in this issue . . . Understanding the Spectrum of Tactical Threats to Schools   Too Many Choices - Creating Frustration in Interrogation   10 Common Indicators for Highway Drug Interdiction

 

   By John Giduck
   reprinted from Swat Digest

The officer can feel the adrenaline racing through his veins at the same time his patrol car races toward the

school, lights and sirens slicing the previously peaceful morning. The dispatcher had struggled to keep her voice steady, telling him they were receiving numerous reports of gunfire in the hallways, of children lying in pools of blood. The young cop runs his response through his head, trying to calm himself, ready himself for battle. He had been well schooled in Active Shooter protocols. But what would he confront? What must he be ready for, and did his training adequately prepare him for the broad spectrum of possible tactical threats to the children he swore to protect?

Make no mistake, America’s schools are under siege. But few realize the entire spectrum of extreme tactical

threats that they face, and that our law enforcement officers must be prepared to respond to. Simply teaching

schools to “lock down” in response to every threat is insufficient. As well, the tactical spectrum is so wide that merely offering our rescuers the two options of going in (Active Shooter), or holding and securing (Stable Barricade Scenario) are just as insufficient. As with any problem, the key to not only preparing for it, but knowledge comes the recognition that all three levels of LE-school response – SROs, patrol and SWAT – must  develop joint tactics, as they will all be involved. Anyone with a terrorist mindset understands the value of attacking kids in schools. Whether our own homegrown child shooters, adults or trained al Qaeda terrorists, they all understand that nothing brings more fame, or devastates a community and a nation better, than the killing of its children.

Single Student Shooter.

The lowest level of extreme tactical threat (X-Tac) to schools is the single student school shooter. This applies to high school age children and below. With this age group, the shooter will only attack his own school, or schools below his grade, but never above. You will not see a high school student attacking a college, nor a middle school age kid attacking a high school. Though the variables in human nature ensure exceptions to any rule, the lack of maturity and sophistication of shooters at the different levels of the X-Tac Spectrum provide a fairly predictable model. At these ages, children are too intimidated by older kids, and nature’s rule of child socialization would render it almost impossible psychologically for a child to attack a school full of older students. That, coupled with the fact that few children would have a reason to attack a higher school, allows officers to presume that lone kids in a school are attacking their own, or a lower grade school; most likely one they left the year before.

At this age, the student shooter may have put together some rudimentary explosives, but will not have the resources to carry many into the school. He will be heavily armed, however. Due to his status as a lone attacker, he will not be able to control his target victim population, but will move through hallways, engaging targets of opportunity. Where he can breach a room, he will do so and engage what targets present themselves before moving on. Given the option of schools to attack, he will have perfect intelligence on the emergency response plan, and will have factored that response into his attack. Though no one has yet attacked a school with an armed police officer present, at some point a student will decide to increase his fame by doing so. He will know the SRO is the first tactical hurdle he must overcome. He will likely have made a recent attempt to develop a relationship with that SRO, so that his approach will not alert the officer to possible danger. The same will occur in the next two higher levels of the tactical threat spectrum. Though the recent example of Virginia Tech (VT) will have left this shooter wanting to fortify the building prior to his attack, his solitary status, size of the school, and ubiquitous presence of students, will make that difficult, allowing easy entry by police.

Low Multiple Student Shooters.

The next more difficult X-Tac will involve only two or three shooters at the high school level and below. Their target selection will be limited in the same way as the single shooter. Due to age, immaturity, psychological co-dependency and limited numbers, these shooters will not separate. They may use their numbers to better control and assail groups of victims in rooms, but will otherwise fail to control their target population, moving through hallways and delighting in the predatory response to fleeing prey. At this X-Tac level, the presence of numerous explosives is greater, as happened at Columbine where Kleibold and Harris had built 90 devices. Also, with these numbers, and with the example of Cho at VT to guide them in tactics, they may attempt to secure major points of egress (main external doors), and drive their victims in that direction. At this level, as with the single shooter, LE can employ Active Shooter responses, and with the exception of concern over IEDs, move quickly past rooms and areas that are unsecured, in the direction of the gunfire.

