in this issue . . . Revisiting The Amish Schoolhouse Massacre   Fat Cops   Beslan: Cry Of The Bear Cubs

 

By Rick Armellino
Director and CEO of Baker Ballistics, LLC

When visitors do not brighten peoples' days

Inside the tiny and picturesque Amish schoolhouse, it was instantly apparent to all visitors from the outside world that the single classroom was furnished and decorated similarly to any modern elementary school classroom.

Fastened onto the corner of the blackboard in the front of the class was a prominent sign that read, "Visitors Brighten Peoples’ Days," punctuated by yellow-and-black smiley face stickers. The irony of this sweet and innocent message had not yet registered with Lancaster County Deputy Coroner Janice Ballenger, as she surveyed the horrific results of an evil plan carried out within the small confines of this classroom a couple of hours earlier.

Grotesquely positioned beneath the friendly sign with the smiley faces lay two dead bodies. One was the mass murderer, Charles Carl Roberts IV, and the other was a gentle 12-year-old girl named Anna Mae Stoltzfus. Deputy Coroner Ballenger arrived at the grisly crime scene with law enforcements’ second wave of responders. Her first official duty was to legally declare Roberts and Stoltzfus dead from their head wounds. The forensic evidence collection and documentation duties that remained to be completed by the state police crime scene and county’s coroner employees was difficult for even the most seasoned veterans.  

"There wasn’t a desk or chair in the room that wasn’t covered in blood or broken glass," Ms. Ballenger later recalled. After counting more than a dozen shotgun- inflicted pellet wounds on one small child during the next day’s autopsy, she withdrew herself from this emotionally draining process, leaving the remaining autopsies for others within her department to complete.

Homicidal and suicidal psychopaths — Not the typical criminal

Fact: When a homicidal and suicidal predator enters an occupied school carrying a weapon, their murderous plan is now in motion and the outcome has a high probability of ending very badly.

The October 2nd, 2006 Amish schoolhouse massacre in Nickel Mines, Pennsylvania, is a textbook example showing how quickly and efficiently killing can commence in the presence of a closely established police containment perimeter.

The first notification of this developing massacre occurred after Roberts released everyone from the schoolhouse except ten young females. The teacher immediately ran to a neighboring farm and contacted 911. An Amish adult male from this farm, with his two large dogs, took the bold opportunity to stealthily approach the windowless back wall of the schoolhouse. Hoping for an opportunity to help the little girls, he slowly crept around one side of the wooden structure and positioned himself as an observer next to a side window. Upon reaching the double paned window, he noticed that the old-fashioned type blind was not pulled and this window was not barricaded.

Observing that the first police patrol vehicle to approach the scene was not slowing down to stop, the Amish man quickly withdrew from his strategic observational position and sprinted towards the roadway to wave down the trooper, who did a fast U-turn and parked. That would be the last successful attempt at an unnoticed move upon the building by anyone.

As unlikely as it sounds, Roberts may have been very surprised by the early arrival of police. The Amish are a passive and non-violent culture who often do not report crime or assist in criminal prosecutions. The items that this deranged individual brought into the schoolhouse were indicative that he expected to have a lengthy period of time to sexually molest these little girls.

Typical of armed school invaders, Roberts was steadily progressing towards the final chapter of his plan, mass murder then suicide. Not all patrol officers are taught that armed school invaders should immediately be considered and handled as weapons of mass destruction. The widespread use of the common descriptor "emotionally disturbed person" combined with the continued use of containment / negotiation tactics in the absence of active shooting confirms this obvious operational flaw.

More troopers arrived. A brave group of patrol officers formed-up and cautiously approached the schoolhouse. Roberts, obviously agitated, yelled for them to immediately leave or he would begin shooting. They partially complied with his demands by retreating, but not leaving. A police vehicle’s public address system was used to announce multiple pleas for him to throw out his weapons and come out with his hands up. Roberts again loudly ordered them to leave, or he would immediately shoot everyone.

Out of options

This psychopath had established full control and time was running out. The troopers on-scene sensed the tension and realized the girls’ situation was extremely precarious. Shooting could begin at any moment. SWAT takes a long time to arrive and this psychopath had shown absolutely no interest in negotiation. To make matters worse, the control of this volatile situation had seamlessly transitioned off-site command.

From this point forward any potential "window of opportunity" for resolution that could suddenly arise would need to be conveyed up the command chain for permission to react. Aggressive action against the intruder, short of hearing gunfire from within the school, would now take time and would require courage of leadership from a distant commander. Although all the troopers had been trained in "active shooter" procedures, they were not trained, authorized or equipped to conduct independent "Immediate Action Rapid Deployment" (IARD) tactics.

"Immediate Action Rapid Deployment" (IARD) is an underutilized concept in today’s policy heavy micromanaged patrol environment. This novel concept relies upon the officers on scene to use their ingenuity and courage to operate independently of off-site command and control during emergencies such as armed school invaders.

Homicidal and suicidal individuals kill fewer people while being hunted, pressured and pursued. Unable to focus full attention to the intended victims, the predators’ planned carnage is delayed by an active pursuit. When police ultimately close-in on a homicidal and suicidal individual, the predator usually rushes to commit suicide. Suicide by cop at this point sometimes occurs, but usually the ending is self-inflicted.

The longer this incident progressed, the higher up the chain of command the decision-maker was likely to be. More time was now required to make any decision, right or wrong — or worse yet, making no decision at all. The SWAT team was still a long way from Nickel Mines. Everyone but the psychopathic intruder was clearly out of options.

