in this issue . . . Responding to Active Killing Requires Training and Trust   Force Decision-Making    Interpreting Verbal Phrases

 

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By Rick Armellino
Baker Batshield
Reprinted from Policeone.com

 

Deadly day at the office

The deranged gunman walked in, granting just enough time for the receptionist to stand up and ask the simple question, “Can we help you”?  The shooting barrage began, and another deranged homicidal and suicidal coward would be immortalized, brutally trading a warped sense of fame in return for the precious lives of innocent victims.

The American Civics Association building in downtown Binghamton, New York would forever remain a footnote in the massacre record books, along with the names of the victims and the police response.

Seriously wounded, the receptionist lay quietly on the floor, playing dead after taking a shot to the stomach.  Bleeding and in great pain, she was lucky to be alive.  Her co-worker seated next to her at the reception counter was not so fortunate, her bleeding body lay dying a short distance away, hit multiple times - including the head.

When shot, 61 year-old Shirley DeLucia stumbled backwards, fell down and played dead.  The shooter swiftly shot her co-worker and moved on, searching for fresh targets, which he soon located in a nearby classroom.

In shock and valiantly clinging to life, she became aware that the sound of rapid gunfire was now emanating from an area further back into building, out of her line of sight.  Defensively positioning herself under the receptionist’s counter, she located her cell phone, dialed 911 and soon found comfort speaking with the emergency operator.

Knowing that police headquarters was only three short blocks away, it was assumed that assistance would be arriving shortly.  She was right, the sound of sirens close by was almost immediate, rescuers and medical assistance were now positioned just outside.

Silence is golden

Police first responders arrived within 2 minutes, and the police chief soon followed.  Upon arrival, the sound of gunfire was not heard, so there would be no multiple officer entry team formed up in accordance with this region's typical active shooter responder policy.  The default procedure kicked-in, and an outside perimeter was quickly established.

Police Chief Joseph Zikuski had assumed command, collecting all available information.  Within ten minutes dozens of officers were positioned behind available cover outside awaiting orders - so many officers soon surrounded the building that protective cover was in short supply.

Shirley DuLucia realized that rescue would not be immediate as her observations and ability to speak English had become an important resource to help end the potential for more death.  Instructed to remain hidden, she continually confirmed that the shooting had stopped, and that no movement could be detected within her earshot.

Who do you trust?

The killer was still alive and capable of ambushing rescuers, or he was already dead.  Chief Zikuski had a choice, could his less prepared and equipped patrol officers be trusted to effectively make entry and clear the building, or did the gravity of this dynamic situation require the specialized services of SWAT?

Individually ready, willing and able, brave Binghamton patrol officers badly wanted to take out this cowardly monster, right then and there, before anyone else was allowed to die - this was not destined to happen.  Instead these officers were ordered to remain stationed around the outside perimeter, in full view of the citizenry and media.  During the long wait for SWAT entry, law enforcement personnel moved worried friends and family to a church a few blocks away.

Approximately one hour after the shooting ceased, SWAT made entry.  One hour and fifteen minutes after being shot, Shirley DeLucia was evacuated.  Three hours after the shooting stopped, twenty-six traumatized people were located hiding in a basement boiler room, and were freed from their terrible ordeal.

It was later determined that the killer promptly committed suicide w hen the sound of sirens outside broadcast a close police presence.

Tough questions

Following the conclusion of the search and rescue operation, the Governor of New York arrived by helicopter and attended a hastily prepared press conference - joined by the local U.S Congressman, the Mayor of Binghamton and the Chief of Police.

Chief Zikuski commended the actions of Mrs. DeLucia, who he labeled “heroic”.

When questioned why it took his officers so long to make entry into the building the chief informed the media that real-time vital information was continually being supplied from the receptionist, and others, which indicated a possibility that the killer might still be alive and therefore a danger to his officers.  Since there was no reported gunfire, the situation did not rise to the level requiring endangering the lives of non-SWAT personnel.

"He was dead. We didn't know it," Zikuski informed the media, adding, "If there's a bunch of cops laying on the floor shot trying to rescue somebody else, it's not going to help anybody. All I can tell you is that we did what was expected and was the right thing to do under the circumstances. We did the right thing."

The public lashes out

Considering the severe lack of municipal funding plaguing most rust-belt cities located in upstate New York, no doubt the chief did the best he could with what he had available.  No one ever wants to see anyone get hurt.

