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May 2012
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By
John Reid & Associates
1998 David Lykken wrote
a book titled, "A Tremor in the Blood: The Uses and Abuses of the
Polygraph Technique". In it, he advocated the use of his own "Guilty
Knowledge Test" and attacked the existing Control Question Technique
by initially offering a naive description of control question
theory. He then picked apart his own implausible theory. The
uninformed reader was left with the forgone conclusion: 'Of course
the control question polygraph technique is invalid, look at how
faulty the underlying theory is.'
History is repeating itself. Defense "experts" are condemning
contemporary interrogation techniques by presenting their own
distorted portrayal of what occurs during an interrogation and then
attacking their own inaccurate description. Fortunately, most courts
have seen through their blatant attempt to discredit any confession
obtained through a police interrogation. Nonetheless, it is
instructive to know what these defense experts are saying.
The
Defense Experts' Characterization of Interrogation
The following is taken from a report prepared by Dr. Richard Leo on
a contested confession case in Wisconsin (Brendan Dassey). It is
representative of how many defense experts describe the
interrogation process:
A. "The sole purpose for custodial interrogation is to elicit a
confession. Contemporary American interrogation methods are
structured to persuade a rational person who knows he is guilty to
rethink his initial decision to deny culpability and instead choose
to confess."
B. "The first step of successful interrogation consists of causing a
suspect to view his situation as hopeless. The interrogator
communicates to the suspect that he has been caught , that there is
no way he will escape the interrogation without incriminating
himself, and that his future is determined - that regardless of the
suspect's denials or protestations of innocence, he is going to be
arrested, prosecuted convicted and eventually incarcerated."
C. "The second step of successful interrogation consists of offering
the suspect inducements to confess - reasons or scenarios that
suggest the suspect will receive some personal, moral, communal,
procedural material or other benefit if he confesses to some version
of the offense." There are three forms of such inducements:
. "Low-end inducements refer to interpersonal or moral appeals the
interrogator uses to convince a suspect that he will feel better if
he confesses."
. "Systemic inducements refer to appeals that the interrogator uses
to focus the suspect's attention on the processes and outcomes of
the criminal justice system in order to get the suspect to come to
the conclusion that his case is likely to be processed more
favorably by all actors in the criminal justice system if he
confesses."
. "High-end inducements refer to appeals that directly communicate
that the suspect will receive less punishment, a lower prison
sentence, and/or some form of police, prosecutorial, judicial, or
juror leniency if he complies with the interrogator's demand that he
confess."
This portrayal of the interrogation process clearly describes
techniques that are illegal and, if used, may cause a confession to
be suppressed. It certainly does not describe The Reid Nine Steps of
Interrogation. In fact, it contains a number of procedures that we
specifically teach as being improper.
Reid's Response
We certainly take issue with the stated purpose of an interrogation
being to elicit a confession. On page 4 of our training manual we
state that the objective of an interrogation is to elicit the truth
from a suspect, not a confession.
There are a number of possible outcomes of a successful
interrogation other than obtaining a confession. Some of these are:
(1) The suspect is innocent; (2) The suspect did not commit the
offense under investigation but lied about some aspect of the
investigation (motive, alibi, access, etc.) ; (3) The suspect did
not commit the offense under investigation but knows who did.
Throughout an interrogation the investigator's goal is always to
learn the truth.Leo states that the first step of an interrogation
is to convince the suspect that his situation is helpless. This is
an outright false statement. This statement or goal never appears in
our text books or seminar manuals. On page 49 of our training manual
we teach the opposite, that it is improper to tell the suspect that
he is facing inevitable consequences. We reference cases where
innocence people falsely confessed because the investigator
convinced the suspect that he would suffer consequences regardless
of his denials. On page 64 we offer information on how to identify
truthful from deceptive denials and, on that same page, acknowledge
that sometimes innocent suspects are mistakenly interrogated.
