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By Rick Armellino
Baker
Ballistics, LLC
People snap and then kill
Workplace
shootings,
multiple murders,
school shootings, and the increasing levels of attacks
upon law enforcement officers add up to confirm the obvious -
America is a violent and well-armed nation.
The USA Bureau of Justice Statistics defines
mass murder
as the intentional killing of four or more victims at one
location, within one event. Mass murderers usually fall into
one of three major categories: disgruntled workers, family
annihilators and individuals with mental defects.
The term "massacre" is used to identify a particularly
newsworthy high-casualty count mass murdering incident, assuring
the recording of its' permanent place in history.
Different eras, different tactics
Today, many police personnel are being trained to respond to
active killing by following very controlled, methodical and
well-choreographed tactical procedures. In an earlier and less
complicated era of policing, stopping killers was a freestyle
event left up to the resources of each individual responding
officer.
Using a minimum of equipment and no formal
training, an older generation of American patrolmen did an
outstanding job of protecting the public using just raw basics:
bravery, aggression and speed. They did not have the advantage
of SWAT backup, body armor, or even portable radios. Yet, with
healthy doses of common sense and testosterone these early
lawmen selflessly placed themselves into hazardous situations in
order to do what the public expected.
Active shooter response - A subset
of IARD
Active shooter training curriculums emphasize police activities
initiated after shooting has begun. This category of response
fulfills only a small segment of the much larger overall
responsibility of police to its citizenry - protecting innocents
from all types of physical threats to their safety, including
those that are imminent and developing. Active killing by
gunfire is not the only serious threat to the publics’ safety,
but it is certainly the type of police response that is
receiving the most attention within law enforcement circles.
Immediate Action Rapid Deployment (IARD)
tactics receive far less attention within police philosophical
discussions even though it addresses immediate response to any
and all potential and active threats to innocents, regardless of
situation.
Approaching deranged individuals in an effort
to save the lives of innocents is not a new procedure. Prior to
the availability of reliable communications and SWAT backup,
IARD tactics were commonly used by patrol to assist the
endangered public.
U.S. Marines
are tough opponents
When the average citizen snaps and murders, the results are
bad. When a recently trained, physically fit and well armed
former Marine decides to commit mass murder the situation can be
catastrophic. On August 1st, 1966, the citizens of Austin,
Texas experienced a horrific event, forever known as "The Texas
Clock Tower Massacre".
An honorably discharged U.S. Marine named
Charles Whitman was attending engineering school at the
University of Texas in Austin and one night he snapped, savagely
stabbing his wife and mother to death at each of their
respective homes. The morning after, Whitman secured his gun
locker onto a wheeled dolly, rolled it into the university’s
main administration building and headed up the elevator.
Weighing an estimated 250 pounds, the gun locker contained 5
rifles, 3 handguns, a sawed-off shotgun, ample ammunition,
binoculars, food and water.
This well trained homicidal and suicidal
predator had chosen a tactically superior location to play out
his last living events on earth. In addition to the University
of Texas administration building being a virtual stone fortress,
it was located on a hilltop that overlooked much of the City of
Austin. Exiting the elevator on the 27th floor, Whitman lugged
his gun locker up the stairs to the top floor and proceeded to
shoot the four occupants, gaining full control of the
observation deck.
The University of Texas clock tower,
surrounded by the concrete observation deck, was both a snipers'
dream and a police nightmare. The cement and stone block
construction of this section of the building included recessed
rain gutters, enabling him to remain low, unseen and well
protected from return fire. Whitman had a nearly unlimited
ability to maneuver and change shooting positions at will. He
barricaded the doorways and then continued working his final
plan - to kill every human in sight.
Charles Whitman was a well trained Marine
receiving above average grades for marksmanship, excelling at
hitting moving targets. For the next hour and a half Whitman
methodically fired upon the citizens of Austin, killing 16 and
wounded 31, hitting some as they attempted to pull seriously
wounded victims to safety and others as they peeked out from
behind cover to locate the sniper’s position. Whitman may have
been a heartless deranged killer, but he was amazingly quick,
agile and an exceptionally good shot.
Don't mess with
Texas
The
brave citizens of Austin also knew how to shoot. Red-blooded
Texans were up for the fight, outraged that this maniac was
killing their own. Some scrambled home, grabbed their most
accurate weapon and hurried back to the school to exchange
gunfire with the unknown sniper.
