regularly challenged to articulate and in some cases defend my tactical and operational decisions. As a young officer, I would focus on the external information available to me: individuals involved, factors related to the scene and environment, and my goals and objectives. As my operational experience grew, I realized that my decisions were increasingly influenced by personal and organizational influences. By practicing situational awareness I believe officers can enhance safety, make more defensible decisions, and in the long run reduce personal and organizational liability. Take the following scenario, for example.

One cold blustery morning in December, my partner and I were dispatched at 4:00 a.m. to a maximum-security institution to transport a prisoner to court. The normally one-hour drive from our local courthouse, took over three hours due to a heavy snowstorm that dropped over 9 inches of snow. Many roads were impassable but our supervisor was adamant that we make our way there. The potential for violence was always high when picking up prisoners from this prison but the potential was escalated on this day as the prisoner was refusing to leave his cell and attend court. A cell extraction team had to be called to bring the prisoner to us in the admissions and discharge area.

As we waited, I mentally ran through the variety of scenarios that might play out. A combination of situational awareness and training would form the basis for my subsequent decision making. My situational awareness was not limited to tactical issues or just to the prisoner and task at hand. On that snowy morning, I ran through the four facets of an officer’s situational awareness: informational, environmental, personal, and organizational.

Informational factors available to me included the name of the prisoner, his history of violence, physical description, and reason for not wanting to attend court. In this case, he claimed he was concerned with being transported in the snowstorm. He had a history of institutional violence, and was very muscular and fit.

Environmental factors included working in a controlled environment with additional back up, a small area in which to conduct the required prisoner search, the physical layout of the admissions and discharge area, and the lack of proximity to other prisoners.

Personal factors that I considered included my previous experience dealing with violent prisoners, my concern that I may be injured during an altercation, my personal expectations related to managing the situation effectively, and my fatigue from the three-hour drive through the snowstorm.

Organizational factors included the expectations of the department to meet my operational objective of maintaining safe and secure custody of the prisoner and transporting him to court, the effectiveness of current procedures for dealing with violent prisoners, the level of support from my peers as well as the correctional staff with whom I had not previously worked, and the chance of a formal complaint from the prisoner along with the accompanying stress related to such an investigation.

Thirty minutes after we arrived, the prisoner was brought down in restraints to the admissions and discharge area. He had been extracted forcibly from his cell and was extremely angry and non-compliant with our instructions. In hope of avoiding violence, we articulated the legal requirements for attending court and followed with a cooling-off period. We were able to achieve our goal of searching, securing, and transporting the prisoner to court without incident. This is just one example demonstrating the “background noise” that public-safety professionals encounter on a daily basis. Situational awareness provides a platform to recognize and adapt an approach to not only what law enforcement “sees” but also what other factors are playing out in the background, allowing for informed decision making with minimal risk and liability, leading to a positive outcome. Have you encountered a scenario where improved situational awareness would have changed the outcome?

In your role as an officer, supervisor or command staff, do you see a benefit to situational awareness training? Please contact VCPI’s Training Manager, Sheila Gunderman at sgunderman@vcpionline.org to schedule Rapid Kevin Calder is one of North America’s most knowledgeable and well-respected workplace violence prevention and threat management specialists. His practical approach to violence prevention, conflict resolution and threat assessment is founded on 20 years of comprehensive experience in law enforcement, security management, and performance-based training.

Kevin was a founding member of the British Columbia Sheriff Services Integrated Threat Assessment Unit. In his position as lead threat analyst, he was responsible for assessing violence risk and developing violence prevention strategies to mitigate threats posed from a variety of sources. He also played a key role in the development of the Threat Management Centre of Excellence at the Justice Institute of British Columbia.

Kevin holds an Associate Certificate in Leadership and Conflict Resolution from the Justice Institute of British Columbia and is Board Certified in security management from ASIS. He has trained law enforcement, public and private sector managers and investigators, safety and security professionals, victim service workers and others involved in violence risk reduction. Kevin currently serves as President of the North West chapter of the Association of Threat Assessment Professionals.
 

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SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA UPHOLDS SEARCH OF CELL PHONE INCIDENT TO ARREST

Hawkins v. State

April 2012

 Reprinted from PATC

by Brian S. Batterton, Attorney

On March 23, 2012, in Hawkins v. State [i], the Supreme Court of Georgia addressed the issue of whether a cellular phone may lawfully be searched as part of a search incident to arrest of an automobile. The facts of Hawkins, taken from the decision of Court of Appeals of Georgia, are as follows:

[A]n officer with the Lowndes County Sheriff's Office was contacted by a mother, who said that numerous text messages about narcotics were being sent to her son's cell phone, and who delivered the cell phone to the officer. Sometime thereafter, the officer received a text message on this phone from Hawkins, who evidently believed she was communicating with the son. At the time, the officer did not know Hawkins's identity. Hawkins inquired in her text message whether the son had received certain controlled substances. Posing as the son, the officer responded by text message and asked how many of the pills Hawkins wanted to acquire. In reply, Hawkins asked how many pills were available, and the officer answered in another text message that he had about 25 pills. Hawkins then responded that she wanted all 25 pills and had the money to buy them. The officer and Hawkins continued to correspond by text messages and ultimately agreed to meet at a local restaurant that evening.

Prior to the time designated for the meeting, the same officer arrived at the restaurant and took up a surveillance position in its parking lot. He observed Hawkins drive into the parking lot shortly thereafter. He then observed Hawkins entering data into her phone, and he almost contemporaneously received another text message on the son's cell phone, in which Hawkins announced her arrival at the restaurant.