What we do teach is that, at the outset of the interrogation, the
investigator should express high confidence that the suspect was
involved in committing the crime. Guilty suspects are unlikely to
tell the truth unless they believe the investigator already knows
that they committed the crime. Consequently, expressing confidence
in the suspect's guilt is necessary to learn the truth from guilty
suspects. However, this procedure certainly does not result in false
confessions from innocent suspects. Leo, and others, have taken the
concept of expressing high confidence in the suspect's guilt and
converting it to a self-serving portrayal that interrogations are
designed to convince the suspect that he is in a helpless situation.
This is simply not the case.
As to the second step of the process, any successful interrogation
technique must offer the guilty suspect a real or perceived benefit
of telling the truth. This is fundamental to persuasive
communication and, on a daily basis, the average person is bombarded
with incentives designed to influence their behavior. Whether the
message is to buy a particular product, get a medical checkup, or
watch a particular television program, all persuasive arguments
involves a promise of benefit with one choice and adverse
consequences with another choice.
Common law recognized that some promises of benefit or threats of
adverse consequences may cause an innocent person to confess.
Examples include promises to avoid a lengthy sentence or threats of
physical pain if the suspect does not confess. These would fit the
description of what Leo calls, "high-end inducements." Countries
whose criminal justice system is based on common law forbid
interrogation procedures that involve inflicting, or threatening to
inflict pain or discomfort onto a suspect in an effort to obtain a
confession. However, they differ somewhat on the use of promises to
obtain a confession.In the United Kingdom, promises of leniency in
exchange for a confession are codified within their law, e.g., if a
suspect confesses early during an investigation, by statue, he
increases the probability of receiving a lesser sentence. In 2000
the Canadian Supreme Court provided a bright line distinction with
respect to promises of leniency. In Oickle, the court ruled that
only a quid pro quo offer by the interrogator for leniency in
exchange for a confession is impermissible. The United States has
the most stringent legal requirement concerning rewards for a
confession. Very simply, an investigator cannot offer or imply a
promise of lenience in exchange for a confession.
Applying legal standards, Leo's description of low-end inducements
are certainly legal and are advocated in the Reid Technique. The
high-end inducements are clearly illegal in the United States as
well as Canada and we teach investigators not to use these tactics.
There are multiple references to these illegal interrogation tactics
in both our training manual as well as our text, Criminal
Interrogation and Confessions.
This leaves "systemic inducements" which are designed to get the
suspect to come to the conclusion that if he confesses, his case may
be processed more favorably by the criminal justice system. From the
interrogator's perspective, of course, this is desirable and yet the
interrogator cannot mention or imply a benefit of more favorable
treatment in exchange for telling the truth. It is perfectly legal,
however, to allow the suspect to form his own conclusion that he may
benefit in some way by telling the truth.
To allow a suspect to believe that it may be beneficial if he tells
the truth, the Reid Technique takes advantage of two fundamental
principles of human nature. The first is that criminal suspects
justify their crime in some manner (blaming the victim, an
accomplice, intoxication, financial pressure re-describing the
intentions behind their crime, contrasting their crime to worse
behavior, etc.). Second, it is human nature to not want to be blamed
for something we didn't do. Given the choice, the average person
will choose to suffer consequences for something he did wrong rather
than have people think something about him or his behavior that was
not true.
With this in mind, the first tactic within the Reid Technique that
is used to allow a suspect to perceive some benefit of telling the
truth is an interrogation theme. During the theme we express
understanding toward the suspect's crime and offer moral
justifications and excuses for committing it. The theme is intended
to reinforce the existing justifications already present in the
guilty suspect's mind. The guilty suspect who hears the
interrogation theme may well conclude,
"The investigator is right. I did have a good reason for robbing
that store. I'm not a bad person and I really did need that money to
help out my family. If the investigator can understand why I robbed
that place, maybe others will too." An innocent suspect who has not
gone through the process of justifying the crime will not relate to
the interrogator's theme and will reject the interrogator's
suggested justifications. When presented with a theme, most innocent
suspects offer persistent denials of involvement in the offense.