Passive police first responder policy — Who does it really protect? Before the shooting began, armed and ballistic shield equipped rescuers were mere yards away from the building. Yet they were immobilized by fear. Not the fear of being injured — these courageous troopers clearly proved when the shooting began that they had the stuff heroes are made of. The fear was traditional, institutional and political — originating at headquarters and administratively filtering down to the patrol level. Fear of failure, criticism and the potential for career damage all contribute to the establishment of passive public safety policy.

Timid command during times of crisis is easily hidden behind the fuzzy and noble label titled “officer safety concerns." Command indecision can be just as deadly as making a wrong decision. The results of making no decision offer the most political cover when a situation ends badly.

The specter of training-up and equipping patrol “cowboys” with the personal authority to run into schools with their “guns-blazing” gives heartburn to the toughest of career police administrators. Even when they know this is exactly the type of option that someday patrol may need to save innocent lives.

Everyone on scene hoped that the next wave of higher trained and better equipped officers would be arriving shortly. Although the armed and ready rescuers waiting outside were now being used as observers and conduits of information, they were still cocked and locked waiting for a command decision, or the sound of gunfire — whichever came first.

Permission denied

Suddenly and unexpectedly a child’s loud screaming was heard from within the schoolhouse. The rescuers immediately requested permission on the radio to approach the building. The answer to their urgent request came back -- permission denied.

Approximately twenty-five minutes after the first 911 call, a large anxious group of people was gathered nearby. More police personnel were arriving by the minute. In addition to the schoolhouse perimeter, troopers also manned an outer staging area to shield the already waiting medical personnel, worried friends and family from possible gunfire. County and state police dispatchers were desperately attempting to open a line of communication with Roberts to begin negotiations.

A Herculean effort to prevent injury or death to just one innocent sometimes results in the loss of many. This new breed of predator does not play by traditional rules. Negotiation, surrender and escape are not options. Time works in their favor.

The large "show of force” established just outside meant absolutely nothing to the psychopath in control on the inside. All that mattered to Roberts was completing his evil plan.

The massacre

The shooting began. Ten heroic troopers instantly reacted to the sound of rapid gunfire by bravely moving towards the building. Roberts, probably attempting to slow their progress, fired at least one round, and maybe more, in the direction of the rescuers.

As the first ballistic shield bearing trooper in line reached a window, the gunfire suddenly ended. The monstrous coward had predictably killed himself as these courageous troopers gained close proximity.

The final tally?  All ten girls shot. Five killed instantly. One remains in a coma. And four girls, although disfigured, have thankfully fully recovered from their gunshot wounds. The prompt medical assistance and airlift capability prearranged by these selfless professionals was instrumental in saving the lives of five little girls.
 
Tears, awards and fear of future visitors

The grieving Amish man who took the initiative to view into the window of the schoolhouse at the very beginning of this incident is a simple farmer. He does not fully comprehend the hazards and complexities involved during the delivery of modern public safety.

In the aftermath of the Amish schoolhouse massacre, state police representatives conduct seminars, reminding other law enforcement professionals that their officers heroically "did their best" and nothing more could have been done. They say it all happened way too fast. Roberts was a formidable and wily predator hell-bent on molesting and killing little girls and therefore was unstoppable. According to the rules of engagement on that fateful day, this is all true. He was unstoppable.

The massacre that occurred at the Amish schoolhouse was the fault of one deranged individual, Charles Carl Roberts, IV. Everyone else involved did their absolute best to save the lives of the schoolgirls. Heroism abounded and no one at the scene should ever be criticized for failure to perform as trained and expected. The fact that five girls survived is a testament to their efforts.

Recently, the ten troopers who had courageously approached the schoolhouse as wood splinters and bullets exploded off the exterior walls all received their department’s highest award for courage and bravery in the line of duty, the Medal of Honor.

Nineteenth-century philosopher George Santayana astutely observed, "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."  Fearing future armed visitors from the outside world, Amish parents in this idyllic rural corner of Pennsylvania Dutch country vividly remember the recent past. Some are reluctant to send their precious children to the brand new school built in the wake of this terrible event.

Patrol first response — Become the hunter, not the observer

Fact: Early contact interrupts a killer’s murderous plan. “Immediate Action Rapid Deployment” (IARD) tactics can stop a massacre before the shooter goes active.

Senior Range Instructor Jeff Reed of the Alameda County California Sheriff’s Department understands the importance of early aggressive contact with armed individuals and trains accordingly. Reed’s deputies are taught to be the hunters and the armed potential killers their prey.

According to Reed, "An officers’ fighting mind set, coupled with good, sound training and tactics will turn the officer into the hunter. This should enable them to take the fight to the fight when the situation requires it. Hesitation, indecisions and inability to act can sometimes be as dangerous as the suspect.”

Having the confidence and ability to instantly adapt to a changing environment are vitally important skills needed to win a violent encounter. The great American General George S. Patton, Jr., knew it too.  Patton cautioned his subordinates, "Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity."

Immediate aggressive response — It’s called "officer needs assistance"

When a call goes out for an officer needing assistance, the response is immediate, aggressive and automatic. Nobody waits for permission and everybody goes in to assist. Patrol initiative, ingenuity and heroism are commonplace, for good reason.

Police administrators and policymakers need to treat intruders inside schools with the same level of responder intensity and seriousness as the call for "officer needs assistance" garners within police agencies.

SWAT - A crutch for patrol responders?