High Multiple Student Shooters.

These attacks will be launched by kids in the same age groups, but will involve four to eight shooters. This was seen in 2006 in Kansas where an attack was prevented involving five kids; and one week later in Alaska, where six teenagers were prevented from assaulting their school. It is highly unlikely that LE would ever confront more than eight. Due to maturity levels and typical group dynamics among children and teenagers, at numbers above eight, one will be ostracized by the group, or will otherwise get cold feet and report the planned shooting. The greatest tactical hurdles for LE at this level, however, are the presence of significant numbers of IEDs, efforts to secure and fortify major points of egress (external doors), and, most importatly, the recognition of the advantages of dividing their forces. With Low Multiple Shooters, they cannot split up without at least one youth being on his own, which is unlikely. With numbers of four and above, our own teenagers will eventually recognize that separating into two or three teams will yield them a substantially increased body count. They will follow a standard military hammer and anvil attack plan, or as is often described, having the hounds move to the hunters, with the quarry driven ahead of them. At this X-Tac level, they may also use one team to ambush arriving police officers. It is here that standard Active Shooter doctrine increases the threat to the first entry team, and they must be careful of moving past areas that have not been cleared and secured. For any Hasty Team that is assembled, the rear guard position becomes critical to the team’s survival. If intel on the shooters is sparse en route to the school, all LE must assume that they are confronting this number of attackers in responding to any school assault and maintain excellent rear security.

Young Adult Single Shooter.

Here the attacker would most likely be a college student, a recent college dropout, or possibly a recent high school dropout, as with the killer in Erfurt, Germany who killed 17, including a law enforcement officer. Though the number of assailants is dramatically reduced at this X-Tac level, the threat to victims and LE may actually be greater. At this age the attacker benefits from increased maturity, greater intellectual sophistication, and better tactical planning. Statistically, this is also the age where increasing numbers of Americans begin exhibiting symptoms of severe depression and paranoid schizophrenia, and evidence indicates that may have been the case with Seung-Hui Cho at VT; just as thousands of students at colleges across the country suffer from the same mental afflictions. Shooters at this level will be very well planned, armed, trained, and emotionally disengaged from their victims. As young adults living away from home, they will have had enhanced opportunities to purchase any manner of weapons and ammunition, train at gun ranges, and use their increased sophistication to research and develop tactics and fortifications that will make rapid LE response almost impossible. By this age the shooters may have had a decade of immersion in violent video games; excellent training for an attack (see Dave Grossman’s books On Killing, On Combat and Stop Teaching Our Kids to Kill, along with his Bullet Proof Mind series.). Coupled with their likely mental illness, police will be confronted with a cold, well programmed, killing machine, whose only emotion may be rage. The main advantage with these shooters, is the fact that due to their disenfranchisement with society and even others their own age, it would be unlikely they would team up with anyone. At none of the X-Tac levels up to and including this point, would it be likely that the assailants would take and hold hostages. At these levels arriving officers will be confronted with indicia of an Active Shooter scenario: they will hear gunshots, see students in windows calling out to them, students jumping from windows, and other victims streaming out of doors. But at this level, if a college age student chooses to attack his former high school, or a high school student or dropout chooses to attack his former middle school, holding hostages for a short time before “going active” is possible. Adult Single Shooter. As the age of attackers increases, so does the planning and preparation. As well, so does the ease of taking life. For LE, this means the level of threat, and the tactical difficulty they confront, will increase proportionately. Here, as with the Platte Canyon High School in Bailey, Colorado, and Amish school in Nickel Mines, Pennsylvania in 2006, you have an increased probability of older attackers holding hostages for a time before going active. At this level, and that of the college age shooter in a high school, responding officers cannot ever afford to believe that they have a stable barricade situation. Officers and commanders must understand that they are responding to a Pre-Active Shooter scenario. It will go active at any time, often with no warning, just as happened at Nickel Mines. Keep in mind that this will not be similar to a bank or convenience store robbery: where the robbers were only there for money, but rapid police response upended their plan. In the vast majority of those situations, the presence of SWAT and negotiators result in the robbers surrendering with no one getting hurt. But when these adults go into schools with guns, there is no reason for them to be there but the deaths of children. In Adult Shooter situations, the assailant will go through all six phases of the Islamist Mass Hostage Siege Model,* (editor note – see end of article) though they will move through them very quickly. Fortifications will have been quickly assembled, but sufficient to make many standard LE and SWAT entries difficult, if not impossible, given the short period of time they will have to enter with hostages being shot or blown up. After chaining the three public entry doors to Norris Hall, Cho managed to discharge 204 rounds in approximately nine minutes, killing or wounding 55. Only a high speed police response prevented him from firing the other 174 rounds he had in magazines on his person.

