By Bill Woessner
Today criminal
organizations are sophisticated enterprises that operate on a global
scale. These organizations are increasingly difficult for law
enforcement to identify and penetrate. One area of vulnerability for
these organizations is the transportation centers they must use
along with everyone else. Trained law enforcement officers have
developed methods over the past four decades to detect criminal
activity occurring in transportation centers and employed these
methods to interdict individuals traveling through these hubs.
Interdiction is a means of narrowing the field of possible suspects
from the thousands of legitimate traveling passengers to those few
who are most likely involved in criminal activity. Many trained law
enforcement officers currently work in interdiction units at various
transportation centers in the U.S. and throughout the world. These
units need to be expanded, or created where they do not currently
exist, because the interdiction units are not only effective in
targeting criminal elements, but have been a very effective tool in
identifying and stopping terrorist activity.
History of Drug Interdiction
Beginning in the early 1970's, DEA agents, along with state and
local police officers working in Detroit and Los Angeles, determined
that a number of investigations involved individuals transporting
heroin from Los Angeles to Detroit via commercial aircraft. The
officers began monitoring those airports and noticed that the drug
couriers displayed discernable methods and characteristics. Those
characteristics or “indicators” proved to be useful tools that could
be utilized by law enforcement officers to identify drug couriers.
It was during the transportation of commodities and personnel that
the traffickers became vulnerable to detection by alert law
enforcement officials trained in the proven methods of drug
interdiction. In the mid-1980's, reacting to the change in
distribution patterns of the drug trafficking organizations, airport
interdiction units expanded to include bus terminals, train
stations, commercial package and freight shipping facilities. In the
1990’s the interdiction concept was shared with law enforcement
organizations in countries throughout the world. Today, numerous
countries have active interdiction units or teams. While
interdiction units were created to address the movement of drugs and
money by drug trafficking organizations, it was discovered that
using particularized characteristics to identify traffickers in
specific cities also identified individuals involved in other types
of criminal activity. In addition to arresting drug couriers and
seizing currency from drug trafficking organizations, interdiction
units also arrested individuals with arrest warrants for crimes
including murder, financial crimes, credit card fraud, and other
felony offenses, including those related to terrorism. For example,
in 1993, members of the DEA Greensboro, NC interdiction unit
identified an individual traveling on a bus through Greensboro who,
when ultimately detained, was identified as Abdel-llah Elmardoudi
(Hakim, 2002). Elmardoudi was wanted by the FBI for
terrorist-related activities in Detroit, MI (Hakim, 2002).
Transportation Center Screening Methods
There have been no published studies in the United States on the
effectiveness of employing specifically identified characteristics
to recognize and approach potential criminal suspects in a
transportation location. Notably, the British law enforcement
community received interdiction-style training from U.S.
counterparts and began utilizing characteristics that were cited as
unusual relative to traffickers in the British Islands (Buck, 2010).
The British subsequently conducted a study of the effectiveness of
using characteristics displayed in prior investigations to identify
potential criminal activity. They compared cases involving the use
of interdiction techniques to those cases where only standard
security screening measures were employed. Standard security
screening methods are currently in use throughout the world today by
dedicated security organizations, such as the British Airport
Authority and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in
the United States.
Standard security screening methods include x-ray of carry-on
luggage, employment of magnetometers on traveling passengers, random
spectrometer examination of carry-on bags for explosive materials
and random hand searches of individuals. The standard security
screening methods could be described as mass screening. The British
Study, which was conducted by the Centre for the Protection of
National Infrastructure (CPNI), revealed that application of the
known unusual or criminal characteristics by trained personnel was
six times more effective in identifying passengers involved in
criminal activity than relying on the current mass screening process
(Buck, 2010).
The purpose of screening, especially in an airport, is entirely for
the safety and security of the traveling public. However, while
these screening methods can be effective as a deterrent to criminal
activity, they are not intended to identify and arrest criminal
elements traveling through transportation centers. It falls on
active law enforcement interdiction teams to conduct investigations
and pursue criminals in the transportation hubs.
Though it is not the duty of screening personnel to identify and
arrest criminals, it is incumbent upon them to identify those
individuals, especially terrorist organization directed persons, set
on circumventing security and attacking individuals, especially
relative to air travel.
Screening Methods to Combat Terrorism
Attempts to destroy airplanes and kill all passengers onboard are an
ever present concern for security screening in the world’s airports.
In the U.S., the TSA has responded to these threats through enhanced
mass screening techniques that have been developed relative to
specific attempts or threats. Several of these enhancements include:
(A) The removal of shoes for x-ray, which is in response to the
attempt by Richard Reid to ignite his explosive laden sneakers on an
airplane in flight from London to Detroit (BBC News, 2001).
