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line-small.gif (227 bytes)     January 2008

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By Andrew Hawkes, Author of "Secrets of Successful Highway Drug Interdiction"

1.  Focusing on violations and not indicators - unsuccessful highway drug interdiction officers habitually focus on violations instead of indicators. I've personally seen these officers stare at their radar while indicator after indicator passes them by on the highway.  Stop obsessing over violations and educate yourself on indicators and you will greatly increase your chances of finding the mother load.

2.  Waste valuable time arresting a suspect for minor violations - another common habit that I've noticed among unsuccessful interdiction officers is booking suspects for small amounts dope.  Just remember when you are booking a suspect for an ounce of marijuana, hundreds of pounds of dope are passing through your jurisdiction.  If you can't let a suspect go for a misdemeanor drug offense then highway drug interdiction is not for you.

3.  Unable to establish a rapport with the suspect - a common habit among unsuccessful interdiction officers is the inability to start "small talk."  These officers rush right into the interview which can make the suspect put up his guard. Instantly putting the suspect on guard can lead to consent refusals and can cause you to misread body language.  Be courteous, respectful and establish rapport with every suspect you come in contact with and you will greatly increase your success rate in highway drug interdiction.

4.  Fail to establish proper vehicle search patterns - another common habit among highway drug interdiction officers is erratic vehicle search patterns. By not having a consistent search pattern, these officers waste a lot of time looking for dope and will even overlook compartments where dope is commonly hidden.

5.  Easily Discouraged - another habit that is very common among interdiction officers is being easily discouraged after searching a vehicle and not finding any dope.  When this happens the unsuccessful officer will go get something to eat or just stop looking for indicators all together.  Remember, you must be relentless in your pursuit. If you don't find any dope, don't get discouraged.  Immediately get back to your spot and continue looking for indicators. 

6.  Fail to notice an "Attitude" refusal - a common habit among unsuccessful officers is the inability to recognize an "attitude" refusal. Theses officers habitually mistake "attitude" refusals for "dope" refusals and end up wasting a lot of time searching for dope that just isn't there.

7.  Too relaxed in officer safety - as we all know, officer safety is paramount when you are on the highway searching for narcotics.  A deadly habit that I've observed among many officers is becoming too lax or relaxed when it comes to officer safety. We've all let our guard down at one point or another.  Remember, be vigilant and always protect yourself.

Sergeant Andrew Hawkes is a 17 year law enforcement veteran. He began working Highway Drug Interdiction full time in 1993.  Sgt. Hawkes has won many awards in Texas for his interdiction success.  He has been an interdiction instructor for police departments, area police academies and for the U.S. DEA basic narcotic investigator's school.  Sgt. Hawkes has completed graduate courses in Public Administration and holds a bachelor's degree in Criminal Justice from Dallas Baptist University.  Sgt. Hawkes latest publication, Secrets of Successful Highway Drug Interdiction is a "how to" book for the street officer wishing to develop drug interdiction skills without all the complicated police jargon and terminology that goes with a lengthy and expensive training class.  Sgt. Hawkes has been featured in The Dallas Morning News, TNOA Narcotic Officer's Quarterly, many area newspapers and law enforcement websites. You can visit his website at www.highwaydruginterdiction.com
 

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by Paul J. Mendofik
PATC

Beslan, Russia September 1-3, 2004.

One of the most horrific acts of School Violence seen by the world in modern times:

A trained group of Chechen separatists, armed with explosives and other weapons took control of the Beslan School corralling over 1,000 children and adults. This act of Terrorism cost the lives of more than 300 children and left countless secondary victims and others living with the emotional memory.

Over the three days of the stand-off people were tortured, murdered and raped. They were deprived of food and because of the oppressive heat, drank their own urine to quench their insatiable thirst.

When an explosive device unintentionally detonated, the Terrorists believed an assault had taken place. They began killing more of their captives. Russian Special Forces took intervening action and for hours, engaged in a firefight that displayed the untold sacrifices and forfeiture of Warrior lives to save as many of the children as possible.

Living the Spetsnaz credo,"If not me, then who?", some forfeited their life.

Thanks to John Giduck (www.antiterrorism.org) we have as factual an account of this tragedy as can be publicly released.

Platte Canyon High School, Bailey Colorado, September 28, 2006.

Duane Morrison, 53 years of age, enters Platte Canyon High School in Bailey, Colorado. Dressed in a hooded sweat-shirt and jeans he proceeds through the school with purpose. An alert student goes to the administrative office and warns of this individual who "does not seem like he belongs here". Upon entering Room 206 he displays a handgun and orders all males to exit the room. When one male refuses, he points the weapons in his direction and states he will kill him if he refuses. After the male departs, the female teacher refuses to leave when instructed to do so. Morrison fires a shot into the ceiling to demonstrate his resolve. The female teacher departs and rushes to alert the administrative office.