The second tactic takes advantage of the drive within each of us to
not want others to think things about us or our behavior that are
not true. We call it the use of an alternative question. An
alternative question offers the suspect two choices concerning some
aspect of his crime. Accepting either choice represents an admission
of guilt. For example: "Did you plan this out for months in advance
or did it just happen on the spur of the moment?"; "Did you steal
that money and blow it on drugs and booze or did you take it for
something important?" The perceived benefit offered through the use
of an alternative question is that by choosing to confess, the
guilty suspect may keep others from believing something about him or
his crime that is not true, e.g., that he planned the crime out for
months or that he blew the money on drugs and booze. The suspect, of
course, always has a third choice which is to state that neither
alternative is true - that he did not commit the crime.
Whether Reid's use of an interrogation theme or alternative question
falls within the category of Leo's low-end or systemic inducements
is insignificant since neither procedure offer a direct or implied
promise of leniency. Rather, the techniques represent legally
persuasive tactics that increases the likelihood that a guilty
suspect will choose to tell the truth during an interrogation.
In summary, defense experts have attempted to suppress confessions
by first providing a distorted and inaccurate description of the
"standard police interrogation" and then presenting studies
demonstrating that these improper interrogation techniques result in
false confessions. As explained in this web tip, these experts are
not describing procedures or tactics taught in the Reid Technique,
nor tactics that are considered legal by most courts.
Credit and Permission Statement: This
Investigator Tip was developed by John E. Reid and Associates Inc.
Permission is hereby granted to those who wish to share or copy the
article. For additional 'tips' visit
www.reid.com;
select 'Educational Information' and 'Investigator Tip'. Inquiries
regarding Investigator Tips should be directed to Janet Finnerty
johnreid@htc.net.
For more information regarding Reid seminars and training products,
contact John E. Reid and Associates, Inc. at 800-255-5747 or
www.reid.com


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We Need Defensive Driving
By Val Van Brocklin
Let’s look at some stories of real cops who posted stuff
on the internet that got them disciplined or cost them
their jobs, and hurt the reputation of their
departments. Too bad they didn’t have a clue about their
rights, responsibilities and liabilities as a police
officer online. WARNING – VIEWER DISCRETION ADVISED. If
you like happy endings, you may not wish to proceed.
Bikini wearing cop vs. bikini wearing cop car.
Can a bikini get you fired? That may depend on how and
where you wear it.
Let’s say one of you is a female Deputy Sheriff. In your
off-duty time you philanthropically participate in a
charity bikini car wash fundraiser wearing, well, a
skimpy bikini. The fundraiser is marketed as “Tits n
Tats.” The event also features employees from a topless
strip club.
The other of you is a male police officer who takes his
private car to the fundraiser, then decides to take his
patrol car. A photo of your patrol car with the
“scantily-clad” car washers draped on the hood surfaces
on Facebook.
This happened in Moncks Corner, South Carolina –
population 7,044. The ending is a mixed bag. No job
action was taken against the Deputy Sheriff. A statement
issued by the Sheriff’s Office said, “She was involved
in the event as a private citizen and did not violate
the law, BC [Berkley County] SO or county’s policies.”
The police officer is out of a job. It’s unknown whether
he was fired or asked to resign. His Chief said there
were policies governing take-home cruisers and allowing
bikini-clad women to be photographed next to one
violated those policies. [For the sake of research, you
can link here to a photo of the bikini-clad patrol car –
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20017318-504083.html]
I ask you, dear readers, if you think the punishment
would’ve been the same if the photo hadn’t been
circulated on Facebook, thus garnering public attention.
That is, would the officer have been fired for violating
the policies governing the use of take-home cruisers if
the violation had been known only within the department
and hadn’t made it onto the wide world web?
"They weren’t thinking.”
An Indiana State Trooper resigned and an Indianapolis
Metro PD Officer was suspended for what all would agree
were some stupid postings on the trooper’s personal
Facebook page.
The trooper bragged about heavy drinking and posted
photos of his banged up patrol car with the comment,
“Oops! Where did my front end go?” Perhaps the most
infamous photo showed the police officer friend holding
a gun to the trooper’s head as he described drinking
lots of beer with his buddies.
The trooper also weighed in on his work and people who
resist arrest. He referred to himself as a “garbage man”
and “I pick up trash for a living.” Commenting on an
incident in which Fresno police officers punched a
homeless man during his arrest, the trooper posted, “Let
someone, homeless or not, try and stab me … he’ll
probably end up shot. These people should have died when
they were young anyway, I’m just doing them a favor.”