A local pilot rushed to the nearby airport and
returned flying a small aircraft carrying a passenger armed with
a scoped hunting rifle. Unfortunately, low level air turbulence
prevented accurate aiming at Whitman. As the plane circled the
tower it took 14 of Whitman’s well aimed rounds through various
sections of the metal tube and fabric covered structure,
narrowly missing both occupants. The airmen retreated to a safe
distance after realizing they were on the losing side of this
air-to-ground battle.
Patrolmen
respond to the tower
Two
young Austin police officers, without prior coordination,
steadily made their way into the administration building and up
to the 27th floor. Patrolman Houston McCoy, armed with a 12
gauge shotgun, had graduated the police academy less than three
years earlier and Patrolman Ramiro (Ray) Martinez, armed with
his Smith & Wesson .38 caliber duty revolver, had less than five
years on the job.
Martinez, revolver in hand, recalled his
thoughts as he rode the elevator up towards the unknown sniper,
“of course you could see the little lights flicker (on the
elevator’s panel) as the floors go by. I said an Act of
Contrition, because as a Catholic I was taught that in case of
imminent death, you know, you say an Act of Contrition." As the
elevator door opened he spied Patrolman McCoy and a man with a
rifle, whom he did not know but assumed, was a plain clothes
officer. The three men conversed briefly and then slowly and
deliberately climbed the stairs from the 27th floor leading up
to the observation deck's reception area. Upon reaching the top
of the stairwell, they found two people dead and two critically
injured at the reception area.
Standing at the top of the stairs, Martinez
remembers the armed plain clothes man whispered a question, “he
said, ‘are we playing for keeps?’ And I looked at him, and I
said, as I saw dead people there, and you know all the dead
people outside, I said, ‘You damn right we are.’ He said,
‘Well, you better deputize me.’ That’s when I found out that he
was a civilian. And I said, ‘consider yourself deputized'."
The hunter
becomes the prey
Patrolman Martinez began kicking the
glass-paneled door leading outside to the observation deck. It
was jammed by the wooden dolly that Whitman used to transport
his gun locker. The dolly finally gave way and tipped over.
Martinez recalled this particularly anxious moment, “and then it
went over, clanging. And I braced myself. I figured that he,
the sniper, could hear this. And there was no response, but you
know, all that shooting, I’m pretty sure he didn’t hear it.”
The hastily assembled contact team, including
the armed citizen, stealthily made their way outside onto the
observation deck. The sniper was not in view. The sporadic and
frequent crack of rifle fire was deafening, but sound alone
could not determine exactly where on the deck the sniper was
positioned; it was too loud and too close. Martinez, McCoy and
the armed citizen, in line and in that order, slowly rounded the
first corner. They couldn't see the sniper because the clock
tower protruded and blocked their line of sight. Continuing
their approach, they soon spotted Whitman, who was intently
firing his rifle pointed over the southwest corner. Whitman,
comfortably on the attack, was unaware he was no longer the
hunter and was now considered the prey.
An instant and
successful attack
Wasting no time, Martinez carefully aimed his revolver and
described what happened next. "That's when I fired the first
round, and I charged. I hit him - left side somewhere - and he
came up with the rifle. He was trying to turn and to fire. I
kept charging him and shooting, and McCoy was right behind me.
I hollered at McCoy to shoot, and he did - hit him with the
shotgun,” Martinez said.
McCoy had instinctively shifted to Martinez’s
right side and fired two shotgun rounds at Whitman. McCoy
recalls, “all of sudden he just slowly slid down into a laying
position. He was no more dangerous. Still to this day I didn't
need that second shot."
Prophetically, Whitman had left a written
journal which, in part, specifically requested the coroner to
autopsy his brain. When accomplished, a large tumor was
discovered which was applying pressure to the region of the
brain that controls violent and impulsive tendencies.
It has been reported that the so-called Texas
Clock Tower Massacre was the mass murder event that rallied law
enforcements' call for the creation of the modern day SWAT team.
Twenty-five years later – Don’t
mess with Texas, again
October 17th, 1991 was the greeting card inspired holiday known
as National Bosses’ Day, so, take your boss out to lunch.
Luby’s Cafeteria in Killeen, Texas was packed during lunch hour,
containing at least 80 total patrons and employees.
