By John E. Reid & Associates
It is a common trial strategy for an attorney to attack
inconsistencies within testimony offered by a victim, witness, or an
investigator. And yet most victims, witnesses and investigators tell
the truth when testifying. On the other hand, consider a suspect who
told an arresting officer that a friend drove him home on the night
of a crime. Several hours later the suspect tells an investigator
that he drove himself home that night. This inconsistency supports
the opinion that the suspect has principal or secondary involvement
in the crime under investigation. However, not every inconsistency
in a suspect's statement supports deception. In
fact, when an account is repeated two or three times with perfect
consistency this should be viewed suspiciously. The question then
becomes, when do inconsistencies in an account support deception?
It is first important to distinguish between inconsistencies and
omissions between two statements. An inconsistency refers to a
change of fact between two accounts. When a subject initially
reports that on a particular afternoon he was golfing with friends
and later recalls that on the afternoon in question he was watching
a football game alone in his apartment, this is an inconsistency. An
omission, on the other hand, refers to information left out of an
original account that is included in a subsequent statement. During
our training seminars we show the interview of a woman who
fabricated a story that she was abducted from a parking lot. While
her statements were all consistent, during her initial description
of the assault she omitted the very significant detail that the
abductor had a knife.
A second important consideration is whether or not a suspect's
statement represents a true inconsistency. A security guard
suspected of arson may state at one point during an interview, "I
checked the floors around 8:00 and didn't smell any smoke --
everything was fine. I don't believe I entered any of the rooms. I
just walked the halls." Later, he may acknowledge that it is
possible that he checked the floors as late at 8:15 and may have
entered some rooms, because he occasionally does this. The guard did
not contradict himself because he used qualifying phrases in his
first statement ("around" and "I' don't believe").
A naive investigator may believe that if a person is telling the
truth there should be a perfect correlation between two accounts
relayed at different times. However, there are circumstances when a
truthful person may provide inconsistent objective recollections of
what happened, when it happened and even where it happened. The two
most important factors to consider when evaluating inconsistencies
are the passage of time between the event and its recollection as
well as the significance of the event. Consider a suspect who
initially reported that two weeks ago Friday when he arrived home
from work his wife was out shopping. After talking to his wife or
giving more thought to the evening, he may now recall that she had
already returned from her shopping trip by the time he arrived home.
This inconsistency should, in no way, tarnish his overall
credibility.
Conversely, consider the suspect who initially reported that his
wife struck him with a frying pan which caused him to grab a knife
to fend off her attack at which time he stabbed her. During a
subsequent interview he now acknowledges that, because he was
cooking, he already had the knife in his hand at the time his wife
struck him with the frying pan. The cause-effect relationship
between being struck and grabbing a knife is certainly significant
and it is highly improbable that a person could somehow be confused
as to the sequence of these two events.
A person's state of mind at the time of an event should also be
evaluated. Intense emotions (anxiety, fear, pain) or intoxication
may certainly influence an individual's recall. However, such
conditions should be associated more with omission and memory
qualifiers (I believe, etc.). When a person who was admittedly
intoxicated or frightened at the time of an event expresses no
uncertainty in recollections and offers an inflexible version of
events the investigator should be suspicious of the veracity of the
recollections.
Finally, possible motivations for inconsistent statements must be
assessed. A rape victim may initially report that the assailant
pulled down her jeans and later change her statement indicating that
she undressed herself at the man's instruction. This inconsistency
makes perfect sense since many legitimate rape victims are initially
reluctant to acknowledge any level of cooperation with the rapists,
including engaging in friendly conversation with him before the
attack. In instances where a suspect is interrogated and
subsequently identified as being innocent, it is often because the
suspect previously lied about his alibi, access, motive or
involvement in a crime unrelated to the issue under investigation..
In each of these cases, the suspect will be able to articulate a
reasonable explanation for the earlier lie. A suspect may explain
that he offered a false alibi to avoid disclosing that he has been
having an affair. He may acknowledge lying about knowing the victim
for fear of becoming a suspect in the investigation or lie about
being behind on bills (having a financial motive) for the same
reason. We are not suggesting that when these types of
inconsistencies surface during an investigation that they indicate
truthfulness. In fact, they often support deception. What is being
suggested is that when these circumstances exist the innocent
suspect is able to offer a plausible explanation for his previous
lie.