Not unexpectedly, the overwhelming majority of citizen comments expressed via the local newspaper internet bulletin board didn’t agree with the decision for delayed entry - here’s a small sampling:

“Did I understand correctly that if there was still shooting when the police arrived they would have entered but because the shooting was over the police waited for swat? What the heck sense does that make?” 

“What were they thinking just standing around outside while people were possibly bleeding out in the building!” 

"They cleared the emergency rooms and cancelled elective surgeries in the operating rooms...emergency units of blood were rushed in from all over...and we waited and we waited and we waited for our patients and...late in the afternoon we got a poorly-scripted press conference from the mayor, governor, congressmen, police chiefs ... all praising each other and bragging about how well-trained our police were in 'clearing the streets'..."

“Once again, the police stood by, just as they did in Columbine.”

And once again, a homicidal and suicidal predator leaves their mark of death and destruction on an American community, and a local police department is perceived as being unprepared to efficiently provide help to citizens whose expectations are higher than the actual public safety services delivered.

Perimeter establishment - A safe policy for who?

A standardized policy of setting up an outside perimeter and adherence to policy that prohibits immediate pursuit of a potential or active mass murderer in a public setting is often attributed to "officer safety" concerns.  We’ve all heard the sage logic that, “Police can’t rush in with guns-a-blazing.”

The reality is guns-a-blazing may be the only appropriate response to active killing.  It is doubtful the public realizes an officer hiding behind cover on the outside perimeter of an armed invasion is much less likely to make mistakes that could bring unwanted attention to any perceived deficiencies of management and/or political leadership.

Police trainer Ron Borsch runs the SEALE academy in Bedford, Ohio and has been a strong advocate against the policy of setting up an outside perimeter during an armed invasion, labeling this practice “tactical loitering”.

Borsch states, “The hurry up and WAIT delay is conceptually deadly for the public we are sworn to protect. The medical GOLDEN HOUR targets severely injured victims. Victims arriving at a trauma center in less than an hour are more likely to be saved.”

Solo “Immediate Action Rapid Deployment” (IARD)

IARD during pursuits of armed invaders in public places simply means "no perimeter" is established until close proximity to the threat is obtained.

In many regions of our nation, particularly smaller more rural areas where the luxury of timely backup is not available, it is common for law enforcement agencies to write policy that requires the first responding officer to utilize Immediate Action Rapid Deployment tactics, without specifically identifying or referring to the term IARD in their policy manuals.

An eastern Tennessee police department representative shares his agency’s “General Orders”, which prohibit establishing a perimeter until the gunman takes hostage(s) and is cornered.  He quotes, “Our general orders instruct officers to immediately pursue an armed public threat, waiting for SWAT only if following engagement the shooter barricades their self into a room with hostages.  At that point, the pursuit becomes containment, and the officer(s) waits for SWAT.”

Discretion is the better part of valor

Carthage, North Carolina police officer Justin Garner recently showed the nation how a well-prepared first responder conducting Immediate Action Rapid Deployment (IARD) tactics was able to end the massacre at an adult care facility, long before the deranged killer was finished with his rampage.

The valiant life-saving actions of Officer Gardner is an excellent example of departmental policy that allows officers the discretion to do their job to the best of their ability - conspicuously lacking administrative obstacles put into place to provide all kinds of presumptive benefits at the expense of public safety.

Agencies that trust, authorize, train, and expect their officers to think and act on their own during a life-threatening emergency, without the need for the micro-management style of command inherent to departments’ top-heavy with centralized control, truly offer the highest level of public safety to their citizens.

 