(B) The deployment of low emissions x-ray machines that can scan an
individual’s body and reveal items concealed underneath clothing,
like the attack by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who had the explosives
concealed within his underpants on a flight inbound from Amsterdam
to Detroit (BBC News, 2002).
Al Qaeda has adapted to TSA’s enhanced screening methods by
employing drug traffickers smuggling methods such as the insertion
of drugs in a body cavity. A prime example of how Al Qaeda is
adapting to tighter security is the recent assassination attempt of
Saudi Prince Mohammed Bin Nayef by Abdullah Asieri where Aseiri
inserted a pound of high explosives and a detonator up his rectum
and managed to pass through two sets of airport security, including
metal detectors and palace security (MacVicar, 2009). He then waited
30 hours before meeting Prince Nayef and detonating the explosives (MacVicar,
2009). The use of a low emission x-ray might have detected this
suicide bomber and possibly prevented the attack. Of considerable
concern is a potential method of transporting explosives that would
be undetectable by the commonly utilized technological detection
methods.
While explosives are the primary concern for security in airports,
they are not the only threat that requires detection. In July 2010,
Housrou Kediji was arrested at the Bush Intercontinental Airport as
he was attempting to board a flight to France. Kediji had ingested
85 condoms containing cocaine that weighed approximately 2.2 pounds
(Schiller 2010). In December 2010, Uemduen Sophawat was arrested in
Bali, Indonesia upon her arrival from Bangkok, Thailand. Sophawat
had ingested 1280 ecstasy pills weighing approximately 402 grams
(BNO News, 2010). These are but a few instances of drug couriers
ingesting drugs and transporting them aboard airlines.
The DEA has encountered numerous Iranian couriers that had ingested
crystal methamphetamine and were arrested at the Bangkok
International Airport upon arrival from the United Arab Emirates as
well as numerous other countries (Ngamkham, 2010). A number of these
Iranian couriers had ingested several latex incased AAA batteries
along with the crystal methamphetamine. Upon being interviewed
subsequent to their arrests, none of the Iranian couriers knew nor
could explain why they had been asked to ingest the batteries along
with the drugs. Many DEA investigations have revealed that numerous
drug trafficking organizations have and are still using couriers to
ingest drugs and money and travel through airports throughout the
world for delivery to local distribution organizations.
Terrorist organizations could easily recruit individuals that are
willing to ingest explosives, up to a kilograms worth, which could
be passed on an airplane and then detonated via a device that was
also ingested or even inserted anally. Based on Al Qaeda’s
assassination attempt by making use of an individual who inserted
explosives up his rectum, it is highly likely they are aware and
possibly planning utilization of individuals to board airplanes
after ingesting explosives. To the author’s knowledge, there is
currently no effective security method routinely employed that would
identify couriers that ingest illicit items, including the use of
low emission x-ray. Perhaps the only sure way to identify an
individual, who has ingested drugs or other illegal items, excluding
their personal admission, is through standard or digital x-ray of
the stomach and intestinal areas. However, the problem lies in
identifying those individuals who should be subjected to the x-ray
as it is a time consuming and invasive procedure. The current
security model of mass screening will most likely not identify
individuals who have ingested dangerous or illegal items. Since the
current method to detect if an individual has ingested drugs is
through x-ray of an individual’s internal organs, and TSA’s current
application of the low emission x-ray has proven controversial
(Nader, 2010), there is conceivably no way to perform a large number
of the more invasive internal x-ray’s on the traveling public.
Therefore, it is needed to narrow the field and identify those
individuals most likely involved in criminal activity by identifying
specific trafficker characteristics or indicators.
Identifying discernable criminal characteristics or indicators along
with interviewing, to minimize the number of persons who might
require a more intensive search including an internal x-ray may be
one way to overcome the current screening obstacles. Additionally,
articulation of the precise indicators of criminal activity will
permit law enforcement officers to take appropriate investigative
steps that are legally authorized, such as a temporary detention or
x-ray. Criminal characteristics identified by law enforcement
personnel in particular venues and types of investigations can be an
effective law enforcement tool in locating and arresting criminal
elements utilizing many nations’ transportation hubs. Our best line
of defense against criminal activity including terrorism is three
fold. First, interdiction units need to be put into place at all
major transportation centers, staff them with law enforcement
officers who demonstrate the ability to work effectively in that
type of environment, and then provide those officers with proper
training. Second, personnel need to be identified who work in the
transportation environment and who demonstrate the ability to
recognize circumstances that are unusual or out of the ordinary.