Law enforcement responders arrive within minutes only to be confronted by Morrison using several of the female students as human shields. A stand-off begins as additional resources begin to arrive. In total, nearly 300 personnel will be on scene to aid the Park County Sheriffs Office.

Over the next four hours, he will sexually assault a number of the six, 16 and 17 year old hostages. As negotiations play out, four of the girls will be released. Morrison will also claim he has explosives with him and he will detect the sounds of special units trying to obtain a tactical advantage and intelligence.

As a deadline approaches and a rescue-entry plan is made the officers outside of the room report screams coming from the remaining females. The rescue-entry order is given and multiple entries occur simultaneously.

During the ensuing exchange of fire Morrison fatally wounds seventeen year old Emily Keyes before he is killed by law enforcement.

A community is experiencing a tragedy. The students, faculty and support staffs are in shock. The assembled parents and loved ones are both relieved and in mourning.

Midland, MI March 7, 2007

She had been dropped off at school that morning by her mother who was still in the parking area as her 17 year old daughter entered the school. Her 17 year old boyfriend was not allowed to enter the school. As he tried to do so, he was turned away by alert school officials.

Outside, in the parking lot, he would call her cell phone convincing her to exit the safety of the school. As she approached, her mother would watch in bewilderment. The teen would pull a handgun from his backpack, shooting the girl four times before taking his own life. Her mother would make a valiant intervention effort to save her daughters life by driving her car between the two. The female victim would survive.

Foss High School, Tacoma Washington, January 3, 2007

Shortly after returning to school from Christmas break a seventeen year old is shot in the hallway after winter break.

Weston, WI September 29, 2006

A disgruntled young 15 year old would come into the Weston High School armed with a shotgun. Realizing the danger to the student body, Principal John Klang puts his life at risk to intervene. As he tried to disarm the 15 year old, he would be killed by the shotgun blast. Others would overpower and disarmed him prior to the law enforcement response.

Tampa Florida, May 21, 2006

Two Saudi men board a school bus, raising suspicion and response by various law enforcement authorities including the FBI.

Another time, in Hoboken New Jersey, a 48 year old school administrator is killed by a man who mistakenly believed his wife was having an affair with him.

These are only a few illustrations of the more than four-hundred deaths which have occurred in schools in the United States and school related Terrorism occurring in other countries. While these domestic incidents are a statistically snapshot of events recorded by the National School Safety Center (www.nssc1.org) since 1992, they illustrate a lethal threat that continues to face us. Truly the likelihood of such an event is minimal but the consequences are catastrophic. Who wants to be the School Administrator, law enforcement head or government official that has to acknowledge, "It happened here."

Who are these persons who take lives in and around our schools? There have been events that have involved adults, juveniles, males and females. Some have been staff, others have been community members. Some have been students and some have been gang members. The most notorious attackers have been connected with the targeted school and frequently are students.

Examining the attacker information we find the predominant student characteristic to be a white male, 14-17 years of age, family living above the poverty line, suburban school district. He is often of low self-esteem, has a close circle of friends whom he narcissistically manipulates to enhance his ego and aid him in bringing his aggressive plans to fruition. He is likely not to be involved in "team" functions (i.e.: sports; band) or community volunteer activities. He has likely experienced bullying and becomes resentful of the "haves"... have stuff and have attention.

The victims of such carnage are both male and female. Pertaining to student victims, we find no gender predominance. Frequently, Administrators (principals, vice-principals) are either targeted or attempt to intervene. When this occurs, the predominant victim gender is male. Faculty also becomes subjected to the violence of these offenders. The predominant faculty gender is female.

There is statistical gender predominance in school administration and faculty. This may account for some of the victim data. Also a phenomenon associated with nurturing and intervention may place faculty at greater risk as they take action to diffuse an event.

Weapons can be configured from anything. The school attacker may utilize an edged weapon, blunt object or other instrument. However, he is most likely to utilize a firearm - their preference being a handgun or a shotgun. The shotgun of choice is a 12 gauge pump-action model. Explosives may be used as a threat but are rarely a reality... at this time.

Human behavior is often predictable and based on learned outcomes resulting from actions taken. Some have dubbed it "criminal profiling" others have called it invasions of privacy. But patterns of action are often the result of positive stimuli (rewards) that foster repeat behavior or reinforcement of motivation to enhance the behavior ("pushing the envelope"). It can have a positive or negative impact on the affected individuals in that sphere.