The unfortunate people inside Luby's had no
warning of the life altering mayhem and carnage they were about
to witness as a pickup truck suddenly crashed through a glass
windowed wall, driven by 35 year-old George Hennard. As the
startled customers and employees looked towards the accident
scene Hennard climbed out. Sam Wink was seated inside the
restaurant and watched Hennard climb out, noticing he was
holding a large black semi-automatic handgun. Hennard yelled
something about injustice and immediately began shooting his
high-capacity 9mm Glock. Wink remembers, "he was firing at
anyone he could shoot, he had tons of ammo on him."
Panicked patrons scrambled to the rear of the
restaurant, dove and cowered under tables. Parents shielded
their children with their bodies as a final sacrifice. One man
threw his body through a thick plate glass window, being
severely cut as he saved himself and a few others who quickly
followed.
The first phone call came into 911 as a motor
vehicle crash at Luby’s, followed within seconds by a second
call reporting a vehicle crash with shots fired.
Two buildings down the street from Luby’s was
a Sheridan hotel. Inside, five Texan law enforcement officers
were attending an auto theft prevention training seminar and one
of the lawmen attending the class was an officer of the Killeen
Police Department (KPD). Also nearby were two KPD undercover
officers out on assignment. Police dispatch broadcast the
urgent call for assistance, and all seven officers converged
onto the chaotic and bloody scene nearly simultaneously.
Immediate entry
is made
Captain J.W. Dunn has been with Killeen PD for 37 years and
recalls the police response, “there was no waiting outside.
People were dying. Back then there was no active shooter
training. It was spontaneous. They entered and approached the
killer from two sides. I’m not sure if any of our officers were
even wearing body armor.”
The three Killeen officers made entry into the
killing zone as the other four officers established a
perimeter. Once inside the entranceway, one KPD officer
positioned himself near the entrance as the other two separated
and carefully preceded down opposing interior sides of the
building, stalking the shooter. Hennard was intently and
actively shooting at people piled up towards the rear and was
not initially aware of their presence.
The brave KPD officers courageously and
aggressively engaged Hennard, repeatedly shooting and hitting
him three times. The dynamics of this massacre suddenly changed
– once confronted and shot, Hennard's murdering of innocents
abruptly stopped. He lowered the Glock and bolted away from his
attackers towards the rear of the restaurant. He retreated into
an alcove near the restrooms – shooting at no one else, not even
at the two officers in pursuit as he was quickly cornered.
A predictable
ending
Homicidal and suicidal killers of innocents are cowards, they
attack the unarmed. Once confronted by police, the murdering
phase of their plan is interrupted and proceeds straight to the
ending. Only one more death and this planned event was over
— Hennard wasted no time and promptly shot himself dead in the
right temple.
The Luby's massacre resulted in a total of 23
people killed and 20 others seriously injured. The entire event
lasted less than fourteen minutes from beginning to end. Thanks
to the immediate and brave actions by members of the Killeen
Police Department, Hennard's deadly plan was interrupted before
he could shoot the remainder of the citizens trapped inside.
When waiting
for SWAT has deadly consequences
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1984 –
San Ysidro McDonald’s Massacre: No police entry during
active killing. The massacre lasted 77 minutes. 22 deaths,
15 wounded. The killer, James Oliver Huberty fired a total
of 257 rounds before he was fatally shot by SWAT sniper
Chuck Foster, taking the shot from the rooftop of a nearby
post office.
-
1999 -
Columbine High School Massacre: No police entry during
active killing. The massacre lasted 53 minutes. 13 deaths,
25 wounded. The killers, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold
fired a total of 188 rounds of ammunition and detonated
numerous pipe bombs before committing suicide 2 minutes
after the entry of the first SWAT personnel.
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2006 -
Amish Schoolhouse Massacre: No police entry during
active killing. Police had established a tight perimeter 25
minutes prior to the massacre and were waiting for SWAT,
which was enroute. The massacre lasted less than 2
minutes. 5 deaths, 5 seriously wounded (out of 10). The
killer, Charles Carl Roberts IV fired a total of 18 rounds
before committing suicide.
Every police agency has a unique
"culture"
The general public expects local and state government to fulfill
its' primary obligation to protect lives and property from the
ravages of modern society's predators as expeditiously as
possible. Some police departments have a well established
culture of proactively and aggressively protecting their
citizens, while others do not.