According to a Major with the ISP, the state’s biggest
concern was that the trooper may have been Facebook-ing
on duty. I’m biting my keyboard here. How does personal
use of a computer (not unlike a personal phone call) on
department time rise above concern about the content
here? Maybe it’s because, in the absence of any specific
social media policy, using a computer for personal
communication on tax payer time was the only violation.
Asked what the trooper and IMPD officer could have been
thinking, an IMPD Sergeant spokesperson said, “They
weren’t thinking. It was an error in judgment…so now
there has to be accountability and that’s what we’re
doing.” [Trooper resigns after Facebook controversy --
http://www.wthr.com/Global/story.asp?S=10552361]
With MySpace friends like these, who needs enemies?
A well-known roadkill on the information highway was
Lexington Officer Joshua Cromer who stopped and arrested
country singing star John Michael Montgomery. Montgomery
ended up charged with DUI, possessing a controlled drug
and two counts of carrying a concealed weapon.
Friends, mostly fellow cops, congratulated Cromer on his
MySpace page and made fun of Montgomery by posting a
doctored photo portraying Cromer as an adoring fan.
Complaints about Cromer’s site sparked the brass into
checking out other officers’ MySpace pages. The pages
contained disparaging comments about the citizenry,
gays, and the mentally disabled. Cromer was dismissed
and five of his MySpace friends were suspended. [Watch
What You Post --
http://www.policemag.com/Channel/Technology/Articles/2009/12/Watch-What-You-Post.aspx]
Montgomery copped a plea to just the DUI charge with a
$660 fine and court costs. If you don’t think his
attorneys’ possible subpoena for the officers’ MySpace
pages had anything to do with that deal, I’ve got some
costume jewelry I’d like to show you. [Country Singer
John Michael Montgomery Makes Plea Deal in DUI Arrest --
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,210160,00.html.]
Detective’s Facebook comments targeted by gun advocates.
An East Palo Alto detective came under fire for posting
disparaging Facebook comments about gun advocates
carrying unloaded weapons. The California gun law at
issue apparently prohibits carrying a concealed weapon
without a license but permits open display of a firearm
in a holster, but it’s illegal for the gun to be loaded
in most cases.
Gun advocates say they’re open-carrying unloaded
firearms because they can’t get concealed carry permits.
Police say the practice is dangerous because officers
can’t tell whether a gun is loaded and what an armed
person’s intentions are.
The detective got caught in the cross fire when he
posted back and forth with a Facebook friend about the
issue and apparently joked that an unloaded carrier
should be “proned out,” reminded that “turds will jack
him for his gun in a heartbeat” and if he makes a move
…”2 weeks off!!!”
A gun rights advocate and lawyer posted a screen grab of
the Facebook thread and a link to the detective’s
Facebook page on his own web site and urged his readers
to complain to East Palo Alto council members. They did.
They also railed in a thread that continued for 45
pages.
The Chief said the detective wouldn’t be fired but he
would be disciplined. The Open Carry advocacy group said
they were “ecstatic about the decision.” [East Palo Alto
cop takes heat for Facebook remarks --
http://www.mercurynews.com/breaking-news/ci_14361484.]
Officer gets his goat…and some discipline.
Southfield is a suburb of Detroit. Imagine you’re a
Southfield cop and you get a call about two baby goats
playing on a rooftop. It’s illegal to keep goats inside
city limits so you respond to the densely populated
neighborhood. The baby goats are really cute so you post
a picture of them on your personal Facebook page.
Any problem? Well, Southfield PD didn’t have specific
policies about social media sites, but their policies do
require officers to keep evidence and investigations
confidential. In disciplining the responding officer,
the Southfield Police Chief said, “[T]hat’s a photograph
of the crime scene.” [Too Much Info – Police Officers &
Their Social Media Profiles --
http://www.poam.net/on-the-job/2010/police-officers-social-media-profiles/.]
No good MySpace deed goes unpunished.