At Nickel Mines, Charles Carl Roberts needed only seconds to pull the trigger ten times on little girls, compared to the rapid two and one-half minutes it took Pennsylvania State Police SRT teams to breach a heavily fortified building. Even Duane Morrison’s threat that he had a large bomb in the Bailey school, and the stacking of chairs and desks between himself and the classroom door, making it difficult for the entry team to move quickly toward him while he used 16-year old Emily Keyes as a human shield, constituted sufficient fortifications to make a rescue difficult.  No matter how fast LE is responding or breaching, you can anticpate one round being discharged by the Adult Shooter every second or two (three at the most) into the controlled hostage group. The reality is that innocent people are going to be killed, or at least wounded. Whether you wait until the attacker begins shooting hostages to initiate your rescue, or dictate your own assault schedule, you must expect that there are going to be victims. The only advantage, is that at this level you will not see more than a single adult assailant, unless part of a trained terrorist team, as described below. Multiple Terrorist Decimation Assault. This will be tactically identical to the High Multiple Student Shooter scenario, with the exception that it will be conducted by a coordinated team of better trained, better armed, adult attackers. The “active” assault against the students and teachers in the building will dictate an immediate attack by arriving law enforcement. The terror team will have prepared ambushes for arriving officers. This attack will only end when the terrorists have been killed by police. An attack of this nature in America is less likely than a Terrorist-Mass Hostage siege stretched out over days.

Multiple Terrorist-Mass Hostage Siege

This is the worst and, therefore, most tactically difficult. Here you will be dealing with a team (anticipate at least ten) of well trained, heavily armed adults who will have been conditioned to not only kill as many innocents as possible, but as many cops as they can. They will intend to die inside the building, and will keep killing innocents until police kill them. Before that, the assailants will attempt to drag the standoff out for a period of days. Al Qaeda and related groups know all about Active Shooter responses of American LE agencies, and will ensure that the first cop to arrive on scene will be confronted with a cold, dead, quiet building. There will be none of the indicators of an Active Shooter situation. What hostages were going to escape will have already done so. All of the others will be controlled in a single collection point, most likely a gym, auditorium or cafeteria.

The first officer on site will see several large vehicles, with engines running, parked just outside the front doors. Most likely this will include at least one school bus. If there is an SRO in the building, they – like all of the Low and High Multiple Student Shooters, Young Adult and Adult Shooters – will have to eliminate that officer first. They know that if arriving officers hear a single gunshot, the police are going in, and will keep pouring cops into the building until the battle is over. In that event, American LE would effectively be following the Israeli model for dealing with mass hostage takings: Attack right away no matter what. This means SROs must be sufficiently armed with both weapons and ammunition, equipped with adequate body armor, and trained, to stay alive to keep firing so that arriving LE assaults immediately. To wait until the terrorists want the assault to come, is to ensure a greater body count of hostages and police.

From the arrival of the first officer on scene, throughout the days of the siege, they will make it easy for American LE to not attack; until the terrorists are ready for the battle. They will negotiate until all of their goals have been met, which will not include a peaceful surrender. The earliest point at which negotiations will end, however, will be when fortifications have been completed. At that point, if SWAT has not already launched a rescue operation, the terrorists will begin the mass execution of hostages, compelling police to attack. When the rescue comes, police should anticipate a large number of explosives fortifying the building, in addition to heavy firepower. Be ready for them to wire bombs to hostages, and even to place young females wearing suicide belts or vests, in among the hostages. When it is over, all of the terrorists will be dead; they will allow no other result. Some of the hostages will have died. As well, tragically, some of the police will likely not be going home that night.