Common sense dictates that potential or active predators inside the school must be stopped at the earliest opportunity, yet opinions and policies still vary widely as to what pre-conditions need to be in place before the "earliest opportunity" criteria that trigger an aggressive pursuit are met. Without hearing the sound of gunfire, many agencies still rely upon SWAT for entry to initiate active pursuit.

Clay Searle, a retired Los Angeles Police Department officer, currently runs PoliceTraining.net. Clay was still hard at work fighting crime when LAPD formed the nation’s first dedicated full-time SWAT team. He recalled a prophetic conversation back in the early 1970s with some older and very experienced patrol officers.

Searle said, "The old-timers were saying that creating SWAT was a two-edged sword that SWAT would keep officers safe but they eventually would no longer feel obligated or expected to go into dangerous situations to assist the public. They would stand outside and wait for SWAT to arrive and do the much of the hazardous police work once required of patrol."  Thirty-five years later, this insightful observation has been proven valid many times over.

The solution to school intruders - IARD

The commonly accepted definition of "Immediate Action Rapid Deployment" (IARD) is; "a police tactic that provides swift deployment of law enforcement resources to developing or on-going, life-threatening situations where delayed deployment of emergency personnel could otherwise result in death or great bodily harm to innocent persons. The innocents are likely to be incapable of self-protection or escape to a safer environment owing to duress, time and/or other logistical restriction."

Law enforcement leaders and policy makers must be willing to accept the following two logical propositions if reducing the potential for mass killings at school is truly desired:

• Any unauthorized intruder inside a school must be considered armed, dangerous, and capable of initiating and conducting a plan that includes the mass murder of children

• Law enforcement personnel entering the school and quickly establishing close contact with the intruder(s) will reduce the potential for mass killing

Proactive IARD tactics should not be reserved for use only during on-going violence, such as patrol response to "shots fired." IARD should be utilized by patrol during all approaches to publicly perceived threats. This could prevent an armed individual from the progressing into the "active" shooting stage of their plan. Policy should allow for the liberal use of IARD at the sole discretion of the individual patrol officer.

Every child is precious to someone. Police agency leaders should view their department’s existing first responder policy to a potentially armed intruder at school through the eyes having their own loved ones present inside the school being threatened. Would they be comfortable with the speed and type of police response mandated by the policy?  What is their opinion about mandatory school lockdowns that limit escape options?

Policy crafted to placate parents and school administrators may not be compatible with activities designed to maximize the amount of children surviving an armed school attack. Active shooter and lockdown drills may appear logical and be comforting to concerned parents. However, all policy and procedures must maximize the potential of children to survive, while remaining flexible enough to accommodate a wide-range of various attack scenarios and threats.

 "The IARD Drill" – Before the shooting begins

Here’s the drill: Anytime and anywhere an unauthorized intruder is reported in a public area, especially a school, IARD tactics should be used immediately. Close proximity with the intruder must be made to quickly ascertain the identity, intention and presence of possible weapons. Officers must be trained to ignore any verbal threats of violence or warnings to back-off. An early gun-battle is preferable to allowing a homicidal and suicidal predator unrestricted control of the environment.

The need to approach reported intruders in public places must be drilled into the mindset and culture of each agency. Since most unknown intruders will be not armed and dangerous, police administrators should not view the IARD drill as a waste of time and resources.

Like any skill, IARD must be practiced or it will not be effective when actually needed to save lives. During "false alarms," officers should be instructed to work at improving public safety by learning floor plans and teaching school and public building officials how to properly communicate necessary information. A quick and efficient response directly to the reported threat is the desired goal.

IARD Requirements & Considerations

• Patrol first responders must be authorized, trained, equipped and practiced for IARD tactics without waiting for off-site command decisions.

• First responders must make early and aggressive contact with any potential threat.

• Every unauthorized intruder must be considered armed, suicidal and homicidal until reliable information to the contrary can be determined.

• A running gun-battle at the early stages of an armed invasion is preferable to allowing a murderous predator unrestricted control of the environment.

• Defensive and defeatist policies that "back down" first responders and allow predators'''' the time and ability to establish a "killing zone" must be replaced.

• Patrol responders are the most important law enforcement asset available during the early stages of a potential or active school massacre.

• Public safety has not been properly administered when children at school die before aggressive activities are allowed to be initiated.

• Immediate Action Rapid Deployment (IARD) procedures need to become a common and well practiced function of patrol.

• The measure of effectiveness of a rescue at school must be based upon the amount of innocent lives saved and not the final tally of those killed and injured.

Technology advances the capabilities of first responders

Recent advances in police equipment and tactics have greatly enhanced the ability of patrol officers to confidently move aggressively towards armed individuals until very close proximity is obtained.

Ballistic shield cover minimizes the need to hopscotch between natural cover features and offers excellent protection while moving down hallways. In order to conduct inconspicuous IARD tactics in public buildings, it is preferable that the ballistic shield and weapon remain concealed in an inconspicuous manner, yet be available for use in an instant if needed. Unrestricted speed of movement combined with the capability of quickly delivering accurate deadly firepower is vital.

A quality holographic sight equipped patrol rifle combined with the lightweight and portable Baker Batshield gives police first responders a tremendous tactical advantage while approaching armed individuals or during a subsequent gun-battle.

Using modern equipment and training, IARD is no longer considered an insane risk to the rescuer or the endangered potential victims. The use of this type of protective equipment should be strongly encouraged whenever IARD tactics are conducted.

Obstacle to school safety - Institutional resistance to change

When one home-grown nut, in a simple one-room school is able to shoot every child in the presence of a crowd of armed police officers – tactics must be reviewed and possible alternative options considered.