Twenty-four years after San Ysidro and nine
years following Columbine scores of police departments are
finally creating, for the first time, official policy addressing
response and training protecting citizens against an armed and
hostile individual or active shooter. Policy that will determine
under what circumstances entry will occur and the speed and
aggressiveness expected of their officers.
When the established culture of a particular
agency is defensive and risk-adverse, the likelihood writing
policy that expects an expeditious entry of patrol is
unlikely. Not all police agencies trust and train their officers
enough to grant them the authority and ability to take
aggressive action in these situations. Waiting for SWAT is still
a popular option, especially in the absence of active killing.
A “report card”
on quality of leadership
The
main purpose of government is to provide for the publics' safety
and law enforcement is the unit of government tasked with that
duty. How quickly, efficiently, and effectively a department
utilizes their patrol personnel when responding to assist a
threatened innocent citizen is the de facto "report card" on the
caliber of leadership currently managing that agency.
Establishment of priorities falls squarely on
the shoulders of upper management. When the physical safety of
citizens is not near the top of the priority list, leadership is
misguided and public safety suffers.
Virginia Tech
was the “wake-up call” for this progressive chief
One
career police administrator who realizes that fast aggressive
pursuit of an armed intruder in a public area is vitally
necessary to save lives is Chief Marvin Fischer of the State
University of New York (SUNY) College at Farmingdale, New York.
Chief Fischer has made available to his
officers; graphite stocked and
holographic sighted M-4 long-guns,
Baker Batshield® portable ballistic shields, ballistic helmets
with clear armor face
visors,
and
leg armor. If time and circumstance allows, a
responder can gear-up with complete
"head to toe"
ballistic protection, totally dominating entry into the killing zone.
SUNY Farmingdale training instructors are currently teaching the
entire department the skills necessary for their officers to
take the initiative, using the new equipment, to save lives.
Says Fischer, “Virginia Tech was a wake-up call. This type of
random violence can happen anywhere. I have been informed that
SWAT assistance from the county could be as long a wait as
thirty minutes and this is unacceptable”.
Fischer recognizes the difficultly of asking some officers to
become the hunters, “some of my older officers were hired on in
the 1980’s as unarmed security guards and even they are now
learning how to pursue armed individuals and will be prepared to
neutralize the threat if that is what’s needed. The mindset and
training necessary to stop active killing demands a lot of our
officers, but we have no choice but to prepare for the worst.”
Clash of cultures - Officer safety
versus public safety
Officers have a job to do and no one expects them to become
kamikaze warriors to save lives. However, few expect them to
remain passive observers of violence, either. Somewhere
in-between these two extremes exists a realistic policy that
combines the proper balance of both officer and public safety.
Police training teaches officers to be
responsible for their own safety first, their partners second,
and the general public third. The balance between officer
safety and aggressive response to extremely dangerous situations
is a tough balance that has no clear-cut answer. Generally, as
officer safety increases, public safety decreases.
The ability to pick and choose the location,
timing and terms of the fight is the ultimate survival skill.
Officers should, whenever possible, limit conflicts to those
which offer overwhelming odds of winning. During an active
shooter event this is impossible. The violent predator
determines when and where the fight, death or surrender will
occur.
When the fight can be avoided, does everyone
win? Not always. Innocents trapped within close proximity to
armed and hostile individuals are placed into much greater
physical danger by a passive and non-aggressive police
response. Hope is NOT a strategy. Every armed and hostile
intruder must be considered homicidal and suicidal - a predator
that has not yet entered the killing phase of their plan.
Upon initial patrol arrival, there may be no
indication of killing in progress. Department policy that
requires first responders to wait outside for the sound of
gunfire within a structure to signal an entry emboldens the
predator and grants the homicidal and suicidal individual more
time to continue working their plan. Plus the fact that killing
inside may be occurring by knife attack or other silent methods.
Hoping for the best should never be a
component of any emergency response strategy. Law enforcement
cannot rely upon the “human goodness” of an invader not to
inflict deadly violence upon innocents for the same reasons law
enforcement trains officers to anticipate violence against
themselves from every criminal suspect. Early contact is key.
Many agencies that have elected to use patrol
assets for active shooter response have established policy that
mandates time-consuming pre-conditions that must be met before
entry is authorized to occur.