Whether al Qaeda ever attempts to attack U.S. schools, we have not seen the last of the schools shootings and hostage takings in this country. It is due to the broad spectrum of extreme tactical threats to schools – and the varied tactical hurdles that LE confronts – that SROs, patrol and SWAT teams must develop tactics that will be used in tandem during an actual attack. Schools must be taught what is expected of them, including what intel must be communicated to police immediately. Tactics must be developed, or modified, to deal with these various scenarios. Knowledge is, indeed, power. But it is only powerful when used to prepare for the problems that American law enforcement will continue to face in her schools.

* (Islamist Mass Hostage Siege Model)

1. Attack on the building;
2. Submission and Control of Hostages – may include some initial murders to stun hostages;
3. Fortifications – will begin early on and may continue throughout Negotiations;
4. Stabilization – will show LE a stable scene so that they do not attempt rescue right away;
5. Negotiations – used by terrorists to gain time for both media access and to fortify building;
6. Rescue – may be forced by terrorists at time of their choosing.

The author is a Senior Consultant for the Archangel Group, a non-profit agency providing anti-terror training and consulting to U.S. law enforcement, military and government. He is the author of Terror at Beslan: A Russian Tragedy with Lessons for America’s Schools, and trains SWAT, SROs and patrol officers throughout the country. As part of his work, John Giduck is a U.S. Army Special Forces firearms and hand-to-hand combat instructor, tactical dive instructor, and teaches Terrorist- Hostage Negotiations, Multiple Terrorist-Mass Hostage Siege Doctrine, Advanced Small Unit Tactics for SWAT and School Survival. His new book, Living the Green Beret Lifestyle: Total Commitment to Life, Family, Career and Sports, co-authored by Green Beret Sergeant Major John Anderson, with Foreword by Delta Force plankowner and Command Sergeant Major Mel Wick, will be available shortly. John can be reached through www.antiterrorconsultants.org  or info@ciron.org.

 

by By Stan Walters

If given the time, we could probably come up with a number of reasons a suspect won't confess, a hostile witness won't cooperate or why the victim won't disclose. If we then reviewed our "list" objectively we might find that we have placed a large portion of the blame on our subject and were partially if not fully blind to any problems we may have created. It's time to give ourselves and our subject a break. The impasse may in fact have been created because of there being too many choices to be made by us and our subject.

All too often when entering an interview room, we like to go in "armed to the teeth" with information and facts. Being fully loaded with evidence is certainly not a bad thing but how we choose to present that information can be a handicap for the interviewer as well as the subject. With so many choices to make about what topics to address, how to address them, what order and more, we get caught up in the "planning" and can bungle the "presentation." Because we have too many choices to make we may see a successful interview as a long and difficult campaign with no assurance of success and even a higher probability of early failure. To overcome this problem, try dealing with and presenting only one issue at a time and strive to win small battles and not the whole "war" with one big "atomic" question that tries to incorporate multiple issues. You'll find you'll be able to focus more on your subject, miss fewer of the important responses and increase your chances of overall success.

Far too many choices presented to the victim, witness or suspect also has a higher probability of negative outcome. Contrary to common belief, it is known in the sales profession too many choices presented to the customer kills more sales than they make and the same behavior response applies to the interview room. Asking for agreement or concession from your subject on several issues at once makes the ultimate decision by the subject much more difficult. When we increase the difficulty of the decision making cycle for our subject, the longer it will take for the person to make their decision to comply, cooperate or confess. The longer the decision-making cycle is extended for our subject, the greater the chance that the results of the decision process will be negative and thus harder for us to reverse and overcome.

Review your case before you conduct your interview. Break down the case interview objectives into smaller more manageable tasks and move toward your goals of cooperation, compliance and admission by winning small victories by reducing the choices to be made at any one time. You'll improve your chances of a successful interview.