Imagine what would occur if an organized team of well trained and dedicated suicidal terrorists targeted a crowded public school. Early contact and engagement by the first responding patrol officers would likely be the ONLY hope to save the entire school from large scale torture and mass murder.

IARD is a return to an early era of policing when the patrol officer had the authority and expectation to perform many dangerous duties now reserved for better trained and equipped specialists. Yet, some highly experienced law enforcement veterans confidentially complain that the quality and inherent survival ability of modern police personnel has slowly degraded over time.

Effective IARD requires the patrol officer to use ingenuity, aggression and survive long enough to save lives and ultimately win the violent encounter. Envisioning the use of patrol assets to meet this expectation is a difficult one for some leaders to consider. Teaching a non-aggressive officer to become the hunter is perceived as a daunting training task.

IARD is frequently not considered for use due to lack of available funding. Higher priority and more immediate needs for resources often are allowed to delay the delivery of improved public safety services.

In the handling of school invaders, the resources required for additional training and equipment are vitally important and should be addressed with school and political leaders before a tragedy strikes close to home.

Conclusion – Leadership required
 
Regardless of the reason for ignoring or discrediting the need for patrol IARD, this aggressive law enforcement tactic is the ONLY viable option that can be proactively utilized to interrupt a planned massacre before the killing occurs.

Responding to an invasion at school is no place for policy tainted with career based fears of failure, or influenced by faint-of-heart politicians. There are situations that demand immediate aggression by patrol officers. The potential of mass carnage inside schools is one of them.

Safeguarding children at school is the responsibility of many American law enforcement agencies. One thing is for sure -- the effort, dedication, understanding and ultimate action that senior law enforcement management devotes to keeping children safe at school is a direct measure of the quality of leadership found within their respective police agency.

 Tip: Target training to respond to an active shooter
 Experts weigh in on active shooter policies: 5-minute delay crucial in Va. Tech shooting

Rick Armellino is the Director and Chief Executive Officer of Baker Ballistics, LLC., the manufacturer of the Baker Batshield® personal ballistic shield. He has over thirty years experience in the body armor industry, including Director of Research and Development and President of American Body Armor and Equipment, Inc. Rick's body armor designs have saved over forty American LEO's from death or serious injury during attacks by gunfire. Recently, Rick has partnered with noted ballistic shield trainer, Lt. Al Baker (NYPD, ret.), to advance the concept of Immediate Action Rapid Deployment (IARD) tactics for use by first responders in the approach to armed and hostile individuals in public places.

 

New Study Shows That Fitness Trumps Fatness
in Determining Risk of Cancer Death in Men

The Cooper Institute

DALLAS – Cancer is the second leading cause of death among U.S. men. While tobacco use and poor diet remain the largest contributors to cancer mortality, there is growing evidence that obesity and low levels of cardiorespiratory fitness may contribute to cancer mortality as well. A new study from The Cooper Institute published January 15, 2008, in Obesity, reports on the relation between cardiorespiratory fitness levels, different measures of body fatness and cancer mortality in men.

Lead researcher and Director of Professional Education Stephen Farrell, Ph.D., studied 38,410 men who completed a comprehensive baseline physical examination at Cooper Clinic in Dallas. “This study shows that sedentary individuals of all body fatness levels should strive to become at least moderately fit in order to decrease their risk of cancer mortality,” said Farrell.

Results showed a strong and direct relationship between all measures of body fatness and cancer mortality. Leaner men had significantly lower rates of cancer mortality than fatter men, regardless of the method used to assess body fatness. A strong inverse relationship between cardiorespiratory fitness level and cancer mortality was also observed, showing lower fit men had significantly greater rates of cancer mortality than higher fit men.

The examination included a maximal treadmill exercise test, which provides an objective measure of cardiorespiratory fitness level. A unique feature of the study was that different measures of body fatness including body mass index (BMI), percent body fat, and waist circumference were also performed. The men were followed for an average period of 17.2 years, during which 1,037 cancer deaths occurred.

Another unique feature of the study was an examination of the cancer mortality rates between fit and unfit men within various categories of the different measures of adiposity or fat levels. Using the three official categories for BMI (normal weight, overweight, obese), fit men in each category had significantly lower death rates from cancer than unfit men. Using the two official categories for waist circumference (obese and non-obese), fit men in each category had significantly lower death rates from cancer than unfit men. Similarly, using two categories for percent body fat (obese and non-obese), fit men in each category also had significantly lower death rates from cancer than unfit men.

Farrell added, “These data suggest that attaining a moderate to high level of cardiorespiratory fitness may decrease some of the cancer mortality risks associated with increased adiposity.”

About The Cooper Institute
Founded in 1970 but Kenneth Cooper, M.D., M.P.H., The Cooper Institute is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit research and education facility dedicated to preventive medicine research and education. The Institute’s research is often sited and has affected public health policy. The Cooper Institute is also committed to educating and certifying health and fitness professionals by offering over 20 courses in Dallas or At Your Site and numerous fitness tools including books and DVDs. The Cooper Institute Personal Trainer Certification Exam (CI-CPT) is accredited by the National Commission for Certifying Agencies (NCCA).

by Greg Ferency
www.swatdigest.com

“He (God) kept the best… the most beautiful ones… the best children”

12 year old girl… Beslan hostage survivor

 

The Day of Knowledge is an important day in Russia. This is the first day of school and they take it much more seriously than their American counterparts. It is a day of celebration and festivities. The first day of school in Russia always is on September 1^st and young Beslan students dressed in their best on that faithful morning. They came with gifts and flowers for the teachers. They also came with joy and excitement.