The following guidelines are offered to interpret suspect
inconsistencies that support the opinion of deception:
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1.
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The inconsistent event is significant
in nature and would not likely to be forgotten.
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2.
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There are inconsistencies in the
sequence of significant events that relate to cause-effect
relationships during a crime.
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3.
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The subject changes his statement after
being challenged either with actual or fictitious evidence
e.g., "If we were to talk to neighbors in that area would
any of them tell us they saw your car in her driveway that
day?" "Now I remember. I actually did go to her house that
day and drove in the driveway but decided not to go in."
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4.
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The suspect rigid in recollections of
remains facts that are usually estimated, e.g., " Three
weeks ago I was at Tom's house from 7:10 until 10: 40."
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5.
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Even though the suspect was under the
influence of alcohol or drugs, he exhibits no uncertainty as
to his recollections of minor events, e.g., "I am certain
that just before this happened Julie stopped playing pool
and went into the bathroom knowing that John was in there.
She was in the bathroom for seven minutes and when she came
out she had a smile on her face and her blouse was untucked.."
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6.
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The suspect is unable to offer any
reasonable explanation for his earlier inconsistency.
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The following inconsistencies would not necessarily support
deception and may, in fact, indicate the normal memory process of a
truthful person:
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1.
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Small discrepancies in estimates of time
or distances
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2.
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The event represents an everyday behavior
for the subject
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3.
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A significant time period elapsed between
experiencing an insignificant event and relating it
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4.
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The suspect has a rationale explanation
for his inconsistency, e.g., "After reviewing my calender I
remembered that ..."
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5.
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A suspect who lies about his alibi to
cover an embarrassing event (being with a prostitute),
protect a friend or prevent disclosure of an illegal
activity unrelated to the crime (using drugs at a friend's
house).
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6.
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A suspect who lies about access or motives
and, when interrogated, sincerely states that he did not
reveal this information earlier because he was afraid it
would make him look guilty.
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In conclusion, significant inconsistencies in a suspect's statements
certainly supports an opinion of deception to the issue under
investigation. These are most likely to occur when the investigator
challenges the suspect's original statement with real or fictitious
evidence. Most guilty suspects are able to relate a consistent
account because they keep their stories simple. Innocent suspects,
who are anxious to get everything right, may offer minor
inconsistencies between two accounts.
Credit and Permission Statement: This Investigator Tip was developed
by John E. Reid and Associates Inc. Permission is hereby granted to
those who wish to share or copy the article. For additional 'tips'
visit
www.reid.com;
select 'Educational Information' and 'Investigator Tip'. Inquiries
regarding Investigator Tips should be directed to Janet Finnerty
johnreid@htc.net.
For more information regarding Reid seminars and training products,
contact John E. Reid and Associates, Inc. at 800-255-5747 or
www.reid.com.
by Steven D. Ashley
Risk management is more than policies and training
Consider this scenario:
A medium-sized department in a typical town handles a call one night
where officers have to use force to take someone into custody.
During the arrest, the subject resists violently, and it takes
several officers to get the subject handcuffed. Because the
individual is so out of control, officers use OC spray, and then an
electronic control device (ECD). Eventually, they just have to use
brute strength and a polyester pile in order to subdue the subject.
At the jail, the subject is booked into a cell. Sometime later a
cell check reveals that the subject is unresponsive. Corrections
Officers immediately start CPR, but the subject is pronounced dead
at a nearby hospital.
This describes every department‘s nightmare scenario. Whenever force
is used, communities rightly demand accountability regarding the
actions of the police. If an in-custody death occurs, the scrutiny
is intense. That‘s as it should be. We need to
be accountable for what happens on our watch.
Unfortunately, society has evolved to the point where law
enforcement no longer gets the benefit of the doubt in these cases.
There is frequently a knee-jerk reaction from the public and the
media that police did something wrong, and whatever that was is to
blame for the negative outcome. Incidents of this type are rare in
American policing, but they grab major headlines. Distraught family
members demand answers, some community leaders vacillate, and
activists stir the pot. Faced with the need to fill hours of time
and pages of web space or print, the media often speculates, which
feeds the frenzy.