Now imagine you’re a great school resource officer,
well-liked by the kids and school staff. Like many
school resource officers, you set up a MySpace page to
further communicate with students. School leaders,
parents and your department are supportive as you widely
share safety tips with the kids and also receive tips
that help investigations. Then it’s discovered that
students who go to your MySpace page can link to
pornographic material.
That’s what happened to Officer John Nohejl. He was
eventually cleared of any wrongdoing but the experience
left a lasting imprint,
“I tried to do a good thing for kids. But I got
blind-sided. I’d checked out this person’s profile and
it seemed OK, so I allowed him on as a friend. … [H]e
went back onto MySpace and maliciously changed his
profile so that in a matter of three clicks from my
page, kids could be exposed to this pornography. … It’s
a good lesson for cops. You can be held responsible for
things that are beyond your control. Who can possibly go
through the profiles of hundreds of MySpace friends
every day to make sure that someone’s not doing the same
thing?”
Big stakes.
There’s more at stake here than individual officers as
roadkill. There’s the tarnishing of entire agencies and
the distrust of the community that other officers must
bear.
There’s also officer safety. As Santa Monica Police
Chief Tim Jackman recently commented at a SMILE (Social
Media the Internet and Law Enforcement) Conference, all
safety precautions can go to the wind with one click of
the mouse. The Chief was speaking of a recent incident
in which a traffic stop of a suspected drunk driver
ended in a gunfight that sent the officer to the
hospital with a bullet wound to his hip. The suspect
fled and was later shot before he could be detained by a
SWAT team.
Turned out the driver was a previous felon, had been in
jail for murder and was a notorious gang member. He was
also sent to the same hospital as the officer who
stopped him. A quick and sound decision was made to not
identify the officer or where he was.
But when the Chief logged onto Facebook at home that
night he found a comment from a retired fellow officer
who had recently moved away. Unaware, the well-meaning
retired officer IDed the wounded officer to the world.
[Calif. Chief on the dangers of Facebook --
http://www.policeone.com/police-technology/articles/3198725-Video-Calif-Chief-on-the-dangers-of-Facebook.]
The safety of officers’ families is also at stake. The
profession prepares officers to have a plan for their
families if a public safety threat occurs when an
officer is off-duty on a family outing. Officers
similarly need to be trained about potential risks when
they post photos of their spouses and children on a
social media site, talk about where they work and go to
school, and when they’re all going to be gone on
vacation.
Accountability needs to be shared.
The Indianapolis Metro PD Sergeant was right, there has
to be accountability. I daresay most recruits eating at
a restaurant the day before they start the Academy,
don’t intuitively sit with their backs to the wall,
evaluate lines of fire and plan their cover and escape
routes. They are taught these things until it becomes
second nature to them. But it’s not common sense.
Commoners don’t routinely exercise such sense.
Relying on common sense to take the place of training
and policies specifically dealing with the risks of
social media seems equally ill-advised. Especially since
the common sense of social media that many recruits and
young officers grew up in is a much lower standard than
they will be expected to meet as law enforcement
officers.
I don’t equate the examples above. But they all have
something in common – officers weren’t thinking. They
weren’t thinking about the special circumstances of
their work as it interfaces with an ever-evolving
technology that is playing an ever-growing role in
officers’ personal and professional lives. Yes, Officer
Nohejl was innocent and unsuspecting, just like a
recruit at a restaurant before he attends the Academy.
But can we afford unsuspecting police officers?
The profession and departments bear responsibility for
training officers and recruits to think in this area
just as they train them in other legal and tactical
aspects of the job. The occasional SMILE conference
isn’t enough.
|


BY KEVIN CALDER, PRESIDENT, K CALDER & ASSOCIATES
Reprinted from the Virginia Center for Policing Innovation
IN TODAY’S COMPLICATED WORLD, it is critical that public-safety
professionals recognize that a wide range of factors impact how
they handle both mundane and critical situations in the field.
Recognition of the risk of violence and situational awareness
allow officers to choose appropriate strategies that enhance
their safety, as well as that of co-workers, protectees, and the
public. Usually in law enforcement when we hear the term
“situational awareness” we often think of the concept within a
tactical application or context. However, having sound
situational awareness is vital in every law-enforcement role.