WITH DR. LAURA ZIMMERMAN ILEETA Use of Force Journal By placing officers in ambiguous situations and challenging them to make difficult decisions they increase the experience bases that they can draw on in real incidents. It is important to create live training scenarios that incorporate ambiguity, complexity (important and unimportant information), continually changing conditions, and multiple acceptable courses of action. The scenarios should contain difficulties that challenge newer officers to perform like experienced officers and embed factors that challenge even seasoned  officers. To do this, instructors need to know the components of tough decisions and the cognitive differences between newer and more seasoned officers. This article summarizes research findings about officers’ decisions to shoot during a live simulation. This research is part of a larger study to understand police decision making at different experience levels (Zimmerman, 2006). Thirty-four officers participated in this research and their experience ranged from one to 29 years. Most had between 1-3 years, or 8+ years experience. For this simulation, officers used Simunition® marking cartridges. Scenario: The officer is on patrol when a witness flags him down and states that a sexual assault is occurring in an abandoned building. The witness also states that the perpetrator may have been holding a gun. The officer will enter the building to investigate. He finds a man in a room alone, holding a cell phone but no weapon. The man is visibly upset and not responding to the officer. The subject eventually starts to reply, but is evasive and angry. He eventually produces a pistol and raises it toward his own head. He finally lowers the weapon but does not drop it. Eventually he points the weapon toward the officer. He will force a lethal encounter if necessary by firing at the officer. The role player was allowed to react to officers’ actions, thus not all scenarios ended with  the role-player pointing or firing his weapon at the officers. Officers had to decide how to get the agitated role-player to comply as he paced back and forth behind a row of tall filing cabinets. Officers did not know why the subject was upset or if he was the suspect in the sexual assault. It was unclear if he was hiding the victim. Once the subject raised the gun to his own head, the situation became less ambiguous – officers now knew a weapon was present. Many thought this might be a suicide-by-cop situation. As the situation became more intense, officers needed to decide whether they should shoot the subject. When making the decision to shoot, officers must notice the cues that indicate a subject is about to shoot. Officers need varying amounts of information to reach an internal decision threshold that allows them to fire their weapons. Eleven officers fired their weapons before the subject did. This decision occurred across all experience levels. In most cases, the officer determined that the subject was about to pull a weapon and point it at the officer. The major cues in this assessment were that he subject was reaching into his clothing “to grab something,” he was suddenly ducking behind cover, and he was making a motion to turn the gun from his head to the officer. The majority (17) of officers did not fire their weapon until after the subject fired. The main reason officers said they waited was that they did not have legal cause to shoot until the subject pointed the gun directly at them. Some officers thought they would fire first if the subject turned the gun on them. However, the subject often fired before the officer had time to react, indicating that officers underestimated their reaction time. Two experienced officers engaged in negotiation and convinced the subject to surrender. Two newer officers either tackled the subject or grabbed the gun from the subject’s hand. The overall research findings indicated that at earlier stages, officers are more concerned about not breaking rules or using force when it is not justified. At later stages, officers are more likely to choose options other than firing, such as negotiating or taking cover and waiting for backup. External circumstances sometimes determined the outcome, such as when safety was an issue or when the weapons jammed. It is interesting to note that in this and another research scenario, the three experienced officers whose weapons jammed continued with the role-play. One officer cleared the jam and shot the suspect, one fooled the subject into thinking the gun still worked and subdued him, and the subject shot the third officer. The two newer officers with weapon jams discontinued the roleplay because of the malfunction. This illustrates the fluidity with which experienced officers could adapt to unforeseen events. The newer officers did not have the experience bases to adapt to the situation and simply ceased the role-play. Some actions taken in this research resulted in good conclusions, while other responses had associated negative consequences. This demonstrates that a clear-cut “correct” response is not often present in fast-paced, ambiguous, situations. Many of the newer officers reported  that they were at a loss about what to do after  the subject failed to comply. By providing newer officers with opportunities to take a variety of actions in response to a variety of subject actions/ reactions, they can start to build up their experience bases. Training to perceive critical danger, understand reaction times, and consider other actions, would likely help officers determine when to shoot and when to engage alternative responses. Based on this research, there are several instruction points to consider in training: Teach/demonstrate that officers cannot assume they will be able to fire first. Discuss/practice transiting from compliance commands to verbal tactics that will deescalate the situation (questioning, negotiation, showing empathy, etc). Discuss when it is legally permitted to fire and the factors to consider when making this decision in ambiguous situations. Discuss a variety of ways to manage non-compliant subjects. Elicit alternative action choices from students to expand their experience bases. Acknowledgement The assistance and endorsement of El Paso, TX Country Sheriff’s Office and El Paso, TX Police Department made this research possible. Much thanks to El Paso County Sheriff’s Deputies who assisted in planning and conducting this project, to the El Paso Police Department S.W.A.T. unit who assisted in conducting this research, and all the peace officers who participated in this project. References Zimmerman, L. A. (2006). Law enforcement decision making during critical incidents: A three-pronged approach to understanding and enhancing law enforcement decision processes. Unpublished dissertation. Laura A. Zimmerman, Ph.D. is a Senior Scientist at Applied Research Associates, specializing in critical incident decision-making issues. Her background is in experimental psychology, with focus on police procedures and training. She is a TCLEOSE certified instructor, and is devoted to researching policing issues and developing cognitively relevant training and technology for law enforcement and other first responder communities. Email her at LauraZimmerman@ileeta.org.