Common
pre-conditions before entry – Waiting for:
-
Sounds of
gunfire
-
The optimum
amount of responding officers to arrive
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Arrival of
special weaponry and/or armor
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Communication with or arrival of supervisory personnel
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Accumulation of information
Time works in
the favor of the predator
During a homicidal and suicidal invasion, time works in the
favor of the predator, always. Howell Township, NJ lawman Kevin
Stout has the necessary response timing figured out and it does
not work in favor of the predator. Stout has twenty-nine years
in law enforcement, twenty-six of those years as a SWAT operator
and is currently the commanding officer for the county's SWAT
team. He also serves as the New Jersey Chapter president of the
Mid-Atlantic Tactical Officers’ Association.
Stout is emphatic, "one properly trained individual officer
taking immediate action can make the difference at the scene of
a crisis", reminding us of a quote from a Russian military
officer interviewed by John Giduck in his book
Terror at Beslan, "There are two things you can be
certain of, there is going to be a fight and people are going to
die - our job is to limit the death". Stout continues, "I think
these words ring true during every active shooting event that
has been recorded. Law enforcement may not be on scene early
enough to save every life, but once on scene they have to get
into the fight, take the fight to the assailant, disrupt the
assailants’ actions preventing any further loss of innocent
life, then eliminate the threat."
What if this
and what if that?
It
is possible to "what if" a response to an armed and hostile
individual into a snail-like process that does little good to
protect the public.
Once entry is made, the amount of time it
takes to enter the killing zone is greatly affected by the type
of policy, training, and equipment dedicated for this purpose.
Officers should quickly move towards the suspected killing zone
using a variable speed of movement to accommodate perceived
threats to their security, which are likely to be plentiful.
Successfully engaging active shooters is
dynamic and is considered a “close quarter battle” (CQB)
operation. The U.S military conducts many hazardous entries and
continuously reminds their operators that during an approach
into the killing zone "speed is safety". Moving targets are
tough to hit, slow and stationary targets are “sitting ducks”.
At some point during this process a police
officer will likely need to assume a greater personal risk than
desired in order to save lives. Will every door and room be
searched while proceeding towards the suspect or sound of
gunfire? Will every citizen be challenged and searched before
being allowed to pass?
In most cases, back-up is not far behind and
can deal with some of these time-consuming procedures. The next
wave of rescuers can assist with the living, dead, and dying,
while they attempt to prevent the escape of any perpetrators
and/or accomplices.
When gunfire is heard the level of risk grows
dramatically in direct proportion to the speed of getting to the
threat. That is the nature of the response. The primary
mission is establishing contact with the threat(s) in order to
minimize the deaths of innocents. Every second counts.
Walking the
walk?
Actively pursuing the threat is dangerous, but is vitally
necessary if the mission is actually saving lives, and not just
informing the public you wanted to save lives but didn't have
the time available to do it. The bravery, aggression, and speed
of operation utilized by well trained and well practiced patrol
personnel helps prevent having to admit, "we were there, but the
killing just happened too quickly".
Officer safety, speed of entry, and pursuit is
greatly enhanced by first responders trained and equipped with
modern “close quarter battle” (CQB) type weaponry, including
lightweight high-speed portable ballistic shields. The use of a
lightweight and short-stocked holographic sighted long-gun, such
as the M-4, used in conjunction with a
Baker Batshield®
is
an ideal balance of speed and officer safety.
Modern protective equipment allows an officer
the option to quickly and silently move through “fatal funnels”,
including: entranceways, hallways, windows, and doors. Moving
past wounded and/or panicked individuals is safer and the
ultimate application of accurate gunfire to neutralize a threat
within a crowded public setting is the final consideration to
assure mission success.
Learning from the mistakes and
successes of others
History permanently records the details of each massacre
including the name of the killer, the responding agency, what
happened, and the total body count of the dead and wounded.
Law enforcement leaders who want to improve
the delivery of public safety to their citizens can learn from
the mistakes and successes of those agencies who responded to a
mass murder event. So-called “peer review” evaluates and grades
each situation by the circumstances including the amount of
lives lost and saved after arrival of law enforcement personnel.
Whether you are approaching armed and hostile
threats before or during active killing, remember that the lives
of your citizens are worth a good fight, and that they hired you
to protect them. Make sure that you and your agency are up to
the task. |