Situational awareness is the ongoing recognition of internal and
external factors and influences that form the foundation of an
officer’s decision making. It is a comprehensive thought process
that ultimately leads to effective decisions resulting in
minimized risk and liability.
As a Deputy Sheriff, I was regularly challenged to articulate
and in some cases defend my tactical and operational decisions.
As a young officer, I would focus on the external information
available to me: individuals involved, factors related to the
scene and environment, and my goals and objectives. As my
operational experience grew, I realized that my decisions were
increasingly influenced by personal and organizational
influences. By practicing situational awareness I believe
officers can enhance safety, make more defensible decisions, and
in the long run reduce personal and organizational liability.
Take the following scenario, for example.
One cold blustery morning in December, my partner and I were
dispatched at 4:00 a.m. to a maximum-security institution to
transport a prisoner to court. The normally one-hour drive from
our local courthouse, took over three hours due to a heavy
snowstorm that dropped over 9 inches of snow. Many roads were
impassable but our supervisor was adamant that we make our way
there. The potential for violence was always high when picking
up prisoners from this prison but the potential was escalated on
this day as the prisoner was refusing to leave his cell and
attend court. A cell extraction team had to be called to bring
the prisoner to us in the admissions and discharge area.
As we waited, I mentally ran through the variety of scenarios
that might play out. A combination of situational awareness and
training would form the basis for my subsequent decision making.
My situational awareness was not limited to tactical issues or
just to the prisoner and task at hand. On that snowy morning, I
ran through the four facets of an officer’s situational
awareness: informational, environmental, personal, and
organizational.
Informational factors available to me included the name of the
prisoner, his history of violence, physical description, and
reason for not wanting to attend court. In this case, he claimed
he was concerned with being transported in the snowstorm. He had
a history of institutional violence, and was very muscular and
fit.
Environmental factors included working in a controlled
environment with additional back up, a small area in which to
conduct the required prisoner search, the physical layout of the
admissions and discharge area, and the lack of proximity to
other prisoners.
Personal factors that I considered included my previous
experience dealing with violent prisoners, my concern that I may
be injured during an altercation, my personal expectations
related to managing the situation effectively, and my fatigue
from the three-hour drive through the snowstorm.
Organizational factors included the expectations of the
department to meet my operational objective of maintaining safe
and secure custody of the prisoner and transporting him to
court, the effectiveness of current procedures for dealing with
violent prisoners, the level of support from my peers as well as
the correctional staff with whom I had not previously worked,
and the chance of a formal complaint from the prisoner along
with the accompanying stress related to such an investigation.
Thirty minutes after we arrived, the prisoner was brought down
in restraints to the admissions and discharge area. He had been
extracted forcibly from his cell and was extremely angry and
non-compliant with our instructions. In hope of avoiding
violence, we articulated the legal requirements for attending
court and followed with a cooling-off period. We were able to
achieve our goal of searching, securing, and transporting the
prisoner to court without incident. This is just one example
demonstrating the “background noise” that public-safety
professionals encounter on a daily basis. Situational awareness
provides a platform to recognize and adapt an approach to not
only what law enforcement “sees” but also what other factors are
playing out in the background, allowing for informed decision
making with minimal risk and liability, leading to a positive
outcome. Have you encountered a scenario where improved
situational awareness would have changed the outcome?
In your role as an officer, supervisor or command staff, do you
see a benefit to situational awareness training? Please contact
VCPI’s Training Manager, Sheila Gunderman at
sgunderman@vcpionline.org to schedule Rapid Kevin Calder is one
of North America’s most knowledgeable and well-respected
workplace violence prevention and threat management specialists.
His practical approach to violence prevention, conflict
resolution and threat assessment is founded on 20 years of
comprehensive experience in law enforcement, security
management, and performance-based training.
Kevin was a founding member of the British Columbia Sheriff
Services Integrated Threat Assessment Unit. In his position as
lead threat analyst, he was responsible for assessing violence
risk and developing violence prevention strategies to mitigate
threats posed from a variety of sources. He also played a key
role in the development of the Threat Management Centre of
Excellence at the Justice Institute of British Columbia.