Once identified, those personnel will need to be trained to assist
in locating and identifying potential criminal suspects. Finally,
flight attendants need enhanced training in recognizing potential
terrorist activity by passengers aboard the airplane, specifically
relative to individuals who ingest dangerous items. The threat of
terrorist activity at our transportation centers is ever present,
and criminal organizations will continue to use transportation hubs
to conduct their illicit activities. The best method we have for
combating the threat of terrorism is the creation of interdiction
units. These units can train transportation hub personnel to watch
for specific characteristics that are unusual or out of the ordinary
and then immediately contact law enforcement who would initiate an
investigation.
REFERENCES
BBC News. (2001, December). Who is Richard Reid. BBC News Internet.
Retrieved January 25, 2011, from
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/1731568.stm
BBC News. (2010, October). Profile: Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. BBC
News Internet. Retrieved January 25, 2011, from http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-11545509
BNO News. (2010, December). Thai Smuggler caught in Indonesia after
Swallowing 1,200 Ecstasy Pills. Thaindian News Internet. Retrieved
January 30, 2011, from
www.thaindian.com/.../thai-smuggler-caught-in-indonesia-after-swallowing-1200-ecstasy-pills_100476923.html
Buck, Gary. (2010, May). Validation of PASS Program. Centre for the
Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI). United Kingdom.
Hakim, Danny. (2002, November). Threats and Responses, the “Sleeper”
Suspects; Man Accused of Being Leader of Detroit Terror Cell is
Arrested. New York Times Archival Information. Retrieved January 25,
2011, from
http://ww.nytimes.com/.../threats-responses-sleeper-suspects-man-accused-being-leader-detroit-terror-cell.html
MacVicar, Shiela. (2009, September). Al Qaeda Bombers Learn from
Drug Smugglers. MMIX, CBS Interactive Inc. Retrieved January 25,
2011, from http://www.cbsnews.com/.../main5347847.html
Schiller,Dane. (2010, July). Trafficking suspect held. Houston
Chronicle. Retrieved January 30, 2011, from
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/bizarre/7125994.html
Nader, Ralph. (2010, November). TSA is delivering naked insecurity.
USA Today. Retrieved February 24, 2011, from
http://www.usatoday.com/news/ralphnader/tsadeliveringnakedinsecurity.html
Ngamkham, Wassayos. (2010, December). Iranians top police watch list
for possible drug traffickers. Bangkok Post Chronicle. Retrieved
February 25, 2011, from
http://www.bangkokpost.com/iranians-top-watch-list-for-possible-drug-traffickers.html
George “Bill” Woessner (email: gww2354@yahoo.com)
The author began his career in 1984, as a
Special Agent with the DEA, working interdiction at the Los Angeles
International Airport. He has been involved in criminal interdiction
for over 26 years and not only provided interdiction training in the
U.S. but also in countries throughout the world. Throughout his
career, the author has traveled to over 50 countries and worked with
those country’s law enforcement personnel in a training environment.
The past three years, the author initiated a standardized DEA
international interdiction training program and has conducted
interdiction training in various countries, including Jordan,
Israel, Korea, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Thailand, England, El
Salvador, and Bulgaria to list a few. This interdiction training
relies on utilizing courier characteristics and interviewing to
identify those passengers most likely involved in criminal activity.
Based on the author’s extensive involvement in both working and
teaching interdiction with countries throughout the world, he has
developed an expertise relative to methodology and trends related to
criminal organizations, utilizing interdiction hubs to facilitate
illegal activities.
by Andrew Hawkes, Author of
Secrets of Successful Highway Drug Interdiction
In today’s drug smuggling world, highway drug traffickers are
constantly attempting to think of new an innovative ways to conceal
their contraband from law enforcement. Little do they realize that
the same methods they come up with have been being used for decades
by their predecessors. Through thousands of narcotic interdiction
arrests by skilled interdiction officers all over the country, we
have learned many of these traits and characteristics. Below, I have
outlined ten popular techniques that highway drug traffickers
attempt to use in hopes that they will successfully get their dope
to their destination. By familiarizing yourself with some of these
tips, you too can increase your interdiction success. Keep in mind
you must always have probable cause to stop a vehicle.
1.
MASKING ODORS.