  

By John E. Reid & Associates

During an interview a subject freely chooses which words or phrases to use when responding to the investigator's question. This choice is not random or haphazard; it is carefully selected to offer either the most accurate response possible or to avoid the anxiety telling less than the truth would cause. Consider the following homicide example where Bob was found stabbed to death at 7:00:

Q: "When did you last see Bob?"

R(1) "Right around 4:00 Tuesday afternoon."
R(2) "I believe it was sometime on Tuesday."
R(3) "As far as I remember it was earlier this week."
R(4) "Its been quite awhile."
R(5) "I really can't say."

From these responses alone, it is not possible to say which ones suggest deception. Some variables that influence this assessment include how long ago the subject did, in fact, see Bob, the subject's frequency of seeing Bob and the likelihood that the subject would specifically remember the last time he saw Bob. What can be stated with confidence is that each response, starting with R(1) through R(5), accepts less and less personable responsibility.

The anxiety a subject avoids by selecting certain phrases in his response may be the result of uncertainty, embarrassment, loss of self-esteem or the fear of having a lie detected. To help identify possible deception, the context in which a statement is made is a key consideration. As an example, consider the subject who is asked, "At any time did you touch Katie's bare vagina?" and his response is, "I don't believe that has ever happened" or, "I would have to say that I did not." Both responses reflect a lack of certainty concerning the alleged behavior. If the subject was a grade school teacher he has no legitimate reason to be uncertain about contact with her vaginal area, and deception should be suspected. On the other hand, if the subject was a physician who gave Katie a sport's physical the uncertainty may be understandable.

The following list of phrases and their interpretations should primarily be used to stimulate follow-up questions during an interview, rather than as a clear indication of deception. Some of the guidelines list as (1), the most typical interpretation and (2), a secondary consideration. A good exercise is to monitor your own use of these phrases. After you have used one of them, ask yourself why you chose to use it and what another person could have asked you at that point during a conversation to learn more about your answer. As with all behavior symptoms, it should be remembered that there are no universal words or phrases that are always associated with truthfulness or deception and that the context in which a phrase is used is a critical assessment.
 

Phrase	=	Interpretation
"As far as I can remember..." "To the best of my knowledge..." "If I recall correctly..." "At this point in time..."		(1) I am not 100% certain of what I am saying. (2) I am blaming my poor memory for not telling you the complete truth.
"The next thing I knew..." "Before I knew it..." "Eventually..."		(1) I am leaving something out of my account. (2) This happened very quickly
"To be honest with you..." "To tell you the truth..."		I have not been completely honest (truthful) with you up to this point (usually through omission).
"Quite frankly..." "Quite honestly..."		What I am about to tell you is only part of the truth.
"As crazy as it sounds..." "Not to evade your question, but..." "You probably won't believe this..."		I want you to accept my response even though it is crazy, is evasive or is not believable.
"As I told the other investigator..." "Like I wrote in my statement..." "Earlier I told you..." "As I previously testified..."		(1) I don't want to lie twice about this. (2) I am frustrated having to go through this again.
"I swear..." "As God is my witness..." "You've got to believe me..."		(1)You shouldn't believe what I am about to say. (2) You probably won't believe what I am about to say.
"I can't remember" "I can't tell you..." "I can't help you out."		(1) It is not in my best interest to remember, to tell you, or to help you out. (2) Because of some intrinsic reason (embarrassment, fear, anger) I don't want to talk about this.
"I probably..." "Most likely I..." "It would be typical for me to..."		It is possible that something other than what I said in my response really happened.
"My answer would be..." "I would have to say..."		(1) I am offering an estimation and don't know for certain. (2) If I tell you what happened I would incriminate myself.
"I feel..." "I believe..." "I think..."		I am offering an opinion, but have no specific proof to back up my position.
"I know..." "I remember..." "I heard..." "I saw..."		I am telling you something that I personally witnessed.
"I don't know" "I don't remember"		(1) The subject has no knowledge or memory of the event. (2) The subject is being guarded and does not want to expand on his answer.
"There's no doubt in my mind..." "I'm absolutely sure..." "I'm certain..." "I'm positive..." "Of course..."		(1) The subject is accepting full responsibility for his response and is confident in it. (2) The subject is purposefully being too certain in his response to fend off further questions.

 

 

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