© 2006 by Stan B. Walters "The Lie Guy®"
Stan B. Walters writes, teaches & does keynote speeches internationally on deception, interview & interrogation. He is regularly called on by the media as an expert to comment on high profile cases. Web: www.TheLieGuy.com  blog: www.TheLieGuyBlog.com 

by Andrew Hawkes, Author of
Secrets of Successful Highway Drug Interdiction

In today’s drug smuggling world, highway drug traffickers are constantly attempting to think of new an innovative ways to conceal their contraband from law enforcement. Little do they realize that the same methods they come up with have been being used for decades by their predecessors. Through thousands of narcotic interdiction arrests by skilled interdiction officers all over the country, we have learned many of these traits and characteristics. Below, I have outlined ten popular techniques that highway drug traffickers attempt to use in hopes that they will successfully get their dope to their destination. By familiarizing yourself with some of these tips, you too can increase your interdiction success. Keep in mind you must always have probable cause to stop a vehicle.

1. MASKING ODORS.
   We have all heard of highway drug smugglers attempting to use large amounts of air fresheners in their vehicles. Not only can you look at for the famous “Christmas Tree” air fresheners hanging from the rear view mirror and other places in the vehicle, but you can also be aware of several other tactics that you may not have picked up on in the past. For example, do you notice several bottles of cologne or perfume in the car, and have they recently been sprayed prior or during your traffic stop of the vehicle? Is there a large bag of scented pipe tobacco, opened, laying in the vehicle but you notice the driver is smoking a cigarette? Or maybe you find it odd that as soon as you stop the car, the driver lights up a cigarette immediately, filling the car with smoke, but has no desire to roll down the windows? These are all examples of masking the odor on the surface of the stop. Masking odors placed directly onto packages of contraband can include animal urine, cayenne pepper, mustard, animal blood, oil and just about anything they feel may frighten off a drug canine or further mask the odor of contraband.
    

2. LAW ENFORCEMENT STICKERS AND SLOGANS.
   Most officers know that the “State troopers association” stickers you see on vehicle are mailed to random people and solicit money that often are not associated with any law enforcement entity. Most experienced officer’s will also come to determine that most cars they stop with these stickers do not belong to anyone in law enforcement. When you stop or see vehicle traveling across many states with an abundance of these stickers, be aware that they will often put these stickers all over their vehicles, thinking that we as officer’s will think they are “Officer Friendly”.
    

3. RELIGIOUS PARAPHERNELIA
   The same goes for religious bumper stickers, symbols and bibles strategically placed throughout the vehicle. I once recovered 80 pounds of vacuum-sealed marijuana placed under the carpet of the vehicle. The driver was traveling down the interstate with the biggest bible I have ever seen, lying open on the front dashboard of his rental car.
    

4. RENTAL CAR AGREEMENTS/PAPERWORK.
   It has been known for years that drug smugglers like to rent vehicles to transport drugs. There are many reasons for this. Often the simple fact is that there personal cars are old and not as dependable as a new rental car. Other reasons include avoiding seizure of their personal vehicles in the event they are caught and arrested. Whatever the reason, the rental agreement paper work can offer several indicators to the investigating officer that could end up instrumental in establishing reasonable suspicion. Questions to ask yourself when inspecting this paperwork are:

   a. Is the driver of the car listed on the rental agreement?

   b. If not, is the person listed on the rental agreement even in the vehicle?

   c. Can the driver give you specific details as to who is on the rental agreement and his relationship to this person?

   d. Does the name listed on the rental agreement show to have a criminal history?

   e. What city and state was the rental car rented in and what distance is that from where you have the vehicle stopped?

   f. What day and time was the rental car rented and how much time has lapsed since then?

   g. What was the mileage listed when the car was rented and how far has it traveled since then? Is the mileage traveled consistent with the occupants’ story as to where they have traveled?