We have all heard of highway drug smugglers attempting to use large
amounts of air fresheners in their vehicles. Not only can you look
at for the famous “Christmas Tree” air fresheners hanging from the
rear view mirror and other places in the vehicle, but you can also
be aware of several other tactics that you may not have picked up on
in the past. For example, do you notice several bottles of cologne
or perfume in the car, and have they recently been sprayed prior or
during your traffic stop of the vehicle? Is there a large bag of
scented pipe tobacco, opened, laying in the vehicle but you notice
the driver is smoking a cigarette? Or maybe you find it odd that as
soon as you stop the car, the driver lights up a cigarette
immediately, filling the car with smoke, but has no desire to roll
down the windows? These are all examples of masking the odor on the
surface of the stop. Masking odors placed directly onto packages of
contraband can include animal urine, cayenne pepper, mustard, animal
blood, oil and just about anything they feel may frighten off a drug
canine or further mask the odor of contraband.
2.
LAW ENFORCEMENT STICKERS AND SLOGANS.
Most officers know that the “State troopers association” stickers
you see on vehicle are mailed to random people and solicit money
that often are not associated with any law enforcement entity. Most
experienced officer’s will also come to determine that most cars
they stop with these stickers do not belong to anyone in law
enforcement. When you stop or see vehicle traveling across many
states with an abundance of these stickers, be aware that they will
often put these stickers all over their vehicles, thinking that we
as officer’s will think they are “Officer Friendly”.
3.
RELIGIOUS PARAPHERNELIA
The same goes for religious bumper stickers, symbols and bibles
strategically placed throughout the vehicle. I once recovered 80
pounds of vacuum-sealed marijuana placed under the carpet of the
vehicle. The driver was traveling down the interstate with the
biggest bible I have ever seen, lying open on the front dashboard of
his rental car.
4.
RENTAL CAR AGREEMENTS/PAPERWORK.
It has been known for years that drug smugglers like to rent
vehicles to transport drugs. There are many reasons for this. Often
the simple fact is that there personal cars are old and not as
dependable as a new rental car. Other reasons include avoiding
seizure of their personal vehicles in the event they are caught and
arrested. Whatever the reason, the rental agreement paper work can
offer several indicators to the investigating officer that could end
up instrumental in establishing reasonable suspicion. Questions to
ask yourself when inspecting this paperwork are:
a. Is the driver of the car listed on the rental agreement?
b. If not, is the person listed on the rental agreement even in the
vehicle?
c. Can the driver give you specific details as to who is on the
rental agreement and his relationship to this person?
d. Does the name listed on the rental agreement show to have a
criminal history?
e. What city and state was the rental car rented in and what
distance is that from where you have the vehicle stopped?
f. What day and time was the rental car rented and how much time has
lapsed since then?
g. What was the mileage listed when the car was rented and how far
has it traveled since then? Is the mileage traveled consistent with
the occupants’ story as to where they have traveled?
Another great tool to use with rental cars can be to contact the
rental agency, identify yourself and explain to them that you have
one of their vehicle pulled over, several states away from where it
was rented, explain that the renter of the car is not in the vehicle
and possible that the people in the vehicle may not even know the
person that rented the car. Often times they will ask you to impound
the car for them so they can pick it up. This gives you, the officer
the opportunity to inventory the contents of the vehicle, thus
discovering any contraband.
5.
SPECIFIC TOOLS USED TO ACCESS WHERE THE DOPE IS HIDDEN.
Many dope smugglers will go to great lengths to conceal their
contraband. What is so funny to the experienced interdiction officer
is that they leave obvious tools needed to retrieve the contraband
in the silliest of places. I can’t recall the last time I stopped an
honest citizen carrying a brand new floor jack and a special tire
tool in the front seat of a new Lincoln town car. I can however,
recall stopping a drug smuggler, with those tools on the front seat
of a new Lincoln that had 160 pounds of marijuana concealed in all
four tires of the vehicle! Look for out of place items that don’t
fit the rest of the surroundings.
6.
MORE THAN ONE CELL PHONE.
Often a drug smuggler will carry multiple cell phones, that all seem
to be ringing at once. The smuggler may have a personal cell phone,
as well as a cell phone given to him from the origin of the load, a
cell phone from the contact near the destination and numerous other
middlemen involved in the drug transaction so that they can all keep
tabs on the location. Look for this as a possible indicator and
question the suspect in detail as to why he has all these phones and
use their answers to build reasonable suspicion.
7.
CONFLICTING STORIES.
A popular subject to that has been taught in interdiction is the
“conflicting stories” that passengers give as to the purpose and
destination of their interstate travel. Developing these conflicting
stories is paramount in your investigation. By getting the suspect’s
to give your intricate details that totally contradict each other
not only is an indicator, but a great tool in reasonable suspicion.
8.
THE DRIVER IMMEDIATELY GETS OUT OF THE VEHICLE.