Kevin holds an Associate Certificate in
Leadership and Conflict Resolution from the Justice Institute of
British Columbia and is Board Certified in security management
from ASIS. He has trained law enforcement, public and private
sector managers and investigators, safety and security
professionals, victim service workers and others involved in
violence risk reduction. Kevin currently serves as President of
the North West chapter of the Association of Threat Assessment
Professionals.


SUPREME COURT OF
GEORGIA UPHOLDS SEARCH OF CELL PHONE INCIDENT TO ARREST
Hawkins v. State
April 2012
Reprinted
from PATC
by Brian S. Batterton, Attorney
On March 23, 2012, in
Hawkins v. State
[i], the Supreme Court of Georgia addressed the issue of whether a
cellular phone may lawfully be searched as part of a search incident
to arrest of an automobile. The facts of
Hawkins, taken
from the decision of Court of Appeals of Georgia, are as follows:
[A]n officer with the Lowndes County Sheriff's
Office was contacted by a mother, who said that numerous text
messages about narcotics were being sent to her son's cell phone,
and who delivered the cell phone to the officer. Sometime
thereafter, the officer received a text message on this phone from
Hawkins, who evidently believed she was communicating with the son.
At the time, the officer did not know Hawkins's identity. Hawkins
inquired in her text message whether the son had received certain
controlled substances. Posing as the son, the officer responded by
text message and asked how many of the pills Hawkins wanted to
acquire. In reply, Hawkins asked how many pills were available, and
the officer answered in another text message that he had about 25
pills. Hawkins then responded that she wanted all 25 pills and had
the money to buy them. The officer and Hawkins continued to
correspond by text messages and ultimately agreed to meet at a local
restaurant that evening.
Prior to the time designated for the meeting, the
same officer arrived at the restaurant and took up a surveillance
position in its parking lot. He observed Hawkins drive into the
parking lot shortly thereafter. He then observed Hawkins entering
data into her phone, and he almost contemporaneously received
another text message on the son's cell phone, in which Hawkins
announced her arrival at the restaurant.
The officer approached Hawkins's vehicle,
identified himself, and placed her under arrest for unlawfully
attempting to purchase a controlled substance. Hawkins admitted to
the officer that she was the person with whom he had exchanged text
messages throughout the day. After Hawkins was asked for and gave
her consent, and as an incident to her arrest, police searched
Hawkins's vehicle and found her cell phone inside her purse. The
officer searched for, and found on Hawkins's cell phone, the text
messages that he had exchanged throughout the day with Hawkins. To
preserve these text messages, the officer downloaded and printed
them. Police did not obtain a warrant before arresting Hawkins,
searching her vehicle, or searching the text messages stored on her
phone. [ii]
As a review, the Court of Appeals of
Georgia, in Hawkins,
first held that the search incident arrest of the defendant’s
vehicle was lawful under Arizona v.
Gant. The rule, as stated by the court
was stated as follows:
[W]hen an officer lawfully arrests the occupant
or recent occupant of an automobile, and when it is reasonable to
believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the
vehicle, the officer may search the passenger compartment of the
vehicle for such evidence as an incident of the arrest, regardless
of whether the officer has any reason to be concerned about the
potential destruction of evidence. [iii] [emphasis added]
Second, the Court of Appeals held that the search
of the cellular phone for Hawkins’ text messages was lawful as part
of the search incident to arrest. Particularly, the court stated:
When an officer is authorized to search in a
vehicle for a specific object and, in the course of his search,
comes across a container that reasonably might contain the object of
his search, the officer is authorized to open the container and
search within it for the object. [iv] [emphasis added]
Lastly, the Court of Appeals, in light of the
vast amount of information that the cellular phones of today are
capable of storing, discussed the scope of the search of a cellular
phone incident to arrest. As to the proper scope of the search of
Hawkins’ phone, the court stated:
Given the volume and diverse nature of data
that may be contained in a cell phone or other mobile electronic
data storage device, we think courts generally should, as one
prominent commentator has put it, treat such a device "like a
container that stores thousands of individual containers in the form
of discrete files." Kerr, "Searches
and Seizures in a Digital World," 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 555 (2005).