And the fact that these types of incidents really are rare doesn‘t
seem to matter. Knowing this, our agencies focus a great deal of
effort to mitigation measures. We develop policies and procedures,
and we make sure our people are trained as well as possible. We
equip our officers with the best equipment, and we provide guidance
and supervision so that officers know what to do, and how to handle
situations on the street. A large part of our time and treasure is
focused on managing the risk of events that, although they rarely
occur, are catastrophic on many levels when they do hap-pen.
And then it happens, and our response to the inevitable questions?
―No comment.‖
―We don‘t know anything yet.
―We‘ll investigate and let you know.
―When we know something, you‘ll know something.‖
―It will take four to six weeks for the lab report. We‘ll let you
know.
Or we say nothing at all.
In the meantime, people that started out curious become concerned,
then irritated, then angry. People that started out saddened become
shocked, then angry. Family members and friends that are distraught,
become frustrated, then bitter, then angry. Officers that started
out feeling like the department would support them begin to doubt
that support, and become angry. Pretty soon, everyone‘s angry.
The people that have an interest in keeping things stirred up have a
field day‖. The media, desperate for news, fills the space with
statements from everyone except us. All of our efforts to mitigate
the risk mean nothing if we mismanage the aftermath of an event like
this. Indeed, the first thing we have to acknowledge is that
no matter how well we manage the risk
if we do police work long enough, our odds of having such an
incident at our department continue to increase. We can reduce the
likelihood, but we cannot eliminate it. So we plan. And then it
happens, and we mismanage the aftermath, which might at this point
be better referred to as fallout.
So, What Are We Supposed To Do?
The fact is, in the immediate aftermath of an incident, information
is often scarce. It takes time to put it together, and to be fair
and just too all involved. A rush to judgment
serves no one well, especially the officers. We all know that. The
problem is that people want answers now!
Conducting the right kind of calm, reasoned investigation will be a
lot easier in a calm, rational environment. That helps to reduce the
pressure of the media spotlight, and lessens the possibility of
action being taken for political reasons, or just because someone is
in a hurry. That‘s how mistakes get made, and no one wants that.
This is all about perception. The family of the deceased needs to
feel that the events that led to the death of their loved one are
going to be fully and completely investigated. They need to feel
like the truth will come out, no matter what it is. They need to
feel like they are being kept in the loop, and informed as to
progress.
The community needs to feel like the investigation will be fair, and
as speedy as possible, without sacrificing accuracy. They need to
feel like the family is being respected and treated like they would
want to be treated.
The press needs to feel like they are being given information in a
forthright and honest way. They need to feel like they are being
trusted to provide a conduit for information to the public, and that
their watch-dog‖ role is being respected, and even treated as
necessary. They need to feel like they will get the facts as soon as
they become available.
Officers and other members of the department need to believe that a
fair and honest investigation will be conducted, and that politics
will not win out over truth. They need to feel respected and valued
by the agency, and not feel like they are being treated like
criminals.
Everyone needs to believe that the end result will be a full and
complete airing of the facts and evidence, regardless of the
outcome. That‘s what the system is designed to do, and citizens want
to believe that their trust has not been misplaced.
Is there an easy answer for the question of how to accomplish all of
this? Of course not. The answer is hard, and it‘s human, and it‘s
multifaceted. It starts with public education regarding the law
enforcement mission, and with openness and honesty. It includes
getting out ahead of problems by explaining why things are done the
way they are, before a problem arises. It involves performing daily
in such a way that the public will continue to have faith in the
righteous motivation of their police officers. Following an event,
it includes full and fair disclosure of information, presented with
sensitivity and respect.
It involves treating others the way we would want to be treated.
Stay safe, and wear your vest.
by Steven D. Ashley
Don‘t become over reliant on your weapons
Not too long ago I taught a use of force class, and was fortunate
enough to have some really sharp officers as students. During one of
the sessions, we got to talking about force and control options,
including what they had and what they wished they had,
technology-wise.
As part of the general discussion, I asked the class (rhetorically)
how many of their departments included transition‖ drills in their
training. When they looked at me sideways, I explained that to me –
a transition drill was one in which an officer has to move from one
level of force (or weapon) to another, under stress. The example I
gave was moving from an aimed firearm to a non-lethal weapon, such
as an electronic control device (ECD).