This is another post stop indicator that can be a sign of dope
trafficking. In this case, the subject is trying to distance himself
from something he wants to hide from you. Keep in mind, this
indicator can be a sign of something less sinister than drug
trafficking, e.g. the subject might be have a weapon in the car, an
open beer, etc.. Either way, there is something in the car he is
hiding. Just as a side note, if you ask the subject if you can
search the car, and he consents but tries to draw you away from
where he doesn’t want you to look, then you know the
contraband is in a different location than the one they want you to
look in. Dead giveaway indicator.
9.
Cars that drive under the speed limit
– here is a very easy pre-stop indicator you can start using
immediately. Drug traffickers are naturally paranoid and their
paranoia will make them do stupid things like drive 10 – 15 miles
under the speed limit. drug haulers generally will stay in the “slow
lane” as well.
10.
OLDER MODEL CARS THAT ARE IN UNUSUALLY GOOD CONDITION.
Often older cars will be used to transport drug loads, however, what
sets them apart is that they have been very well maintained
mechanically, often have new tires on them and have been washed and
cleaned to help blend in with the average citizen’s vehicle.
Keep in mind as you go through this list, an indicator by itself is
not enough to be a sign of drug trafficking. However, by observing
multiple indicators then you can greatly increase your chances of
finding the mother load. I talk more about indicators and reasonable
suspicion in my book, Secrets of Successful Highway Drug
Interdiction. As always, stay safe and happy hunting.
Sergeant Andrew Hawkes is a 17 year law enforcement veteran. He
began working Highway Drug Interdiction full time in 1993.
Sgt. Hawkes has won many awards in Texas for his interdiction
success. He has been an interdiction instructor for police
departments, area police academies and for the U.S. DEA basic
narcotic investigator's school. Sgt. Hawkes has completed
graduate courses in Public Administration and holds a bachelor's
degree in Criminal Justice from Dallas Baptist University.
Sgt. Hawkes latest publication, Secrets of Successful Highway Drug
Interdiction is a "how to" book for the street officer wishing to
develop drug interdiction skills without all the complicated police
jargon and terminology that goes with a lengthy and expensive
training class. Sgt. Hawkes has been featured in The Dallas
Morning News, TNOA Narcotic Officer's Quarterly, many area
newspapers and law enforcement websites. You can visit his website
at
www.highwaydruginterdiction.com
By
John Reid & Associates
To date, the innocence
project has freed in excess of 200 individuals from prison based
on DNA evidence.* These innocent defendants were found guilty of
serious felonies such as murder and rape.* Furthermore, about twenty
percent of them confessed to committing the crime either to the
police during an interrogation, or to a judge as a result of a plea
bargain with the prosecutor.* What causes innocent people to confess
to crimes they did not commit?
The simple answer is that, at the time of the confession, many of
these suspects believed that it was in their best interest to
confess, e.g., escape a death sentence, keep children out of a
foster home, etc.* However, when evaluating individual cases, a
number of specific motivations can be identified.* When evaluating
the trustworthiness of a confession, the investigator, prosecutor
and judge should consider the following motivations for false
confessions.
Tangible Gains
When speaking of the value of the polygraph technique, John Reid
told the following story.* A man from Chicago confessed to a
homicide that occurred in California.* The man was extradited to the
west coast and charged with the killing.* At that point he recanted
his confession, and explained that he was seeking to escape the cold
weather of Illinois.* Of course, no one believed him until Reid was
able to verify his truthfulness through the polygraph technique.*
Other examples of tangible gains that may lead to a false confession
include seeking shelter, food, medical care, and protection (being
hunted by drug lords).* These suspects may come forward and confess
without any interrogation (the so-called voluntary false
confession), or confess after a relatively short and mild
interrogation.* Once their need has been satisfied, they recant the
confession but find that it is much easier to be charged with a
crime than having the charges dropped.
Protecting a loved one
During a new years eve party, a guest was shot in the hosts back
yard.* When the police arrived, the hosts teenage son came forward
and explained that the guest was arguing with his father so the boy
ran into the house, retrieved a shotgun and killed the guest.* The
boy was charged with first degree murder and obtained an attorney.*
Once the boy learned that he would be tried as an adult and face
life in prison, he recanted his confession and explained that it was
his father who actually shot the guest.* A polygraph confirmed the
boys statement, the father was interrogated and confessed.* We have
also experienced the opposite situation, where a parent has
confessed to protect a son or daughter who was involved in criminal
activity.