Just because an officer has the authority to
make a search of the data stored on a cell phone (that is, just
because he has reason to "open" the "container") does not mean that
he has the authority to sift through all of the data stored on the
phone (that is, to open and view all of the sub-containers of data
stored therein). Instead, his search must be limited as much as is
reasonably practicable by the object of the search.
See Ross, 456 U. S. at 824 (IV).
Although it may not always be possible at the
outset of a search to immediately identify the specific data that is
the object of the search without examining something more, it more
often than not will be possible to narrow in some meaningful way the
sub-containers that might reasonably contain the object of the
search. Where the object of the search
is to discover certain text messages, for instance, there is no need
for the officer to sift through photos or audio files or Internet
browsing history data stored on the phone. [v] [emphasis added]
As such, the Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed
the denial of the motion to suppress.
Hawkins applied for certiorari to the Supreme
Court of Georgia, which was granted on May 16, 2011. On March 23,
2012, the court delivered its opinion.
The Supreme Court first reiterated that during a
lawful search incident to arrest, an officer may search the
passenger compartment of the arrestee’s vehicle and any containers
therein when it is reasonable to believe evidence related to the
crime of arrest may be found in the vehicle. [vi] In Hawkins’ case,
the police observed Hawkins texting as she arrived to conduct a
narcotics transaction and almost immediately after this observation,
the officers received a text message from her. Further, the cellular
phone was found within Hawkins’ vehicle during the search incident
to arrest.
Thus, the issue before the Supreme Court of
Georgia was whether, for the purposes
of a search incident to arrest, [Hawkins] cell phone could be
treated in the same manner as a traditional physical container.
Hawkins argued that a cell phone should not be considered a
traditional container for the purposes of a search incident to
arrest because it does not contain tangible objects. However, the
Supreme Court disagreed and held that:
[A] cell phone is “roughly analogous” to a
container that properly can be opened and searched for electronic
data, similar to a traditional container that can be opened to
search for tangible objects of evidence.
Hawkins,
supra at 257.[vii] [emphasis added]
The court then stated that, in
Hawkins, it was
reasonable for the police to believe that the object of their
search, particularly text messages, would be found in the cell
phone.
The Supreme Court also noted that the
dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals decision in
Hawkins stated
that the high volume of information stored in a cell phone should
change its character from that of a traditional container. The
Supreme Court disagreed with the dissent’s argument in the Court of
Appeals decision but did advise a word of caution on the
scope of a permissible search of a cell phone incident to arrest.
Agreeing with the Court of Appeals in its discussion of the
permissible scope of the search, the Supreme Court stated:
[W]e must apply the principles set forth in
traditional ‘container’ cases to searches for electronic data with
great care and caution. And, the
majority opinion of the Court of Appeals gave appropriate guidance
regarding the scope of a search of a cell phone incident to arrest:
the “search must be limited as much as is reasonably practicable by
the object of the search.
That will usually mean that an officer may
not conduct a “fishing expedition” and sift through all of the data
stored in the cell phone. Thus, when “the object of the search is to
discover certain text messages, for instance, there is no need for
the officer to sift through photos or audio files or Internet
browsing history data stored [in] the phone.”
Accordingly, reviewing the reasonable scope
of the search will largely be a fact-specific inquiry.
[viii] [internal citations omitted]
The Supreme Court then affirmed the decision of
the Court of Appeals and found that the search of the cell phone
incident to arrest was reasonable in Hawkins’ case.
_____________________
Note: Court holdings can vary significantly
between jurisdictions. As such, it is advisable to seek the advice
of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on
specific cases. This article is not intended to constitute legal
advice on a specific case.
_____________________
CITATIONS:
[i] S11G0644, ___ Ga. ____ (2012)
[ii] Hawkins v. State, 307 Ga. App. 253 (704
S.E.2d 886)(2010)
[iii] Hawkins
at 5 (quoting Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1714)
[iv] Id.
at 9 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 842 (1982)
[v] Id. at
14-15
[vi] Hawkins, S11G0644 at 2
[vii] Id. at 3 (citing See e.g., United States v.
Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (III) (B) (n.7) (5th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Wurie, 612 F.Supp.2d 104, 109 (D. Mass. 2009))
[viii] Id. at 6
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