The city of Beslan (population 40,000) was celebrating the first day of school like the rest of Russia. Beslan School #1 had drawn approximately 3000 people due to the fact that it handled grades 1-11.

            At Beslan School #1 a party of sorts was held outside the school. Teachers, students, parents and relatives met, hugged, sang and welcomed each other on school grounds. The students then lined up according to grade, a perfect formation and an advantage for those who were about to come. At approximately 9:00am, the rage of terror struck, approximately three dozen Chechen and Islamic extremists pulled up in two large trucks and jumped out. This was the catalyst for several others hidden among the crowd to jump into action. In total approximately forty nine heavily armed terrorists charged and took the lives of a massive amount of innocent people over a period of sixty two hours.

            They executed a plan of action, which involved wrangling the adults and students into the school building. They fired their weapons in the air and on the ground in an effort to maximize panic and submission to their demands. It was incredibly effective. Speed was vital to them and they had planned and done their job well. At first some of the victims thought the original shots being fired was a military drill or police “chasing bandits”. One teenage student thought this exact scenario until she saw a “bearded man” yell at her… “Why are you standing here? You are all being taken hostage!” A police officer and security guard engaged the attackers with minimal effect. They didn’t have much of chance and were quickly cut down. However, it is just possible their actions allowed an amount of potential victims to get away. No matter how small or large that unknown number was it was significant.

            What can now be considered hostages were herded into the school with threats of death to themselves and more importantly to their children. Families were split up in the chaos and many children were left on their own to deal with this frightening event. The hostages were effectively driven into, what could be loosely called by American standards, a gym in school. The siege had begun.

            In a matter of minutes the terrorists had taken approximately 1,132 innocent souls. Almost immediately the citizens of Beslan gathered around the school forming a human fence around the hostages and terrorists. The hostage takers consisted of Chechen and Islamic extremists, this included two “Fiancés of Allah”. The “Fiancés of Allah” are women who are under the age of twenty-five and had a male member of their family killed in the Chechen War. The women strapped explosives to their bodies to be used as mobile human bombs.

The group eventually divided themselves in three command and control elements:

“Control group” – supervised and controlled the hostages.

“Security group” – protected the group from barricaded positions within the school. “Leader group” – gave orders and controlled limited negotiations.

After the hostages were forced into the gym mothers attempted to calm their children by telling them that they were in a movie, a military exercise or it was just “a game”. Even with the terrorists attempts to control everyone it was obviously chaotic inside the gym. The terrorists were constantly threatening the children that they would be shot if they continued crying. A forty six year old man who attempted to calm the other hostages down was executed in front of everyone in the gym. His body was then drug out of the gym leaving an ominous blood trail.  This was an obvious submissive tactic to let the hostages know that they had no problem killing their prey.

The group then began wiring explosive devices amongst the hostages. The bombs were placed around and above the sitting hostages, including a basketball goal that would later play a catastrophic role in the events of this incident. Most of the bombs were primitive but deadly. They were embedded with nails and other objects to act as shrapnel to increase their effectiveness. The terrorists claimed to have wired one of the bombs to a foot controlled “dead mans switch”. It appeared in the form of a pedal. This was one of two dead man switches that they claimed to have and the foot pedal can be seen in video footage the terrorists sent out to the Russian authorities to let them know that it existed.  A terrorist would keep his foot on the pedal. If he was shot or lifted his foot off the pedal for any reason the bomb(s) would detonate. Russian authorities now believe that the dead mans switch was a fake. But, whether it was or not was irrelevant to the hostages at the time. Hence, it was effective.

Early on the first day the hostages were told to give up their cell phones along with any cameras, including video cameras. They were told that if anyone hid a cell phone and were caught they and others around them would be shot. In the end a pile of these devices were on the floor. The terrorists found a video camera that a father had brought to video his child going to school. They used it for their own and videotaped the hostages along with themselves. The videotape was later found by a group of boys going through the carnage of the school after the event was over. The videotape can be seen in several documentaries about the Beslan event and can viewed on some video web sites. It offers some limited insight into conditions of the hostages on the first two days of the siege as well as the mindset of the terrorist holding them. In this video a bomb can be seen hung so low that anyone walking under it would have hit their head on it. It was obviously slung this way for maximum killing effect.

Fear and death were not over yet for day one of the siege. Up to sixteen men and boys were taken to the second floor (room 206) of the school and lined up against the wall of one of the classrooms. They were then executed outright. Their bodies were then tossed out a window onto the ground below. It is probable that the terrorists viewed these men as a possible threat and wanted to get rid of them quickly. These men were probably large in stature, appeared to be healthy and most likely posed a liability. It made no difference if the threat perception was real or not. Several other men were forced to assist them in the fortification of the school. They were forced to assist in barricading the windows and door from the outside. After their efforts were complete they were shot dead and left where they lay. This brutal group had something else in store for the young attractive female hostages. They were singled out and one by one taken to another room of the school where they were sexually assaulted over the entire course of this event. This included the barrels of assault weapons and other forbidding objects. 

As day one progressed and the hostages suffering continued Russia began its response to the school. The 58^th Infantry Division arrived at Beslan. This division is a standard military entity made up of mostly young conscripts. They were in no way prepared to handle this situation. What they found was a melee of armed angry civilians that had surrounded the school by the thousands. Many of the men were armed with their own weapons and were threatening to storm the school. The Russian authorities did not help matters any by announcing that there were only 354 hostages in the school. The crowd knew the number was much higher and this number incensed them, as well as the terrorists in the school when the number reached them. This down playing of the numbers did not help the authorities in any way. All it did was escalate suspicion of them by the Beslan civilians and caused the anger of the terrorists to pour over onto the hostages in the school.