Low Intelligence / Youthful offenders
In the previous New Years eve killing, the boys father told him that
because he was a teenager he would not go to prison.* It has been
suggested that suspects who are young or have a low IQ may fail to
understand the severity of consequences they face through their
decision to confess.* Consider an analogous situation:* I believe
most adults of average intelligence would pay the IRS a* $200 fine
even though they contest the alleged error on their tax return;
putting an end to the hassle, fear and frustration of dealing with
the IRS is worth $200.* However, I doubt that the same taxpayer
would be willing to spend even a day in jail as punishment for the
contested error.
Suspects under the age of 16 who have had little contact with
police, or suspects who have an IQ under 65 are statistically
abundant in documented false confession cases.* Certainly a
confession coming from this category of suspect should be carefully
scrutinized to make certain that it was obtained in the absence of a
promise of leniency and that the confession contains corroborative
information that originated from the suspect. When investigators are
dealing with these vulnerable suspects, caution should be exercised
to make certain the interrogations are not too lengthy, intense or
psychologically manipulative.
Coercion
Many innocent people will confess to a crime if they are subjected
to sufficient pain or threats of harm (coercion). This concept is
fundamental to common law and, within the judiciary, there is
zero-tolerance when it comes to coercion.* For a confession to be
admissible as evidence, it must be obtained without inflicting or
threatening to inflict any physical harm to the suspect.*
While coercion specifically relates to the suspects physical well
being, there is a related psychological circumstance which may have
an even greater impact on false confessions. Consider* the following
interrogation of an innocent mother in a case involving the death of
her infant child.
Martha, the fact that you can't tell the truth about what you did to
your child tells us you're an unfit mother.* You know what we do
with unfit mothers?* We place their children in foster homes.* Your
children will be placed in foster homes across the country and they
will never see each other again and you will never see them.* That
is what will happen if you don't confess to shaking your child.
When an innocent suspect is convinced that his denials will not
prevent a prison sentence, loss of reputation, or loss of something
else he values, in an effort to reduce or escape those inevitable
consequences, certainly the suspect may be persuaded to confess.*
Under this circumstance, because the suspect is still under the
threat of the consequence, the confession may not be retracted until
the suspect feels it is safe to do so
Duress
The average innocent suspect can answer questions and fend off
persuasive interrogation techniques for many hours without being
tempted, in any way, to confess.* However, when the sessions become
too lengthy, intense or unbearable, the innocent suspect may confess
to terminate the conditions.
Duress describes lengthy questioning, as well as deprivation of
biological needs such as sleep, warmth or food.* Unlike coercion,
duress is considered by the courts on a continuum, in which a number
of different factors are considered.
A homicide confession obtained after a ten hour interrogation from a
mentally competent adult suspect who has waived his Miranda rights
may be considered by most courts as legally admissible.* However, a
burglary confession obtained after a ten hours of interrogation of a
15-year-old suspect who did not have a parent or guardian present
may be suppressed, partially as a result of duress.* When evaluating
the trustworthiness of a confession, it is important to recognize
that some suspects are more susceptible to persuasive interrogation
techniques.
Mental Illness
Following a heinous crime, it is not uncommon for innocent
individuals suffering from mental illness to come forward and
confess.* Some of them are delusional and receive messages to
confess.* Others have lost touch with reality and believe they
committed the crime. Some confess to seek attention or recognition.
Most of these cases involve voluntary confessions (obtained in the
absence of interrogation) which are readily identified as false
because the confession lacks accurate corroboration.*
This motivation presents a greater difficulty when the innocent
suspect with a mental illness initially maintains his innocence, and
confesses after interrogation.** Innocent suspects with anxiety
disorders are more susceptible to duress than the average
population. With some depressive disorders, the individual may
rationalize a false confession by convincing themselves that they
deserve to be punished for some real or imagined past transgression.
The latter group of suspects are aware that they did not commit the
crime at the time of their confession.* These suspects were simply
vulnerable to interrogation tactics that the mentally healthy
suspect can easily resist.* Consequently, mental illness and
cognitive functioning becomes an important factor when considering
duress.
Faulty Memory
Finally, an innocent person may be persuaded to confess if he has no
recollection of his activities at the time of the crime but is
convinced, after learning of evidence of his guilt, that he must
have committed the crime.* This is termed a
coerced internalized
false confession. There is generally a tangible cause for the
suspects memory loss such as intoxication, head trauma, epilepsy or
suffering from multiple personality disorder.
Once convinced of their guilt, these suspects may accept this as the
truth, plead guilty in court and accept their prison sentence.*
Through time, therapy or happenstance, this suspect may question his
guilt.* But, as with the earlier suspect who confessed to obtain a
warmer climate, he discovers that it is very difficult to undo a
plea bargain.