   Another great tool to use with rental cars can be to contact the rental agency, identify yourself and explain to them that you have one of their vehicle pulled over, several states away from where it was rented, explain that the renter of the car is not in the vehicle and possible that the people in the vehicle may not even know the person that rented the car. Often times they will ask you to impound the car for them so they can pick it up. This gives you, the officer the opportunity to inventory the contents of the vehicle, thus discovering any contraband.
    

5. SPECIFIC TOOLS USED TO ACCESS WHERE THE DOPE IS HIDDEN.
   Many dope smugglers will go to great lengths to conceal their contraband. What is so funny to the experienced interdiction officer is that they leave obvious tools needed to retrieve the contraband in the silliest of places. I can’t recall the last time I stopped an honest citizen carrying a brand new floor jack and a special tire tool in the front seat of a new Lincoln town car. I can however, recall stopping a drug smuggler, with those tools on the front seat of a new Lincoln that had 160 pounds of marijuana concealed in all four tires of the vehicle! Look for out of place items that don’t fit the rest of the surroundings.
    

6. MORE THAN ONE CELL PHONE.
   Often a drug smuggler will carry multiple cell phones, that all seem to be ringing at once. The smuggler may have a personal cell phone, as well as a cell phone given to him from the origin of the load, a cell phone from the contact near the destination and numerous other middlemen involved in the drug transaction so that they can all keep tabs on the location. Look for this as a possible indicator and question the suspect in detail as to why he has all these phones and use their answers to build reasonable suspicion.
    

7. CONFLICTING STORIES.
   A popular subject to that has been taught in interdiction is the “conflicting stories” that passengers give as to the purpose and destination of their interstate travel. Developing these conflicting stories is paramount in your investigation. By getting the suspect’s to give your intricate details that totally contradict each other not only is an indicator, but a great tool in reasonable suspicion.
    

8. THE DRIVER IMMEDIATELY GETS OUT OF THE VEHICLE.
   This is another post stop indicator that can be a sign of dope trafficking. In this case, the subject is trying to distance himself from something he wants to hide from you. Keep in mind, this indicator can be a sign of something less sinister than drug trafficking, e.g. the subject might be have a weapon in the car, an open beer, etc.. Either way, there is something in the car he is hiding. Just as a side note, if you ask the subject if you can search the car, and he consents but tries to draw you away from where he doesn’t want you to look, then you know the contraband is in a different location than the one they want you to look in. Dead giveaway indicator.
    

9. Cars that drive under the speed limit – here is a very easy pre-stop indicator you can start using immediately. Drug traffickers are naturally paranoid and their paranoia will make them do stupid things like drive 10 – 15 miles under the speed limit. drug haulers generally will stay in the “slow lane” as well.
    

10. OLDER MODEL CARS THAT ARE IN UNUSUALLY GOOD CONDITION. Often older cars will be used to transport drug loads, however, what sets them apart is that they have been very well maintained mechanically, often have new tires on them and have been washed and cleaned to help blend in with the average citizen’s vehicle.

Keep in mind as you go through this list, an indicator by itself is not enough to be a sign of drug trafficking. However, by observing multiple indicators then you can greatly increase your chances of finding the mother load. I talk more about indicators and reasonable suspicion in my book, Secrets of Successful Highway Drug Interdiction. As always, stay safe and happy hunting.

Sergeant Andrew Hawkes is a 17 year law enforcement veteran. He began working Highway Drug Interdiction full time in 1993.  Sgt. Hawkes has won many awards in Texas for his interdiction success.  He has been an interdiction instructor for police departments, area police academies and for the U.S. DEA basic narcotic investigator's school.  Sgt. Hawkes has completed graduate courses in Public Administration and holds a bachelor's degree in Criminal Justice from Dallas Baptist University.  Sgt. Hawkes latest publication, Secrets of Successful Highway Drug Interdiction is a "how to" book for the street officer wishing to develop drug interdiction skills without all the complicated police jargon and terminology that goes with a lengthy and expensive training class.  Sgt. Hawkes has been featured in The Dallas Morning News, TNOA Narcotic Officer's Quarterly, many area newspapers and law enforcement websites. You can visit his website at www.highwaydruginterdiction.com

 

< < jump to the policetraining.net home page