Russia sent numerous other military and government Special Forces to Beslan. These groups are known as “Spetsnaz” units. The word Spetsnaz comes by combining the words “Special Purpose Forces”. Although several responded, the two primary units assigned to the school were Alpha and Vympel. These units responded from Chechnya and Moscow. Alpha can be best compared to America’s Delta Force or CAG, as they are now known. Vympel is Russia’s formal “terrorist type” unit. They conduct the missions that are very specialized and unpleasant. They are also trained to go behind enemy lines and cause havoc. Both are top notch units and trained well in what they do. Again, upon their arrival they found a scene that was chaotic at best… both behind the walls of the school and streets outside of it. During this time snipers began taking up positions around the school.

In regards to negotiations with the terrorists… they were limited at best. The terrorists had a bloody end planned for this incident and talking to them was not going to divert them.

Civilians continued to gather around the school. Over the course of the siege and up to its catastrophic end the civilians stayed at the school. Many refused food or to sleep in solidarity with the hostages inside the school. For logistical reasons this helps nothing and might be construed as a bad idea… no matter how noble. If an event like this ever occurs in the United States we can assume that the end will also be bloody to say the least. First responders, especially law enforcement, may very well be decimated with officers wounded and killed. Other first responder agencies will also be pulled to their furthest brink. The one element that has potential to remain strong is the community. People may need places to stay. Children victims may need blankets and someone to hold on to until the proper entity can assist them. Food may need distributed. In other words the community may be called in some low level, but important factor when the final bullet is fired. Hence, they will need to be strong, rested, fed and ready to assist if that is asked of them.

It is amazing how the civilians were able to intermingle with the security forces around the school. Males with rifles with some fueled with vodka continued to place themselves in positions to fire at the school. They exchanged verbal insults and gestures with the terrorists inside the school. The Russian authorities may have feared that if they attempted to disarm the civilians of their weapons they would be involved in a firefight with the very same people whose children were being held hostage inside the school.

As the morning of September 2^nd came to Beslan little had changed for the hostages. Parents continued to try to comfort their children as well as keep the calm. Those with medical conditions started to feel the effects of the lack of their medication, food and water.

One politician was allowed inside the school for negotiations on the second day of the siege. He was Ruslan Aushev. Aushev was a former Russian general who later became the President of Ingushetia. Ingushetia lies between Chechnya and North Ossetia (where Beslan is located). Chechnya and Ingushetia are predominately Muslim while North Ossetia is mostly Christian. The Inguish, including Aushev, are very sympathetic to Chechnya and its bid for independence. A number of the terrorists that took over the school had Inguish origins.

Aushev was allowed inside the school. The video footage that the terrorists took with their new camera shows him attempting to get the terrorists to release some of the hostages. The school principal can also be seen pleading for the children. The terrorist to whom they were speaking with agrees to release some of the nursing babies. When they were released mothers were forced to make decisions no parent should never have to do. They were forced to leave with their babies but leave older children behind. As they left the school Aushev left with them carrying a baby that a mother gave up to stay behind with her older child. Aushev followed the released mothers out of the school with the child and he was never able to return to the school.

This was not a kind act by the terrorist. It was at best a standard stalling tactic. As in, “see we are releasing hostages”.  Babies do not know terrorism or any other act of violence. They only know they are hot, hungry, thirsty and not having a good time. As we all know this usually translates into crying. These particular babies were driving the terrorists crazy. However, they probably knew enough to know that if they started executing babies outright this would be the one thing to cause a riot of sorts among the mothers inside. Hence, this was probably a strategic move on their part as much as anything else.

Interviews with the former hostages stated that many started losing hope of a peaceful resolution as day two went on. The terrorists also became more hostile and unpredictable towards them. Many of the hostages had gone without food or water since the siege began the day before. They started drinking their own urine and eating pedals off the flowers that they had brought for the teachers to celebrate the Day of Knowledge. Everything bad from day one transferred over to day two. Hostages continued to be sorted out for various forms of harassment and abuse. This continued as day two grew into day three of the siege of Beslan School #1.

The hostages continued to obviously deteriorate as the morning September 3^rd  arrived. Many hostages and civilians outside the school later reported that there was something in air on September 3^rd. They knew something was going to happen on this day. Parents stated that the children inside the school no longer responded to the terrorists threats and the gunfire that usually followed. They were exhausted, dehydrated and numb to all stimuli around them. One mother even said that some of the mothers pondered doing something to spark an end to this horror. The mental stability of the hostages and even the terrorist (even they began arguing with each other) appeared be to breaking down. 

At approx 1:05pm that something did happen. One of the bombs hanging from a basketball goal fell and detonated. It was followed by another explosion several seconds later. This set off a trigger of events that proved catastrophic for all. The explosions obviously killed many people immediately. They obviously injured many parents, teachers and children alike. Some survivors described a deafening silence and zero visibility from the debris of the explosions. As time progressed hostages began jumping out the gyms windows in an effort to make a dash for escape and life. The terrorist realized what was happening and started firing into the fleeing victims. One teenage female hostage stated that she was finally able to fall asleep. She was awakened by the explosions and was surrounded by “dead bodies”. She escaped out of a hole blown into the gym wall with a friend. Several minutes after the second explosion the roof of the gym caught fire and collapsed. This took even more innocent lives. One child survivor stated that he saw other children melting alive.