Conclusion
Just because there are many possible motivations for innocent people
to confess does not mean that most confessions are false.* To the
contrary, the average criminal suspect is more than capable of
resisting standard interrogation tactics and a great deal of effort
is required to persuade these individuals to tell the truth.* But
experience and scientific evidence proves that innocent suspects
have confessed.* Furthermore, each of these false confessions
satisfied a particular motivation.* Awareness of these motivations
should assist investigators in selecting appropriate interrogation
techniques for particular suspects and should also assist
prosecutors and judges to identify confessions that may not be true.
With the above discussion in mind, the following represents some
factors to consider in the assessment of the credibility of a
suspects confession.* These issues are certainly not all inclusive,
and each case must be evaluated on the totality of circumstances
surrounding the interrogation and confession, but nevertheless,
these are elements that should be given careful consideration
1. The suspects condition at the time
of the interrogation
a. Physical condition (including
drug and/or alcohol intoxication)
b. Mental capacity
c. Psychological condition
2. The suspects age
3. The suspects prior experience with
law enforcement
4. The suspects understanding of the
language
5. The length of the interrogation
6. The degree of detail provided by
the suspect in his confession
*********
7. The extent of corroboration between
the confession and the crime
8. The presence of witnesses to the
interrogation and confession
9. The suspects behavior during the
interrogation
10. The effort to address the suspects physical needs
11. The presence of any improper interrogation techniques
Credit and Permission Statement: This Investigator Tip was developed
by John E. Reid and Associates Inc. Permission is hereby granted to
those who wish to share or copy the article. For additional 'tips'
visit
www.reid.com;
select 'Educational Information' and 'Investigator Tip'. Inquiries
regarding Investigator Tips should be directed to Janet Finnerty
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For more information regarding Reid seminars and training products,
contact John E. Reid and Associates, Inc. at 800-255-5747 or
www.reid.com.
Reprinted from
WWW.PATC.COM
Firearms and Terry Stops
by Brian S. Batterton, Attorney
PATC Legal & Liability Risk Management Institute (www.llrmi.com)
Questions often arise as to whether the mere
possession of a firearm in public, absent some other illegal
conduct, legally justifies a brief investigatory detention or
Terry Stop. This is not an easy question to answer
because each state is free to interpret their firearms possession
and firearms permit laws as they wish. Typically, if a state views a
firearms permit as an affirmative defense to the state statute that
prohibits unlawful possession of a firearm or concealed weapons,
then the fact that a person possesses a firearm in public is likely
to amount to sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify a brief
investigatory detention to determine if the person possesses a
firearms permit. On the other hand, if a state views the absence of
a permit as an element of the crime of unlawful possession of a
firearm or concealed weapon, then questions arise as to whether mere
possession of a firearm, without some other articulable
manifestations of criminal conduct, will justify an investigatory
detention.
Recently, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
decided the
United States v. Montague [i] , which illustrates the
principals above. In this case, officers in Florida received
information from a local security guard (who was known to provide
reliable information) that Montague was carrying a concealed
firearm. The officers located Montague and conducted a
Terry stop and frisk based on the security guards
information. They located a firearm and ammunition.
Montague was arrested and ultimately charged with
firearms violations under federal law. He filed a motion to suppress
the gun and ammunition and argued that mere possession of a firearm
in public did not provide the officers with sufficient reasonable
suspicion to justify a
Terry stop because it was legal to carry such a weapon
with a permit and the officers did not know if he possessed a permit
prior to detaining and frisking him. The district court denied the
motion to suppress and Montague was convicted. He appealed to the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
The issue before the court of appeals was whether
the
Terry stop and frisk of Montague was reasonable under
the
Fourth Amendment, in light of Florida’s firearms
possession laws.
The court of appeals first noted several rules
that apply to this case. First, they noted
The
Fourth Amendment, however, does not prohibit a police
officer from seizing a suspect for a brief, investigatory stop where
the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the suspect was involved
in, or is about to be involved in, criminal activity. [ii]
Second, the court clarified that
[R]easonable suspicion is a less demanding
standard than probable cause, but requires at least a minimal level
of objective justification for making the stop in light of the
totality of the circumstances. [iii] [internal quotations omitted]
Lastly, the court stated
In connection with a
Terry stop, a police officer who has reason to believe
that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual may also
conduct a reasonable search for weapons in support of his own
protection and that of others, even if he is not absolutely certain
that the individual is armed. An officer may conduct a
Terry pat-down search for weapons on a suspect's person
if the requisite reasonable suspicion is present, and that search
may continue when an officer feels a concealed object that he
reasonably believes may be a weapon. [iv] [Internal citations
omitted]
Thus, when considering the above rules, the court
must resolve whether the officers initially had sufficient
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, particularly the State of
Florida’s concealed weapon statute, to justify the initial
Terry stop and frisk. The court of appeals noted that
Florida’s concealed weapons statute states
A person who carries a concealed firearm on or
about his or her person commits a felony of the third degree. [v]
However, this same statute, in subsection (3)
provides that the prohibition above does not apply “to a person
licensed to carry…a concealed firearm pursuant to the provision of
section 790.06.” [vi] Section 790.06 provides that the concealed
firearm permit must be carried at all times while carrying a
concealed firearm and the permit must be displayed upon the demand
of a law enforcement officer.