During one of the breaks, an officer approached me and said that he
had asked his department to let him incorporate similar drills into
their mix‖, and he was told that it wasn‘t necessary, and there
wasn‘t time. Later, I couldn‘t stop thinking about his comments.
Early and Simple Weapons
Most departments equip their officers with some sort of non-lethal
technology nowadays, even if money is scarce. Not everyone has the
latest and greatest ECD, but most everyone has some sort of baton,
and usually an aerosol weapon. In fact, officers have probably had
various impact weapons at their disposal since the first night
watch-man or Town Crier pinned on a badge.
Along with a firearm, a nightstick or baton (or sap or billy-club)
made up the only armament for many generations of officers.
Eventually, departments started practicing their shooting skills,
but it took quite a bit longer before officers started getting any
appreciable training with their stick‖. Perhaps bosses believed that
it didn‘t take any skill to hit someone with a club, so training
wasn‘t necessary. At any rate, many decades passed before impact
weapon training systems became common.
And, even then, there wasn‘t a reduction in the amount of firearms
training in order to begin training with the baton
both types of training
(using the term a little loosely here) were continued.
The New Age
Along came aerosol weapons, in the form of OC sprays (we‘re not
ignoring earlier products here, just skipping a discussion of them
because they weren‘t that effective, and fell into disuse). Many
departments jumped onboard the new technology as less harmful than
hitting someone with a stick. Additionally, and more
problematically, some department administrators got the idea that if
they adopted an OC weapon they could cut back on defensive tactics
and baton training, and some even moved toward dropping their issued
impact weapons all together.
From a purely administrative stand-point, the idea made sense. Less
harmful and easier to train with, therefore less likely to cause a
lawsuit and cheaper to adopt and implement what‘s not to like?
Next came electronic control devices. Here some administrators
remained concerned regarding all the negative media hype, but others
saw the usefulness of the new tools and took the time to do their
research. Many adopted ECDs, and more continue to do so.
And, following the earlier pattern, some departments still manifest
the thought process that they can cut back on other training and use
of force options, because now
they have the newest and best tool. Again, the savings in training
time seem to be a no-brainer.
The Technology Problem
The primary problem with this view of technology is that no single
tool is the answer. Nothing works all the time, and officers need
both alternatives for different situations, and back-up options when
one of their tools fails. They must be trained in the use of all
those tools, and in the decision-making skills that are required to
choose among them.
Nothing works all the time, and officers need both alternatives for
different situations, and back-up options for when one of their
tools fails
Officers also need training in the skills required to transition
from one weapon to another, which sometimes means transitioning from
one level of force to another.
Consider this scenario:
A fleeing, stolen vehicle is coming to a halt. The driver exits the
vehicle and starts to walk quickly away. Officers leave their
vehicles and draw their firearms, ordering the suspect to stop. He
does not, and begins to jog away from them. One of the officers is
armed with an ECD. As he pursues the fleeing suspect, he needs to re
holster his fire-arm and draw his ECD, and then fire it at the
suspect.
That is a technology transition, and it‘s a pretty awkward one. If
we haven‘t trained him to perform those skills, we increase the
possibility that he will either continue to run with his gun in his
hand, will drop his gun while trying to re holster on the run‖, or
will try to draw his ECD with his support hand, and then use it
while he has his firearm in his strong hand. Each of those
possibilities greatly increases the risk to the officers and the
suspect. Training in the appropriate skills is absolutely necessary.
The Greatest Danger
Another disturbing trend is one in which some departments have cut
back or eliminated their defensive tactics training pro-grams
(usually due to budgetary constraints), and have begun to rely upon
their non-lethal weapons almost exclusively. The thinking here seems
to be that the technology can solve most, if not all, of the suspect
management problems faced by officers. This can lead to
overdependence on OC and ECDs by officers. What happens when neither
of those tools is the appropriate response to resistance, or when
one or both of them fail to function as expected?
Money is tight, and time is the scarcest resource of all. Still,
departments should make every effort to provide officers with
technological options for managing behavior, and the necessary
training for using those options effectively and safely. Along the
way, officers should remember that no weapon or tool or technique
works every
time. Technology has helped to keep officers, and suspects, safer
but we can‘t allow it to
become a crutch.
Stay safe, and wear your vest
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