Confusion was apparent on both sides. The Russian military thought the terrorists set the bombs off on purpose. The terrorist thought the Russians had started their assault on the school. Just prior to the explosions going off the terrorists had agreed to allow the Russian authorities to remove the bodies of the men killed on day one of the attack and thrown out the window. As the men were doing this the explosions occurred. This may very well have seeded the terrorists belief that the assault was planned on the Russian side and the body removal was an attempt to place soldiers in a strategic position. These brave rescuers assigned to remove the bodies were fired upon… one was killed.

Alpha and Vympel units waited for the “go” command to enter the school. The problem was that none of the “higher ups” could or would give the order. Finally the units began the entry after not being able to stand by any longer as their Russian children were being slaughtered. Patch made elements of both units began their rescue attempt. A large portion of Alpha was 18 miles to the south in the city of Vladikavkaz practicing a prepared assault on a school that was similar to Beslan School #1. Vympel would bear much of the brunt of the initial rescue attempt.

Obviously, the Spetsnaz units were placed in a position that forced them to engage. Some with in rescue teams used their own bodies as shields as they attempted to protect the fleeing hostages that were pouring out of the gym. The Alpha and Vympel teams made entry through windows and “mouse holes” they blew into the walls of the school with explosive breaches. One Vympel element attempted to enter the school through the main entrance, but it was heavily barricaded and wired with explosives. A tank round finally gave them a way inside.

The armed civilians also started firing their weapons at the school. Others surged forward toward the school with the Spetsnaz teams. Some helped hostages through the windows and rushed them to safety. Others can be seen in photos helping with fire hoses showering water into the gym. The civilians were playing a role in the incident from start to finish…. for good, bad or worse.  At this point crowd control was literally non-existent.

Six year old Aida Sidokova was blown out the window of the gym after the initial bombs went off. There is a series a photos taken by a photographer that documents part of her story. The photographer was imbedded with a Russian sniper team positioned outside the school. The photos start off by showing Aida and another woman lying on the ground outside the gym in the courtyard. The woman and Aida then start to raise up. The woman flees the area. Aida, dressed in only her underwear with her skinny legs covered in blood, is then photographed climbing back into the gym through the same windows she was blown out of... her attempt to re-enter the gym was successful. The very last photo shows the roof collapsing and the gym engulfed in flames.

Many of the surviving hostages in the gym were forced into the kitchen and cafeteria area of the school. Once there they were forced to stand in front of the windows acting as human shields to protect the terrorists from incoming bullets. The terrorists told them to scream to the military (and in all probability civilians) to stop the assault on the school. 

As Vympel and Alpha teams made their way into the school engaging their targets the hostages continued to stream out of the school. In the end it took ten hours for the Russians to retake the school with the last remaining terrorists were killed on the north side of the southern wing of the school. Alpha and Vympel blasted the barricaded hostiles with RPG and RPO’s, basically blowing that section of the school apart. Beslan School #1 was finally back in Russian control. Hostages continued to stream out of the school during all this in an attempt to escape the carnage. As you view and study the photos of the event several things become evident.

You will notice that most of the children are either naked or in their underwear. This was due to the fact that the gym acted as a greenhouse of sorts with the windows and all the people stuffed inside. The heat inside the gym became unbearable. You will also notice that most of the hostage make up were women and younger children. This may be due to the fact that many of the older, hence stronger / faster kids, were able to flee the school grounds when the assault was initiated. The younger children had no recourse other than to follow the terrorists directions. Note: the lower number of older students was also determined because the older students found such festivities “not cool,” as the event was designed for the younger children. There were also a fairly significant number of men to women hostage ratio. This may be due to the fact that fathers tend to avoid this type of activity and many may have been working at the local businesses and factories.

You will also notice that many of the victims (especially the children) were being carried by other civilians. This was due to them being injured, exhausted, malnourished / dehydrated and panicked. Despite their actions throughout the incident it could be safe to say that some of the civilian males saved the lives of hostages by assisting them to safety.

Make shift aid stations were set up in secure areas around the school. Most of the escaping hostages begged for water from their rescuers and first responders. The Russian authorities planned poorly for the medical treatment side and there were limited numbers of medical assets around the school. For some victims the “Golden Hour” was ticking away. Many of the victims wandered the aid areas looking for family members… children looking for parents… parents looking for children… brother looking for sister and so on. The anguish of Beslan was to continue as families received the news of dead loved ones… some of this came immediately as they identified bodies other news came later as DNA results became apparent in later months.

By 11:00pm the Russian military had taken the battered school back from the Chechens and their extremist allies. Imagine a ten-hour battle in and around an American school. The North Hollywood bank shootout in 1997 between two bank robbers and LAPD lasted less than an hour. And even though the North Hollywood bank actors were heavily body armored they were shooting from minimal use of cover and concealment with a vehicle being their only real option. Imagine dozens of motivated individuals with brick and mortar as cover.

Eleven Vympel and Alpha soldiers were killed re-taking the school. Other Spetsnaz units lost ten other brave men… another sixty-three were wounded. Compare these casualties to any American police department. Stories of heroism on the part of these Russian units should be acknowledged… this may be our American police officers if a similar event happens here. One of the individual incidents that I am aware of involved a Vympel officer grabbing a terrorist in the gym. The officer saw that the man was about to throw a grenade into a crowd of hostages who had survived the initial explosions. The officer tackled the terrorist and held him in a bear type hug until the grenade exploded and killed them both. Another Vympel officer was shot in the neck while trying to cover the fleeing hostages from sniper fire coming from the second floor of the school. He literally bled to death while never giving up or retreating from his position that was completely exposed in the school courtyard. These are just two brief examples and I bet there are hundreds of stories just like these. These acts not only included heroism (true heroism) on the part of the Spetsnaz units, but these are also stories of unbelievable brave acts on the parts of the teachers, parents and even the older students who sacrificed their lives to save others.