The court of appeals then looked at how the
Florida appellate courts interpret the above statutes. Montague
cited
Regalado v. State [vii] , a Florida Fourth District
Court of Appeals case.
Regalado held
Because it is legal to carry a concealed weapon
in Florida, if one has a permit to do so, and no information of
suspicious criminal activity was provided to the officer other than
appellant's possession of a gun, the mere possession of a weapon,
without more, cannot justify a
Terry stop. [viii]
The prosecution cited first to the
State v. Navarro [ix] and stated
The en banc Florida Third District Court of
Appeal, while not explicitly addressing the possibility of a
concealed weapons permit, found that probable cause existed to pat
down and search a defendant where the officer observed the bulge of
what appeared to be a concealed firearm protruding from the
defendant's jacket. The court adopted the dissenting opinion from
the panel decision, holding that the "officers' observation of the
outline of a firearm amounted to probable cause to believe that [the
defendant] was carrying a concealed weapon… [x]
Further, the Eleventh Circuit noted that, in
State v. Burgos [xi] , the Florida Fifth District Court
of Appeal held
[T]hat a suspect's admission that he was carrying
a weapon supported a reasonable suspicion that he was committing a
crime because [a]lthough some citizens do have the right to carry
concealed firearms lawfully, the vast majority do not. [xii]
[internal quotations omitted]
After the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
examined the above cases from the Florida Third, Fourth, and Fifth
District Courts of Appeal, they noted that the incident in
Montague took place in the Third District. Further, in
Florida,
[I]n the absence of interdistrict conflict,
district court decisions bind all Florida trial courts" unless and
until they are overruled by the Florida Supreme Court. [I]f the
district court of the district in which the trial court is located
has decided the issue, the trial court is bound to follow it.
Contrarily, as between District Courts of Appeal, a sister
district's opinion is merely persuasive. [xiii]
Thus, since the incident in Montague took place
in the Third District, the Eleventh Circuit must follow the
precedent from that District. The other cases are considered
“persuasive” but are not binding on the Third District.
As such, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held
Under the facts of this case, the officers did
not need to ascertain whether Montague had a permit before they
conducted a
Terry stop and search because they had reasonable
suspicion that he was carrying a concealed weapon based on a
reliable informant's tip that Montague was carrying a gun. [xiv]
________________________
NOTE: Court holdings can vary significantly between
jurisdictions. As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a
local prosecutor or legal advisor regarding questions on specific
cases. This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a
specific case.
CITATIONS:
[i] No. 10-15693, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16983
(11th Cir. Decided August 15, 2011 Unpub.)
[ii]
Id. at 2-3 (citing
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968))
[iii]
Id. at 3 (quoting State v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1186
(11th Cir. 2011))
[iv]
Id. (citing
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27;
United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743-44 (11th Cir.
2007))
[v]
Id. at 4 (quoting
Fla. Stat. § 790.01 (2) (2006))
[vi]
Id. (quoting
Fla. Stat. § 790.01 (3) (2006))
[vii] 25 So. 3d 600 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)
[viii]
Id. at 5 (citing Regalado, 25 So.3d at 601)
[ix] 464 So.2d 137, 139-40 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1985)
[x]
Id. at 5-6 (citing
Navarro, 464 So.2d at 139)(see also fn 3 – “The wording
of
Fla. Stat. § 790.01 was different at the time Navarro
was decided, but, like the current statute, it provided that a
person carrying a concealed firearm was guilty of a felony in the
third degree and separately stated that this provision did not apply
to individuals with a license to carry concealed firearms.”)
[xi] 994 So.2d 1212 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)
[xii]
Id. at 6 (citing
Burgos, 994 So.2d at 1214)
[xiii]
Id. at 6-7 (quoting
Pardo v. State, 596 So.2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1992))
[xiv]
Id. at 7
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