The officer approached Hawkins's vehicle, identified himself, and placed her under arrest for unlawfully attempting to purchase a controlled substance. Hawkins admitted to the officer that she was the person with whom he had exchanged text messages throughout the day. After Hawkins was asked for and gave her consent, and as an incident to her arrest, police searched Hawkins's vehicle and found her cell phone inside her purse. The officer searched for, and found on Hawkins's cell phone, the text messages that he had exchanged throughout the day with Hawkins. To preserve these text messages, the officer downloaded and printed them. Police did not obtain a warrant before arresting Hawkins, searching her vehicle, or searching the text messages stored on her phone. [ii]

As a review, the Court of Appeals of Georgia, in Hawkins, first held that the search incident arrest of the defendant’s vehicle was lawful under Arizona v. Gant. The rule, as stated by the court was stated as follows:

[W]hen an officer lawfully arrests the occupant or recent occupant of an automobile, and when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle, the officer may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle for such evidence as an incident of the arrest, regardless of whether the officer has any reason to be concerned about the potential destruction of evidence. [iii] [emphasis added]

Second, the Court of Appeals held that the search of the cellular phone for Hawkins’ text messages was lawful as part of the search incident to arrest. Particularly, the court stated:

When an officer is authorized to search in a vehicle for a specific object and, in the course of his search, comes across a container that reasonably might contain the object of his search, the officer is authorized to open the container and search within it for the object. [iv] [emphasis added]

Lastly, the Court of Appeals, in light of the vast amount of information that the cellular phones of today are capable of storing, discussed the scope of the search of a cellular phone incident to arrest. As to the proper scope of the search of Hawkins’ phone, the court stated:

Given the volume and diverse nature of data that may be contained in a cell phone or other mobile electronic data storage device, we think courts generally should, as one prominent commentator has put it, treat such a device "like a container that stores thousands of individual containers in the form of discrete files." Kerr, "Searches and Seizures in a Digital World," 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 555 (2005). Just because an officer has the authority to make a search of the data stored on a cell phone (that is, just because he has reason to "open" the "container") does not mean that he has the authority to sift through all of the data stored on the phone (that is, to open and view all of the sub-containers of data stored therein). Instead, his search must be limited as much as is reasonably practicable by the object of the search. See Ross, 456 U. S. at 824 (IV). Although it may not always be possible at the outset of a search to immediately identify the specific data that is the object of the search without examining something more, it more often than not will be possible to narrow in some meaningful way the sub-containers that might reasonably contain the object of the search. Where the object of the search is to discover certain text messages, for instance, there is no need for the officer to sift through photos or audio files or Internet browsing history data stored on the phone. [v] [emphasis added]

As such, the Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress.

Hawkins applied for certiorari to the Supreme Court of Georgia, which was granted on May 16, 2011. On March 23, 2012, the court delivered its opinion.

The Supreme Court first reiterated that during a lawful search incident to arrest, an officer may search the passenger compartment of the arrestee’s vehicle and any containers therein when it is reasonable to believe evidence related to the crime of arrest may be found in the vehicle. [vi] In Hawkins’ case, the police observed Hawkins texting as she arrived to conduct a narcotics transaction and almost immediately after this observation, the officers received a text message from her. Further, the cellular phone was found within Hawkins’ vehicle during the search incident to arrest.

Thus, the issue before the Supreme Court of Georgia was whether, for the purposes of a search incident to arrest, [Hawkins] cell phone could be treated in the same manner as a traditional physical container.
Hawkins argued that a cell phone should not be considered a traditional container for the purposes of a search incident to arrest because it does not contain tangible objects. However, the Supreme Court disagreed and held that:

[A] cell phone is “roughly analogous” to a container that properly can be opened and searched for electronic data, similar to a traditional container that can be opened to search for tangible objects of evidence. Hawkins, supra at 257.[vii] [emphasis added]

The court then stated that, in Hawkins, it was reasonable for the police to believe that the object of their search, particularly text messages, would be found in the cell phone.

The Supreme Court also noted that the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals decision in Hawkins stated that the high volume of information stored in a cell phone should change its character from that of a traditional container. The Supreme Court disagreed with the dissent’s argument in the Court of Appeals decision but did advise a word of caution on the scope of a permissible search of a cell phone incident to arrest. Agreeing with the Court of Appeals in its discussion of the permissible scope of the search, the Supreme Court stated:

[W]e must apply the principles set forth in traditional ‘container’ cases to searches for electronic data with great care and caution. And, the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals gave appropriate guidance regarding the scope of a search of a cell phone incident to arrest: the “search must be limited as much as is reasonably practicable by the object of the search. That will usually mean that an officer may not conduct a “fishing expedition” and sift through all of the data stored in the cell phone. Thus, when “the object of the search is to discover certain text messages, for instance, there is no need for the officer to sift through photos or audio files or Internet browsing history data stored [in] the phone.” Accordingly, reviewing the reasonable scope of the search will largely be a fact-specific inquiry. [viii] [internal citations omitted]

The Supreme Court then affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and found that the search of the cell phone incident to arrest was reasonable in Hawkins’ case.

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Note: Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions. As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases. This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.

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CITATIONS:

[i] S11G0644, ___ Ga. ____ (2012)

[ii] Hawkins v. State, 307 Ga. App. 253 (704 S.E.2d 886)(2010)

[iii] Hawkins at 5 (quoting Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1714)

[iv] Id. at 9 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 842 (1982)

[v] Id. at 14-15

[vi] Hawkins, S11G0644 at 2

[vii] Id. at 3 (citing See e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (III) (B) (n.7) (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Wurie, 612 F.Supp.2d 104, 109 (D. Mass. 2009))

[viii] Id. at 6

 

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