The FBI, the U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Department of Education have taken a proactive step in trying to identify the potential school attacker. There are a number of behavioral characteristics common among offenders but patterns are not sufficient to determine a "profile".

The research also indicates a number of myths exist pertaining to those who would carry out such acts. The uninformed will often miss indicators or signs. In most of the attacks, there have been plans and others have been aware of pending overt acts. In western culture there exists a society where entertainment sources script us to believe forensic evidence solves homicides in an hour and special weapons abound to neutralize threats in minutes. These school violence events rarely last longer than fifteen minutes once they begin. It is more likely a School Resource Officer (SRO) or the first available law enforcement officers are going to be engaging the threats.

When we are trained and aware, proactive intervening action can be a significant step in reducing the casualties. Establish a survival philosophy to enhance your capability to assess the level of threat and what defensive actions are required. Get serious about emergency planning. Follow the guidelines of multi-hazard crisis plans promulgated by the U.S. Department of Education. Train like it is for real because it just might be someday. Don't let yourself be an ostrich and say it will not happen here. It has happened more than four-hundred times in fifteen years. Stay current and revise or update plans and protocols.

How physically secure is your facility? Because planning is usually involved, overt deterrent means can send a message to the attacker that success may not be possible. Features such as keeping doors locked, except through limited entry points. Any open access area must be monitored by someone. That individual needs the authority to mandate identification and compliance with movement within. Without a means to announce an alarm for non-compliance, their responsibility is usurped. These entry points will be further enhanced if aided by electronic monitoring. Even if an intruder fails to comply with access controls, the recorded entry image will aid greatly in verifying the legitimacy of that persons access.

Other physical features will aid emergency responders as well. In conjunction with proper authority develop a numbering system for doors, windows, basement's and roof portals. Jointly examine the dynamics of after hour's events, such as social functions and sporting events. Pre-designate staging areas and approach routes.

Evacuation and assembly areas are frequently assigned based on convenience more than crisis considerations. If your plan has not taken into consideration the differences between a fire event, hazardous device event, armed intruder event or weather event then your planning may not be adequate. It is difficult to establish multiple evacuation/assembly protocols so partner up with your appropriate emergency responder. You may be able to establish one or two protocols that will meet most of your crisis reasons to evacuate. Remember, various factors effect who may be executing your evacuation signal. So, use the K.I.S.S. principle... Keep It Short and Simple.

Lastly we have to build confidence sufficient to allow for flexibility. These situations do change. They are dynamic. A plan is the predicted to be the most effective way to address the crisis but, an unknown may be thrown into the mix. People need to realize that and feel confident enough that they can make a decision and have the commitment to act upon that.

If we have believe this crisis can come to our school, then we will desire to be prepared. If we desire to be prepared, we will train and learn effective strategies to intervene or mitigate the event. So when we train and learn, we will contribute to reducing the likelihood that such events happen where we are. Because, "If not me, then who."

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By John E. Reid and Associates

For a confession to be admissible as evidence it must not only be trustworthy, but also voluntary.  The test of voluntariness answers the question, “was a statement made of the suspect’s free will?” The concept of “free will” has a somewhat different meaning in law than it does in psychology.  A psychologist would argue that if a person is able to make any behavioral choice he is operating from his own free will.  Legally, however, the concept of free will relates to whether a statement was made in the absence of threats or other inducements.  These “other inducements” generally refer to promises of leniency.

Promises of leniency occur on a continuum ranging from statements that clearly offer a lesser sentence, “If you confess, I will make sure you don’t do hard time,” to statements that merely imply leniency in exchange for a confession, e.g., “I want to help you out on this thing.”  The Canadian Supreme Court has established a quid pro quo guideline in evaluating promises of leniency.  In other words, only statements that clearly offer the suspect leniency in exchange for a confession are prohibited.[1]  The U.S. Supreme Court will consider even implied promises of leniency as part of the totality of circumstances in determining a confession’s admissibility.

The courts’ concern over promises of leniency is that an innocent suspect who is caught in a web of circumstantial evidence may decide to falsely confess to avoid a more significant punishment.  There is no doubt that decreasing consequences is a tremendously powerful inducement to confess.  An example of this occurs on rare occasions when we are permitted to interrogate suspects on behalf of a defense attorney. Because we are operating under privileged communication, anything the suspect tells us cannot be used against him in a court of law.  Once we mention this during the interrogation, almost all of these suspects confess within a short period of time.

What is not established is that promises of leniency cause false confessions.  An attempt has been made to address this question through laboratory studies, [2] but there is no empirical or statistical data that supports the premise that in real life interrogations promises of leniency increase the prevalence of false confessions. Our belief is that a promise of leniency, in and of itself, would not be likely to cause an innocent person to confess. On the other hand, when a promise of leniency is coupled with a threat of more significant consequences, we believe there may be a significant risk of a false confession.