 One of the Chechens made it out of the school. He was found hiding under a truck by the Russians. His name was Norpasha Kulayev and he was sentenced to “life” in prison in the summer of 2005.

During this 53 hour incident the most recent numbers I have seen are as follows:

• 1,132 hostages

• 334 dead

• 186 children dead

• 700+ wounded

Old Soviet habits die hard in the Russian military and political machine. Nobody would take charge of the school scene. Command and control was poor. Lower level officers and officials had no chain of command to turn to.  Shooters for the Spetsnaz teams around the school couldn’t get anyone in a position of authority to give the order to move in on the school after the bombs went off. After waiting so long they decided to go in on their own.

Wounded children and adults were spread out all over southern and western Russia (including Moscow) for medical treatment. It took weeks, even months, for some families to find out that their relatives had survived. It should be noted that Moscow is 1000 miles from Beslan. One female survivor who was a teenager reported that it took her awhile to realize that she was now safe while in the hospital. In her mind she perceived the doctors and nurses as being terrorist who continued to want to harm her.

            Entire generations were destroyed in the Beslan incident… especially younger generations where all the younger siblings were killed. Some children survived but one or both of their parents did not. Pictures were put up on the walls of Beslan streets of unclaimed child survivors.

 During the Cold War America depended on the Russians / Soviets loving their children as much as we did. The heroism of the shooters who re-took the school compiled with the grief of the people of Beslan and Russia itself…. proved that they do. Russian citizens left bottles of water and other beverages at the school as a symbolic attempt to quench the thirst of the dead, dying and injured. They also left stuffed dolls and animals in acknowledgment of the child victims… the youngest of the dead being two years old. This continues to be what can now be considered a tradition at the cemetery where the dead are buried. Toys and drinks are left at the gravesites of the victims slaughtered at the school. 

            Victims of the siege reported that the hostage takers were injecting something into themselves during the incident. Heroin is a major drug in that area of the world. However, the descriptions of the terrorists behavior after the injections are much more consistent with some type of amphetamine based stimulant. The victims reported that they became much more hyper and aggressive and physical / sexual abuse increased towards the hostages after the drug ingestion. We should take note of this as what would be normally be conceived as a recreational drug is now being used as a strategic option against us. If this behavior is observed in future incidents we should not assume that we are dealing with drug addicted thugs… but a crack team of assailants who have an agenda and strategy already set in motion. The drugs are simply an effective part of the original plan. 

            Some have attempted to state that the Russian military units started the assault on September 3^rd thus causing the bombs to detonate. This doesn’t make sense for several reasons. The main Spetsnaz units had only 133 operators around the school that were “on duty” at the time that bombs went off. Another 133 operators were “off duty” on a two minute stand-by. By American police standards this seems like a lot, but their planned assault called for at least twice that many to be at the school. In an exchange of E mails I learned of an important fact from the photographer embedded with a sniper team. He stated that he did not notice anything in Spetsnaz behavior to indicate a planned assault at the time the bombs went off in the school.

             The Russians correctly estimated that there were around fifty terrorists in the school. They also knew that it would take 10 to 1 superiority ratio for each entrenched terrorist to be taken out… plus another 50% of ready reserve to back up the initial assault team. Obviously, if you do the math the numbers needed did not match what an experienced military, like the Russians had at Beslan, would need for a planned assault / rescue.  Also, don’t forget that most of the primary unit (Alpha) assigned for this type of mission was miles away practicing for the planned assault if it came to that. There were other military units at Beslan with Alpha and Vympel. But they rarely train with or draw assets from them. Also, as we already discussed it actually took an extended period of time for the Vympel and the remaining Alpha troops to go into the school because the government officials balked at giving the order.

             The Russians were caught flat-footed. They had no formal assault plan yet and after the bombs went off any type of plan that they might have been trying to formulate converted into “just save as many kids as you can”. .. period. The results are what we have in the history of what occurred at Beslan School #1.

            It has been noted that the floorboards of the library had been torn up. Some have assessed that because of this weapons were hidden under the library floor months prior to assault in September. In all practicality a more obvious answer would be that the terrorists were looking for tunnels being dug underneath the school by Russian forces for a planned assault and entry point into the school. The Russians had done this at the Dubrovka Theatre (the play that was being put on was called Nord Ost, which this incident is commonly known as) play in October 2002. The terrorists at Beslan probably learned from this an were looking for the tunnels, which did not exist, at the school. 

            The only thing that has come out of the Beslan School siege is death, depression, despair and lessons. As police officers in the United States and around the world we were powerless to do anything for the victims while this incident was in motion. However, we can learn from the lessons that can be taken away from this tragedy. If we don’t we may suffer the consequences in a manner that is much more than anything we have dealt with in the past on our soil. These lessons were not free… they came with a price… the cry of the bear cubs… in September 2004.

Note: Aida Sidakova survived her ordeal at Beslan School #1. She was later asked why she climbed back into the gym. She stated she wanted to be with her mother who was still inside.

References and must see resources:

Terror at Beslan – John Giduck ( www.terroratbeslan.com )
---thanks for the help on this, John
Children of Beslan – HBO documentary
Three Days in September – Showtime documentary

Greg can be reached at gregferency@swatdigest.com 

 

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