Even the courts seem to acknowledge that a promise of leniency, if made under proper circumstances, is permissible.  For example, it is a common practice for a prosecutor to offer a plea bargain to a defendant.  Under this arrangement, the defendant agrees to plead guilty in exchange for leniency.  The leniency may involve reducing the number of criminal charges against the defendant, decreasing the charge e.g., rape to battery, or a lesser sentence, e.g., life in prison vs. execution.  To guard against innocent suspects entering into this agreement, courts generally require that the defendant confess details of his crime during the hearing.

Seeing the ease at which prosecutors obtain confessions by offering defendants plea bargains has caused some investigators to try the same tactic during an interrogation, e.g., “Joe, you can avoid a first degree murder charge if you tell me that you didn’t plan this out.”[3] The investigator is then bewildered when the court suppresses the defendant’s confession.  The rule of law is very simple: An investigator cannot offer the suspect a promise he cannot keep.  Our criminal justice system affords prosecutors and investigators different powers in the effort to obtain evidence against a defendant.  Prosecutors alone have the authority to make charging decisions and sentencing recommendations.  Even if the investigator is best friends with the prosecutor and is almost certain that the prosecutor will go along with the suggested leniency, the promise is still  impermissible because the investigator does not have the legal authority to offer it.

In an attempt to get around this legal technicality, investigators have made statements designed to allow the suspect to perceive possible leniency in exchange for a confession.  Especially when an interrogator repeatedly mentions implied leniency, a court may suppress the confession.[4]  Examples of statements that courts have ruled communicate an implied promise of leniency include:

            “The best thing you can do is to confess.”

            “It would be far better for you if you tell the truth.”

            “I want to help you out on this thing.”

            “I want to be an advocate for you on this matter.”

            “It will go worse for you if you don’t confess.”

On the other hand, courts have not objected to interrogation techniques designed to reduce the perceived moral seriousness of a crime.  Some of these permissible techniques include expressing understanding toward the suspect’s decision to commit the crime, e.g., “Joe I can understand why this thing happened”; referring to the crime with soft language, e.g., causing the death vs. murder; avoiding any mention of possible consequences the suspect faces if he confesses.  Similarly, courts have not objected to the phrase, “I want to get something working on your side” or, “I want to work with you to get this matter straightened out.”

Furthermore, there are unique circumstances where investigators can legally make a promise to a suspect because the investigator has the authority to keep the promise.  For example, in a correctional setting, an inmate may be promised certain privileges in exchange for truthful information.  A corporate investigator may be able to promise an employee that he will not be prosecuted.  Under this principle a police officer could make the following statement:

“Joe, I’m not going to arrest you tonight. You can go home and put your personal affairs in order and you can tell your wife whatever you want. Tomorrow morning I will stop by your house and I’ll take you into custody at that time.”

This exception, of course, is only true if the investigator keeps his promise, e.g., provides the inmate with privileges; does not prosecute the employee; allows the suspect to leave following the interrogation.

Applying the same principle, we believe the following statements are each permissible during an interrogation because the investigator is able to keep the promise:

            “I’m not going to call up your wife and tell her that you are some sort of monster.”

            “I’m not going to announce this to your co-workers or post it on the bulletin board.”

“I will include in my report that you were cooperative and that this is the first time you’ve done something like this.”

Promises of leniency are often introduced during an interrogation when the suspect asks the investigator, “What would happen to me if I told you I did this?”  The following response in no way implies leniency and satisfies most suspects:

“Jim, I don’t have the authority to tell you and I’m not going to lie to you and say that I do.  My job is to collect and analyze evidence.  After that I just turn in my report and let other people act on my findings.  I would like to be able to include your explanation in my report, which is why I am talking to you now.”

If the investigator slips up and finds himself making a statement that may be perceived as an implied promise of leniency, often the damage can be repaired by making a prophylactic statement, essentially setting the suspect straight by telling the suspect that the investigator does not have control over the consequences the suspect may face.

In conclusion, especially with the increased practice of electronically recording interrogations, investigators need to be very cautious not to make statements that may be construed as direct or implied promises of leniency. It is our general recommendation not to bring up the criminal justice system at all during an interrogation.  An investigator can conduct a very effective interrogation without mentioning possible criminal charges, how the prosecutor, judge or jury may perceive the suspect’s crime or possible consequences for the suspect’s actions such as substance abuse treatment, probation, counseling, community service, etc.  Courts will be favorably impressed to hear the investigator tell a suspect, “I cannot offer any promises about what will happen to you if you tell me the truth.”

 

 

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